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Executive Summary
This paper examines the role of social health insurance in four European countries:
Germany, Switzerland, France and the Netherlands. It attempts to elucidate the
organisational structure, regulation and management of the social insurance schemes, as
well as the relationships between the insurers, providers and consumers in the various
countries with the aim of uncovering some of the inherent strengths, weaknesses and trade-
offs which exist within social insurance systems. The main discussion points and
conclusions from each chapter are listed below.
Chapter 1: Introduction
Social health insurance systems share a number of features, although all are not strictly
necessary for the system to be described as such:
•  Insured persons pay a regular contribution to a health insurance fund based usually on
income rather than reflecting their risk of illness.
•  Clinical need and not ability to pay determine access to treatments and health care.
•  Contributions to the social insurance fund are kept separate from other government
mandated taxes and charges.
•  Both employers and employees pay contributions.
•  Government support for those who are unable to pay goes through the insurance fund.
•  There may be more than one social health insurance fund and some choice may be
available to citizens.
•  Patients have at least some choice in the doctor and other health care providers they
use.
•  Social health insurance is compulsory for at least some categories of citizens.
•  A basic package of health care benefits is defined which may or may not vary across
funds.
•  Health insurance funds may not turn away applicants for membership.
Services are often delivered by a mix of public and private providers. It is common for
contracts to be negotiated between all social health insurance funds together and
associations of providers. Because there is no risk-rating (to prevent preferred risk selection
and create solidarity), there is usually some sort of system to transfer risk-adjusted funds
between insurance companies, so that all insurers can compete. The risk-adjustment
mechanism, and the regulation of competition and choice are however complex and
expensive and increased diversity can increase inequality. Transaction costs may be high in
social insurance systems, especially where there are complex contracting arrangements with
competition and choice.
Typically people appear to be most satisfied with social insurance based systems compared
to tax funded and private insurance systems. Social insurance systems are often associated
with higher levels of funding and the hypothecation of funds makes the system transparent.
The problems of the system relate to cost escalation, the excessive reliance on payroll
contributions and high transaction and management costs.
Chapter 2: Germany
Associations of providers (physicians and dentists, but not hospitals who contract
individually, although this is expected to change in 2000) and associations of autonomous
sickness funds represent the statutory health insurance system at the corporatist level whereSocial Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 8
negotiations take place. The system is highly decentralised with a mix of private and public
providers and insurers.
Social insurance is regulated by the Social Code Book which is amended by reform laws and
regulates:
•  Mandatory and voluntary membership in sickness funds,
•  The contents of sickness funds’ benefit package,
•  The scope of negotiations between sickness funds and providers,
•  Risk compensation between funds, and
•  The organisational structure of sickness funds and their associations.
The physicians’ associations obtain a total prospectively negotiated budget from the
sickness funds (negotiated as a capitation per member or per insured person) which they
then distribute among their members according to a ‘Uniform Value Scale’. This lists all
services provided by physicians for remuneration within the health insurance system.
There are around 450 sickness funds and membership is compulsory, except for an ‘opt out’
scheme for higher income persons. Contributions are based on income with a 50-50
contribution from employer and employee. There is free choice of sickness fund and
members may change on a yearly basis. Members receive benefits in kind, cash benefits
and health promotion and family members and dependants are also covered. A relatively
crude compensation scheme exists between sickness funds to equalise risk structures due
to differences in contribution rates (from varying income levels). This is calculated
retrospectively from expenditure data.
Privately insured patients usually enjoy better benefits than those covered by statutory
health insurance but they generally have to pay providers directly and claim reimbursement.
Premiums are risk-rated and separate premiums have to be paid for spouses or children. For
those that ‘opt out’, re-entry into statutory sickness funds is not permitted. Supplementary
insurance which covers extra amenities in hospital is a growing market for private health
insurers, since sickness funds are not allowed to offer such policies.
Because sickness funds have to offer the same benefits for a similar contribution rate and
the range of providers is the same since they are contracted collectively, there is not much
competition between sickness funds, although selective contracting is increasing. The
problem is to try and maintain a system of equal access.
There is no gate-keeping system in Germany and patients can select any sickness fund
affiliated doctor or specialist of their choice. There is a problem of separation between
ambulatory care and inpatient care which potentially creates a duplication of services.
Taxes and out-of-pocket payments (which occur mostly for pharmaceuticals) are two other
major sources of finance.
Dual financing exists for hospitals where capital costs are financed through individual states
and general running costs through sickness funds. Hospitals are reimbursed through
prospective case and procedure fees and per diem charges. If the hospital has been
reimbursed above the target budget then it has to pay back a certain part of the income.
Sickness funds do not have fixed budgets but have to cover all expenses which means that
contribution rates have to be adjusted if income is lower than expenditure. All budgets are on
the providers’ side and not the payers’ side.Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 9
Reference prices have been established for pharmaceuticals to establish an upper limit for
the costs that are reimbursable by sickness funds.
Cost containment has been the main theme of health care reforms in Germany. Current
issues however revolve not around expenditure problems as much but financing problems,
since increasing unemployment has caused shrinking financial flows to the social insurance
system.
Chapter 3: Switzerland
The health care system is characterised by liberalism with little state intervention although
the regulatory powers of federal government have increased considerably. The health
insurance system is relatively decentralised and cantons play a large role in the provision
and regulation of health care. Most changes in the system entered into force in 1996 with the
health insurance law when the statutory health insurance system became compulsory.
There are just over 100 insurance companies offering compulsory insurance. They can also
offer supplementary insurance which covers additional benefits such as free choice of
hospital doctor and superior accommodation. The insurance companies must accept all
applicants and offer the same package of benefits. The premiums are community-rated (the
same for each person with a particular company within a canton) whereas supplementary
health insurance premiums are risk-rated. Patients have freedom of choice of provider and
insurer and can change their health insurance company twice a year.
All insurance companies are members of the Association of Swiss Health Insurance
Companies and are in turn monitored by the Federal Office for Social Insurance. Doctors are
organised into cantonal medical associations which negotiate fee levels with cantonal
associations of health insurance companies. Public and publicly subsidised hospitals are
also organised into associations which negotiate fees with the health insurance companies.
Providers are financed by payments from insurance companies or by direct payments from
patients. Federal and cantonal subsidies from tax revenues are used to fund hospital capital
costs and some of the running costs. Insurance companies usually pay hospitals per diems
and higher per diem rates for supplementary insurance. Payments based on a Swiss version
of Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) are also being implemented in some cantons. Cantons
can also impose global budgets for public and publicly subsidised hospitals. Longer stay
inpatient care receives federal subsidies which creates an inefficient incentive for insurance
providers to favour this treatment since some of the costs are borne by the state.
Services in the ambulatory, outpatient and short-stay inpatient hospital sector are paid under
fee-for-service using a Relative Value Scale similar to that in Germany. Negotiations then
take place in each canton about the price to assign to the nationally agreed fee schedule
and can therefore differ between cantons. Hospital doctors receive a salary and Health
Maintenance Organisation (HMO) style insurance models are increasing.
An organisation called Foundation 18 is responsible for meeting the financial obligations of
insurance companies in financial difficulty and for the risk adjustment between the insurance
companies (making the transfer). The risk-adjustment formula is broadly based on age and
sex.
There is no premium fixing by the state, and because of the defined compulsory package of
health care benefits, insurance companies compete on the level of the premium as people
change insurance companies depending on the premiums offered.Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 10
The cantons subsidise compulsory health insurance premiums through tax-financed
allocations to reduce the impact of per capita premiums. These subsidies are targeted
according to the income of the insured person and can either be phased out at a defined
upper limit of income, or used to subsidise individuals or families so that the premiums do
not exceed a certain percentage of their total income. For people on very low incomes, the
entire premium is paid by the canton.
Aside from the tax subsidies, co-payments and out-of-pocket payments are a major source
of financing. Most insurance companies require that people pay a fixed part of the costs in
the form of a deductible. Insurance companies are allowed to offer lower premiums for
higher deductible rates. There is also a 10 percent co-insurance on all services (whether one
item or an episode of care) which has to be paid by patients in the form of a direct payment.
The Federal Department of Home Affairs decides which pharmaceutical products are
covered by compulsory health insurance and what price they should be.
Chapter 4: The Netherlands
1987 ushered in some new radical reforms for the Netherlands under the Dekker proposals
towards regulated competition. They included a uniform national health insurance scheme
and the integration of health care and social services under the scheme with all financing
channelled through a single system. In 1995 the new government announced a change from
one to two regulatory regimes. For non-catastrophic risks the regulatory regime would follow
the Dekker model of regulated competition among insurers and providers to contain costs
and improve efficiency. For catastrophic risks (long-term institutional care) there would be
direct government regulation.
Everyone is therefore compulsorily covered for catastrophic health care expenditure under
the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ) with income-related contributions and
additions from employers. Patients have to make a small flat rate payment towards their cost
of care.
Those on an annual income below a certain level are also compulsorily insured under the
Health Insurance Act (ZFW) for normal non-catastrophic medical risks. Supplementary
insurance is also available for higher standards of hospital accommodation. There are about
30 sickness funds and members are charged both an income-related contribution (with
additions from employers) and a flat rate premium. Insurers have to quote the same flat rate
to all their members.
Insurers’ revenues consist of the flat rate premium and a risk-adjusted per capita payment
which they receive from the Central Sickness Fund (contributions for AWBZ and ZFW are
paid into the Central Sickness Fund). Sickness funds receive partially risk-adjusted
capitation payments based on age, gender, region and disability. The sickness funds are
responsible for only a small fraction of the difference between their actual and predicted
expenses based on these factors (age, gender, region and disability) and the rest is
retrospectively reimbursed. The difference between the actual costs and the risk-adjusted
payment will not be the same for all insurers and will be reflected in the flat rate premium
that competing insurers quote which is one of the main sources of competition between
insurers. It is intended that sickness funds will have increasing financial responsibility for the
difference between their actual and predicted expenditures (based age, gender, region and
disability), and that this will drive premium competition and increased managed care
activities.Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 11
To obtain benefits, individuals must register with a local sickness fund and a GP (who acts
as gate-keeper) with whom the sickness fund has a contract. Enrolment with sickness funds
is open (at least every two years). People may therefore choose a contract which offers the
free choice of provider, while others may offer a limited provider plan with a lower premium.
ZFW provides for a system of benefits in kind. Sickness funds may selectively contract with
health care providers and make direct reimbursements to providers.
People with an income above a certain level can opt out of the ZFW and take out private
insurance with one of 40 private insurers. Privately insured patients pay providers (usually
on a fee-for-service basis) and then seek reimbursement. Private health insurance
companies are also increasingly regulated with the introduction of compulsory health
insurance for all persons not in sickness funds, open enrolment requirements and premium
regulation involving a minimum and maximum premium with premiums below cost for
persons over 65. This imposes social insurance conditions on private insurers and increases
the financial risk of private insurers, especially for expenditures of persons over 65.
Supplementary insurance is financed by risk-rated premiums which also vary according to
the level of deductible chosen and the level of hospital accommodation chosen.
Hospitals receive prospective global budgets. The sickness funds pay GPs by capitation for
their members. They pay specialists for each patient referred to them by a GP. Specialists
are also paid a fee-for-service for a number of procedures. About half of hospital specialists
are salaried. The fees and capitation payments are negotiated between representatives of
physicians and insurers, the Central Agency on Health Care Tariffs and the government.
Pharmaceutical coverage falls under the AWBZ.
Chapter 5: France
The French health care system is based on a national universal compulsory insurance
system linked to employment and financed by employers and employees (roughly in a 65-35
proportion). Membership to a fund is according to occupation and the schemes also cover
spouses and dependants. The funds cover pensions, family benefits and medical care
(Assurance maladie). The sickness funds do not compete since they are organised along
strictly occupational lines. The contribution rates are fixed so that they are the same for all
individuals and employers within a fund, but vary between funds. Contribution rates are fixed
by negotiation between the state, representatives of employers and employees and the
sickness funds.
The social security system forms no part of the national budget, but even though the
government provides little direct money, it in effect underwrites the financial stability of the
system.
The funds have to be self-supporting (they do not have reserves to prevent deficits), but
compensation exists between funds (risk-sharing) in accordance with the principle of the
number of beneficiaries per contributor. This in effect means that one large fund, the Régime
Général which covers 80 percent of the population, supports the other smaller funds.
Patients pay the provider directly and are reimbursed, mostly only partially due to cost-
sharing by patients. The state pays co-payments for those whose income falls below a
certain level. A large proportion of the population are also members of voluntary,
supplementary sickness funds (around 6500 mutuelles) or purchase private health insurance
through the 80 commercial insurance companies. They charge a flat rate or a proportion of
earnings and mostly cover co-payments.Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 12
There is total freedom for people to choose private and public health care services without a
referral system although in 80 percent of cases GPs are the first contact. Doctors are paid a
fee-for-service and can choose to abide by the negotiated fee schedule (in exchange for
pension packages and personal health insurance) or set their own fees. This has helped
contain the increases in fees, but also had an undesirable effect from an equity point of view.
RMOs (treatment guidelines) have been introduced to try and rationalise health care
provision and medical records (in the form of a small booklet carried by patients) have been
introduced to try and limit redundant prescriptions.
Public hospitals are financed according to global budgets, while private hospitals are still
paid on a per diem basis. Staff in public hospitals are salaried. For hospital care, the patient
pays a lump sum co-payment which is not reimbursed and the insurance schemes
reimburse the hospital directly. Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) have been set up and are
expected to contribute to the harmonisation of methods of payment between public and
private hospitals.
Several planning instruments have been used to rationalise the number of hospital beds and
expensive medical equipment and regulate the regional distribution of such services.
Pharmaceutical expenditure is higher than most other European countries. Generic product
use is very low and because of complementary insurance, the impact of co-payment is
diluted and doctors and patients are desensitised to the cost of medicines. As a result
reimbursement rates have been reduced and price and volume agreements have been
introduced.
Most reforms have sought to increase revenues to the social security system from new
sources, to complement payroll contributions. Any measures which affect the degree of
public financing of health care are usually strongly opposed. French public opinion is hostile
to subsidising health care from general taxation and the public is strongly attached to the
notion of an independent social security system. Ear-marked payroll deductions for health
are seen as contributions rather than taxes and are the preferred way of financing health
care.
1995 saw the introduction of the Juppé Plan in France, a comprehensive programme of
reforms which included some emergency measures to cover social security deficits and
longer term reforms to the health care system. These included a progressive widening of
finance sources (including a switch from payroll contributions to general tax revenue) and
cost control strategies. In addition, it created greater state involvement in the general
management of the health care system.
Chapter 6: Conclusions
Most countries in this paper face a similar set of urgent problems. The growth in demand,
due to the ageing population, improvements in medical technology and real income growth is
outpacing the supply of health care. Health care systems have insufficient incentives for
patients or providers to restrain excessive utilisation. There is a general discontent with
current methods of financing and delivering health care and no quick fix solution to the
challenges.
It is argued by many, that a possible solution for excess demand and constraints on
government financing, would be increased information and choice for patients while placing
insurers and providers in competition to provide optimal levels of care at competitive prices.
This would require putting insurance funds in social insurance based systems on an equal
footing to allow them to assume a more commercial role. Most countries have onlySocial Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 13
rudimentary risk-compensation schemes in place. These market oriented type mechanisms
which increase efficiency and choice do however increase transaction costs. Governments
will need to set up regulatory frameworks within which such reforms could work.
Systems which allow richer (and often healthier) people to opt out, can also potentially
reduce solidarity. These systems usually risk-rate which means they allow for preferred risk
selection and even further reduce equity.
In most systems there are growing concerns over the dependence on payroll contributions
when the number of people in permanent jobs in large organisations is decreasing. There
are also concerns that increasing payroll contributions make firms less competitive, although
competitiveness depends on a number of other factors and the link between health
insurance costs and competitiveness is not straightforward.
Restricting choice is another method of cost control, introducing gate-keeping to more
expensive specialist services as in the Netherlands. This depends on the historical and
cultural background of the country as restricting or ending this right could be very
controversial.
Most aspects of the social insurance system require careful balancing, as there are definite
trade-offs to be made:
•  Increased access comes at a higher cost.
•  Increased diversity and choice produce higher transaction costs and may lead to greater
inequality.
•  Higher co-payments have the advantage of raising revenue and may be a valuable tool
in reducing excessive utilisation of some services, but they can reduce solidarity if there
are no exemptions in place.
•  Private ‘opt out’ schemes may be actuarially fairer for the richer population, but they
potentially reduce solidarity and equity.
•  Supplementary schemes can also produce inequality and if the complimentary insurance
is used to cover co-payments, may diminish the effectiveness of co-payments in
reducing utilisation.
•  More complex purchasing arrangements that allow for greater choice and competition
(as opposed to broader systems of contracting) produce higher transaction costs.
•  Managed competition in health care financing could in theory be feasible if a suitable
comprehensive risk-adjustment mechanism were in place, but this has been shown to be
almost impossible to implement in practice.
•  And finally the legal, social and cultural backgrounds and traditions of the country will
temper any changes or reform programmes. These norms will affect the role of
government and the degree of intervention, the level and degree of bargaining power
that the institutional players have, the level of risk sharing between purchasers and
providers and the mechanisms to ensure the financial stability of the social insurance
system.Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 14Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 15
1. Introduction
1.1.  Introduction and overview
This paper examines in greater detail the health insurance systems in Germany,
Switzerland, France and the Netherlands. The paper will examine how institutional factors
regulate and constrain health insurers in these European countries. It examines how the
insurer is organised and regulated, how premiums and fee schedules are determined and
the relationship between the insurer, doctor and hospital.
All the countries in this paper finance their health care primarily through social health
insurance contributions. The systems discussed in this paper share a number of common
features but also differ in a variety of ways.
1.2.  Social health insurance systems
Social health insurance systems share a number of similar features:
•  Insured persons pay a regular contribution to a health insurance fund based usually on
income rather than reflecting their risk of illness.
•  Clinical need and not ability to pay determine access to treatments and health care.
•  Contributions to the social insurance fund are kept separate from other government
mandated taxes and charges.
Except for the separate management of funds, this simple model of social insurance has
much in common with tax finance, especially where taxes are earmarked or ‘hypothecated’
for use by the health care sector.
There are however a number of other features common to health insurance systems,
although these are not strictly necessary for a system to be described as social health
insurance. These are:
•  Both employers and employees pay contributions.
•  Government support for those who are unable to pay goes through the insurance fund.
•  Employees and employers may share some responsibility for management of the fund or
funds, although that is not always the case.
•  There may be more than one social health insurance fund and some choice may be
available to citizens.
•  Patients have at least some choice in the doctor and other health care providers they
use.
•  Social health insurance is compulsory for at least some categories of citizens.
•  A basic package of health care benefits is defined which may or may not vary across
funds.
•  Health insurance funds may not turn away applicants for membership.
Where the system contains a choice of social health insurance fund or sickness fund, there
is usually a system by which the funds with high cost and low-income members subsidise
those with low cost and high-income members. The issues relating to voluntary membership,
choice of funds and mechanisms for ensuring equity exist to a greater or lesser extent in the
countries discussed in this report.
There is no reason why social health insurance organisations should not own and operate
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to be delivered by a combination of public, private and non-governmental organisations. It is
also common for the commissioning of services and the contracts for supply to be done on
the basis of negotiation between all social health insurance funds together and associations
of providers.
In summary, the key features of social health insurance services are that contributions are
usually calculated on the basis of ability to pay, access to care is on the basis of need, and
the system provides a separate, transparent system for the flow of funds from the
contributions to the fund and on to the providers of services.
1.3.  Strengths and weaknesses of social health insurance
The strengths and weaknesses of social health insurance are usually judged against the
health policy goals of fairness and efficiency. Some of the objectives might include the
following:
•  Services should be available for those who are likely to derive significant benefit from
them.
•  Costs should be minimised for any given level of services.
•  People with equal need should have equal access.
•  Priority should go to those services that are likely to achieve the greatest health gain
from given resources, and
•  Users of services should be satisfied with the process and outcome of care.
Development of social health insurance systems have normally been in response to
concerns that inadequate resources were mobilised to support access to health services.
Since there is no simple answer to the question of how much is the appropriate level of
support, the issue of adequacy is best thought of as being a level that is considered
appropriate in the country given its total resources, preferences and other development
priorities. There are several reasons to suggest that the separation of health care spending
from other government mandated spending can be successful in ensuring an appropriate
level of funding for health services. When satisfaction with health services is assessed in
surveys the typical finding is that people in social health insurance systems are most
satisfied. People appear to be less satisfied with tax funded systems and least satisfied with
private, risk-adjusted insurance. There is also a tendency to favour the system with which a
person is familiar. There are several reasons why this may be the case.
First, social insurance finance is normally associated with higher levels of funding than tax
based systems. If people generally believe that too little is spent on health care then it is not
surprising if they prefer systems that achieve higher levels of spending. Second, willingness
to pay may be higher if the system is transparent. Hypothecation of funds allows people to
see that any additional contributions will go to spending on health care and will not be
diverted to other government priorities that may be considered to be of lower priority to the
contributor. To an extent the separation of health care financing from government financing
allows people to take a separate view on the cost to them of higher contributions and better
access to services.
The experience of rationing and setting priorities in social health insurance systems is mixed.
In many European countries at least in principle there is little explicit rationing of access to
care. In other countries with social insurance there are various ways in which access is
constrained, either by having a clearly defined benefits package, a preferred set of providers
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rationing in health care. The economists’ approach is typically to choose services that
maximise health gain for any level of spending (perhaps subject to some equity objective).
Except in cases where resources are sufficient to satisfy all demands, some form of rationing
or priority setting is needed. The use of either social health insurance or tax finance does not
change this. However it may change who is responsible for choosing which services are
provided and may shift blame for constraints (at least in part) away from governments.
Formal and explicit rationing systems, however desirable, are rare in both tax funded and
social health insurance systems and there is little evidence to suggest that social health
insurance is more successful in identifying services for inclusion that are the highest
priorities.
Another objective is for services to be provided at minimum cost. Since the normal market
mechanisms will work only partially in social health insurance systems, some of the
pressures to minimise costs will not be available. Minimising costs allows resources to be
used for other beneficial purposes either within or outside the health service. International
comparisons show higher expenditure on social health insurance systems when compared
to tax financing. The important question is whether this higher spending reflects higher
volume of services or simply higher costs of producing care.
Efficiency in production of care depends on structures, skills, motivation and incentives.
Structures affect efficiency both through the market power of buyers and sellers and through
transaction costs. Where a single social health insurance fund exists and services are
purchased by a single buyer, there is a tendency to control costs. If there are multiple funds
(as is the case in Germany), but negotiation is between providers and the association of
funds then once again there is effectively a single purchaser. However, allowing purchasing
of services on the basis of individual contracts with multiple social health insurance funds
and service providers may lead to higher costs due to the loss of this monopsony power.
Since there are many reasons why cost control in health care tends to be difficult, it may be
important to offset some of these effects with the downward pressure on costs of single
purchaser arrangements.
A more serious issue in judging the efficiency of different systems of finance is how to keep
management and transactions costs to a minimum. Evidence on the relationship of
management costs and performance is still poor and transaction costs in health care are
difficult to measure. Transaction costs are made up of several different elements. The more
complex the transactions the more costly they are likely to be. The important elements of
transaction costs are the costs of the processes (such as negotiation and legal costs), costs
of information and costs of enforcement. At one extreme these can be minimised with simple
agreements covering all insured individuals. At the other, if separate arrangements must be
made for each intervention for each patient, there is a large cost of informing, making and
enforcing the contracts. In all systems there is a trade-off between more complex purchasing
of services, with higher costs, and a broader system of contracting that requires less
measurement and processing.
There is evidence that transaction costs in social health insurance are significant. The choice
of simple contracting arrangements in Germany is in part a response to the need to keep
costs down. One argument for not proceeding with the planned reforms in the Netherlands,
which would have introduced choice and competition on both insurance and provision of
care, was the need to avoid high transaction costs. One way in which transaction costs can
be kept low is for the providers of care to be paid directly by the social health insurance fund.
In France, where the system involves the patient paying and then reclaiming some of the
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In all systems of health care finance that provide services free at the point of delivery, there
is a tendency for expenditure to rise, since it is not in the short-term interest of either patient
or provider to reduce costs. There is no particular reason why social health insurance should
involve higher transaction costs than tax finance, and mechanisms can be designed that
should encourage efficient production of services. However, as the desire for diversity and
choice increases, the tendency to incur high costs and to lose the downward pressure on
costs is a major risk.
Social health insurance combines some of the features of private insurance with some that
make the system more equitable. Since payments are on the basis of ability to pay (or at
least visible earnings) it can achieve the goals of providing care on the basis of need and
paying on the basis of income. In the case of Germany there are systems of equalisation,
both between richer and poorer funds and between funds with higher morbidity and those
whose members are more healthy. In effect there is a subsidy between the former Federal
Republic, which is wealthier and healthier and the former Democratic Republic which has
higher unemployment, lower income and worse health. The solidarity in the German system
is undermined to some degree by the exemption from membership of richer people (opt out
scheme) and a similar exemption exists in the Netherlands. Since in general these people
are also healthier, allowing richer people to opt out means that they do not share in the
subsidy of services for poorer social health insurance fund members. The general issue is
that whenever any group and especially richer groups are allowed to opt out of the system,
the degree of solidarity and equity is reduced. Other ways in which social health insurance
operates can also reduce solidarity. Systems with high levels of co-payments reduce access
to service for poorer people unless there is also a system of exemptions. Systems with very
limited benefit packages also may reduce the extent to which access to care is on the basis
of need.
It is common for there to be a debate in social health insurance systems about the extent to
which there should be competing funds. Historically many countries, most obviously
Germany, have had multiple funds but not competing funds. This is changing as choice of
insurer has been introduced. If a perfect system of risk adjustment and full allowance for
differences in incomes is introduced, then it is theoretically possible to have full choice and
competition between funds and also full solidarity. However such mechanisms are complex
and expensive to run and may be impossible to achieve and there must be a concern that
increased diversity and choice also leads to increased inequality in access to care.
Social health insurance systems in Europe have therefore been very successful at meeting
particular goals, especially in providing near universal access to care, services that are
acceptable to the public and a degree of solidarity. It has already been suggested that social
health insurance systems tend to be associated with high levels of satisfaction in the
population and therefore are normally successful in that objective too. The successes of
social health insurance are clear and there are many advantages of the features the systems
offer. The problems are mainly in the risk of cost escalation, excessive reliance on too
narrow a contribution base and potentially high costs of management and transactions.
1.4.  Lessons for other countries
It is an important principle that one should learn from the experiences of other countries but
not try to replicate exactly systems that have developed in particular settings. It is important
to consider systems of health care financing in the context of their historical, political and
social background. The details of the organisation of funds and provision of care have often
arisen as a result of slow evolution and adaptation of institutions to meet new challenges. In
the case of social health insurance the evolution of the system, initially in Germany, owed
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development of Germany as a united but decentralised country. To some extent the resulting
social health insurance schemes and arrangements are unplanned but have been shown to
remain robust and able to prosper both in Germany and other countries.
Countries that are examining these social health insurance systems need to be aware of the
trade-offs that exist between costs and access to care, between costs and degree of
diversity and choice and between competition and objectives of equity and low management
costs. Observing the German system it is important to note the extent to which the
apparently diverse and pluralistic system is in many ways a single system in each state. The
recent reforms in France, Switzerland and the Netherlands have been grappling with the
different objectives of continued universality, concerns to reduce costs of services and of
administration, while retaining features of the systems that are valued by users.
There are many variants on the theme of social health insurance and the performance of
social health insurance systems may depend significantly on the detail of the chosen
characteristics.  However, the main arguments in favour of social health insurance systems
are the potential to provide universal access to health care, the acceptability to the public,
the transparency of financial flows, the potential to allow diversity and choice in provision
and the long tradition that has allowed the development of mechanisms for ensuring some
control of costs and sound financial management.
The potential problems with social health insurance are the risk of cost escalation, potentially
high management and transaction costs (especially when patients have free choice of
provider) and the need for good accountability. There is also a risk that social health
insurance is too dependent on the payroll for contributions at a time when the proportion of
people with permanent jobs in large organisations is falling.
1.5.  General conclusions on social health insurance
The fact that social health insurance systems have evolved and survived suggest that this
model of semi-independent financing can offer a sustainable model, and one that can adapt
to different conditions. Most systems have significant regulation by government and systems
vary from those that are close to being hypothecated taxes to those where the funds are
independent of government. Many systems have some payments by government and in
others there is an element of government guarantee of any debts. Countries with social
health insurance typically have higher spending on health than those that use tax finance
and this is probably due in part to the greater transparency of financial flows and the
acceptability of funding for health care. Competition for provision of services is common, but
it is only recently that serious consideration has been given to the development of
competition for collecting and managing the funds. It remains to be seen whether market
forces can play a useful role in forcing costs down while avoiding problems of inequity and
high transaction costs. This paper will examine how these 4 countries have fared in meeting
some of the (often competing) objectives of social health insurance systems such as access,
choice, solidarity, efficiency and fairness.
1.6.  The structure of this report
This report hopes to examine in greater detail the social insurance systems in Germany,
Switzerland, the Netherlands and France. In each chapter a different country is described in
terms of the organisational structure of the social insurance system, the relationships
between the key actors in the health care market, the regulation and management of the
insurance system, the financing of and expenditure on health care, benefits available within
the social insurance scheme and how rationing is dealt with. The delivery of health care isSocial Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 20
briefly discussed as well as any major reforms that have taken place, including general cost
containment measures and pharmaceutical expenditures and cost control.
Chapter 2 discusses these relevant issues for Germany, Chapter 3 covers Switzerland,
Chapter 4 discusses the Netherlands, while Chapter 5 covers France. Chapter 6 concludes
with some of the main problems and issues that arise within social insurance systems (such
as the often conflicting objectives of choice, access, solidarity, equity, efficiency,
transparency, acceptability, and cost control), how these are observed in the 4 countries and
what other countries might learn from these 4 European examples.Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 21
2. Germany
2.1 Introduction and overview
The Federal Republic of Germany has a population of 82 million (40 million males and 42
million females). This includes over 7 million foreigners of which just over 2  million are
Turkish. Most of the population is distributed in the western part of Germany.
Germany is a federal republic and has sixteen states (or Länder) each of which has a
constitution which must be consistent with the republican, democratic and social principles
embodied in the constitution. The constitutional bodies, which have legislative functions, are
the Federal Assembly and the Federal Council (the chambers of parliament). The Federal
Assembly’s functions include passing laws, electing the Chancellor and controlling the
government. The main function of the Federal Council is to approve laws which have been
passed by the Federal Assembly. About half of all bills require formal approval of the Federal
Council, in other words both the upper and lower chambers, particularly those of vital interest
such as financial affairs or administrative powers. Passing laws that need approval from both
chambers is often difficult as the political majority in each chamber is typically held by
opposing parties in which case compromise is formulated by an arbitration committee.
The President (elected by Parliament) has the role of approving new laws, formally
appointing the chancellor and the federal ministers and fulfilling a representative function.
The chancellor, who is the head of the government, chooses the ministers and proposes
them to the President for appointment. The Chancellor is in a strong position as he also
chooses the number of ministers, their responsibilities and the guidelines for government
policy. The federal ministers run their departments independently but within the framework of
these guidelines.
Certain areas of legislation pertain almost exclusively to the federation such as foreign
affairs, defence, monetary policy, air transport, and some elements of taxation, or where
necessary to have a uniform law for the whole country. The states can fill in any gaps left by
the federal legislation or areas not specified by the constitution. This applies for example in
the fields of higher education and culture, nature conservation, landscape management,
regional planning, water management, local government and police.
Health is not an area exclusive to federal legislation and specific topics relevant to health are
included in the concurrent legislation (as defined by the constitution) such as social benefits,
measures pertaining to public health, certification of physicians and other health
professionals, pharmaceuticals and drugs and the economic situation of hospitals. Federal
law, where it exists in these areas, takes precedence over state legislation, but implicitly, all
other aspects of (public) health are the responsibility of the states.
Germany is a member of the G7 leading industrial countries and industry is mainly export
oriented. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) amounted to DM 46 100 per capita in 1998 or a
total of DM 3784 billion (see Appendix A for national comparisons). Unemployment is the
major economic problem at around 10.9 percent in 1998 (20 percent in the eastern states
and 8.6 in the western states).
2.2 Health status
The main causes of death in Germany are cardiovascular diseases (50 percent of all deaths
in 1998) and malignant tumours (25 percent). Cardiovascular and non-malignant lung
disease mortality rates in Germany are well above the European average while infant andSocial Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 22
maternal mortality rates are lower (see Appendix A).  Standardised death rates for road
traffic accidents remain a problem in eastern Germany especially among young males. The
incidence of AIDS has been stable since the 1990s and is among the lowest in the EU which
is due to a concerted effort towards prevention. Germans also consume more cigarettes and
alcohol than the average European.
There is an interesting discrepancy in health status due to political, social and economic
influences of an otherwise homogenous population where life expectancy in western
Germany since the 1960s has shown continued improvement. Between 1980 and 1990 the
gap in life expectancy widened, especially for men, largely due to differences in diet, better
living conditions in west Germany, differences in access to high technology care, and better
health care at all levels in western Germany. Since unification the gap has rapidly narrowed,
especially for women. Likely factors responsible for this trend include:
•  The adoption of the western German social welfare system
•  The adoption of the western German health care system
•  Greater personal freedom (but also higher unemployment)
•  A cleaner environment
Current health concerns in the unified Germany are mainly related to diseases associated
with the ageing population and related demographic trends. In addition to the increasing
share of elderly population, there is a decrease in the relative number of working age
population, leading to social security revenue reductions. The change in the structure of the
population is also likely to increase the demand for therapy, rehabilitative care and nursing
care relative to curative medical care. Other concerns include an increase in the number of
one-person households, an increase in long-term chronic degenerative diseases, increasing
public expectation with respect to medical care and incentives for the excessive use of
health care services.
2.3 A brief history of the German health care system
The rise of Germany’s modern health care system dates back to 1883 when parliament
made nation-wide health insurance compulsory. Germany has been recognised as the first
country which introduced a national social security system. In the following decades the
principle of statutory social insurance, called the ‘Bismarck system’ was also applied to
alleviating the risks of work-related accidents and invalidity (1884), old age and disability
(1889), unemployment (1927) and the need for long-term nursing care (1994). The
prominence and continuity of social insurance is one of the key features of Germany’s health
care system to the present day.
Motivated by paternalism and the Emperor’s charter (1881) which declared social welfare for
the poor essential, Chancellor Bismarck suggested a national health service type of system.
The resulting legislation of 1883 built upon existing local funds and occupation-based funds
(miners, guilds and companies) making health insurance compulsory for workers of certain
industries with hourly wages up to a legally fixed income ceiling. They were to pay two-thirds
of the contributions while their employers were obliged to pay one third. Members received
monetary benefits such as sick pay equivalent to 50 percent of the customary local wage for
13 weeks, maternity pay and death compensation. A minimum number of primary health
care services was set as well as medication, while hospital care was left to the discretion of
the funds on a case-by-case basis. The funds were non-profit and were initially free to
choose private suppliers of health care and to determine contracts with them. National
government’s role was limited to setting legal standards for the self-administered funds
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During the 1880s many workers boycotted the self-administered statutory funds and chose
self-supporting funds instead which were self-governing and run entirely by the workers
(called substitute funds). However this choice became restricted in the early 1890s and
national government tried to separate the rising white-collar movements from the blue-collar
by introducing a separate set of statutory health insurance for salaried employees in 1901.
Because white-collar workers enjoyed greater rights to choose, the existing substitute funds
catered almost exclusively for white-collar employees from that time on (until 1995). The
substitute funds kept 100 percent worker representation although contributions were
eventually shared. The 1911 Imperial Insurance Regulation introduced a common legal
framework for social insurance and the regulations covering health insurance remained in
force, with a few changes, until 1988.
Over the following decades statutory health insurance coverage grew from 10 percent of the
population in 1883 to 88 percent (mandatory and voluntary) of the west German population
in 1987 and 100 percent of the east German population in 1949. Social insurance was
concentrated in only two large sickness funds in east Germany, one for workers (89 percent)
and one for professionals, members of agricultural co-operatives, artists and the self-
employed (11 percent). The universal national health insurance scheme of the east German
Democratic Republic (GDR) was abandoned after unification in 1990 in favour of the liberal
west Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) insurance system. The extension of membership
was achieved by either increasing the income ceiling of mandatory membership or by adding
new occupational groups to the statutory fund system. Germany also managed to integrate
certain social groups into the social health insurance scheme which in several other
European countries were financed or cared for by other public agencies, such as the
unemployed, family dependants, pensioners (in 1941), students and the disabled.
Contributions and expenditure increased substantially over the 100 or more years of
statutory health insurance as a result of the extension of benefits through state intervention,
but mainly through the self-administered funds themselves or by joint committees between
funds and physicians. While the scheme aimed initially at primarily preventing
impoverishment by compensating income in cases of illness, sickness funds increasingly
funded services and prescriptions of specialists which was reflected in the falling ratio
between monetary and service/product benefits.
Whilst much of the period saw rising expenditures, the pay-as-you-go principle of
contributions and expenditure ensured a sound financial basis for health care financing even
during two World Wars, hyperinflation in 1923, the economic crisis of 1929 and the
introduction of a new currency in 1948. However after the oil crisis (from 1975 onwards) the
health care sector suffered dramatic cost increases and 1977 ushered in the era of cost
containment in German statutory health insurance with the introduction of the Health
Insurance Cost-Containment Act. This ended the period of rapid growth in health care
expenditure, particularly in the hospital sector and sickness funds and providers were
required to pursue stability in contributions which has remained the main cost containment
target in health care ever since. This requirement pegged increases in contribution levels
with the rate of increase in contributory income. The basic cost containment principle is
therefore one of ‘income-oriented expenditure policy’. The drive for cost containment was
realised through various measures including:
•  Budgets for sectors or individual providers
•  Reference price setting for pharmaceuticals
•  Restrictions on high cost technology equipment and the number of ambulatory care
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•  Increased co-payments (both in terms of size and number of services)
•  The exclusion of young people from certain dental benefits between 1997 and 1998
2.4 Organisational structure and relationships of key actors
2.4.1 Federal level
At the federal level the Ministry of Health and the parliament are the key actors. The Ministry
of Health is divided into five divisions:
•  Administration and international relations
•  Pharmaceutical / medical products and long-term care
•  Health care and statutory health insurance
•  Protecting health and fighting disease
•  Consumer protection (mostly food-related) and veterinary medicine
Before 1991, the divisions dealing with statutory health insurance were part of the Ministry of
Labour and Social Services while most of the other divisions were part of the Ministries of
Youth, Family, Women and Health.
Several subordinate authorities responsible for certain tasks support the Federal Ministry of
Health:
•  The Federal Institute for Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices (BfArM) (licensing
pharmaceuticals and supervising the safety of medical devices)
•  The German Institute for Medical Documentation and Information (DIMDI) (providing the
public and professionals in all fields of the life sciences with information and a broad
collection of databases)
•  The Federal Institute for Communicable and Non-communicable Diseases (Robert-Koch-
Institute) (surveillance, detection, prevention and control of diseases)
•  The Federal Institute for Sera and Vaccines (Paul-Ehrlich-Institue) (licensing of sera and
vaccines)
•  The Federal Centre for Health Education (BzgA)
•  The Federal Institute for Health Protection of Consumers and Veterinary Medicine
(BgVV) (consumer protection in areas of food, chemicals, cosmetics, veterinary
pharmaceuticals and diseases, crop protection and pest control)
2.4.2 State level
The federal structure is represented mainly by the 16 state governments. While none has a
ministry exclusively dedicated to health, almost all have ‘health’ combined with Labour and
Social Services.
2.4.3 Corporatist level
The statutory health insurance system is represented by the (statutory health insurance-
contracted) physicians’ and dental physicians’ legal associations on the provider side and
the sickness funds and their associations on the purchaser side.
Physicians’ and dentists’ associations exist at the state level (the total number of
associations is 23) and at the federal level (The National Association of Statutory Health
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physicians in private practice and other members, mainly hospital physicians who are
accredited to treat patients on an ambulatory basis.
The hospitals are not represented by any legal corporatist institution but by organisations
based on private law, however they are increasingly charged with legal responsibilities as
well.  The hospital organisations are also both state and federal level organisations.
The payers’ side is made up of autonomous sickness funds which are organised on a
regional or federal basis. In mid-1999 there were 453 statutory sickness funds with about 72
million insured persons (50.7 million members plus their dependants) and 52 private health
insurance companies covering around 7.1 million fully insured people.
Sickness funds can be differentiated into seven different groups:
•  17 general regional funds known as Allgemeine Ortskrankenkassen (AOK) – their federal
association is based in Bonn
•  13 substitute funds known as Ersatzkassen – Siegburg
•  359 company-based funds known as Betriebskrankenkassen (BKK) – Essen
•  42 guild funds or Innungskrankenkassen (IKK) – Bergisch-Gladbach
•  20 farmers’ funds or Landwirtschaftliche Krankenkassen (LKK) – Kassel
•  1 miners’ fund known as Bundesknappschaft – Bochum
•  1 sailors’ fund or See-Krankenkasse - Hamburg
All funds are run on a not-for-profit basis and are based on the principle of self-government,
elected by their members. In most funds the management is made up of an executive board
responsible for day-to-day management and an assembly of delegates who decide on
bylaws and other regulations of the fund, passing the budget, setting the contribution rate
and electing the executive board. Usually the assembly is composed of representatives of
the insured and employers who are democratically elected every six years. Many
representatives are linked to trade unions or employers’ associations.
The total number of sickness funds has decreased steadily since the AOKs and the
substitute funds were legally opened to competition for all insurees through the Health Care
Structure Act (1992). The first wave of mergers in 1993/4 affected the AOKs as some were
very small and merged into single AOKs per state. In 1994/5 the IKKs followed, partly before
they opened themselves to outside members. The latest wave of mergers was the BKKs,
also often as a prelude to competition. By the beginning of 1999, the open BKKs had more
members than those which remained closed (with an exclusive in-company membership).
Table 1: Number of Sickness Funds in Germany 1993-1999
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1999
AOKs 270 93 20 20 18 17
BKKs 845 826 807 651 570 359
IKKs 174 166 122 48 48 42
All other
funds
39 39 38 38 37 35
Total 1328 1124 987 757 673 453
Source:  WHO (1999a)
By law, sickness funds have the right and the obligation to raise contributions from their
members which includes the right to determine what contribution rate is necessary to cover
expenditure. The Health Insurance Contribution Exoneration Act of 1996 interfered with thisSocial Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 26
right by legally lowering the contribution rates of all sickness funds on 1 January 1997 by 0.4
percent.
Other health-related statutory insurance schemes similar to the sickness funds exist as well.
These include:
•  Accident funds for statutory accident insurance covering curative and rehabilitative care
services for work-related accidents and diseases
•  Retirement funds for statutory retirement insurance which is responsible for most
rehabilitative measures, and
•  Since 1995, long-term care funds which were formed by the existing sickness funds
Statutory long-term care insurance was introduced following concerns about the situation of
the elderly and concerns about inadequate access and support for nursing care especially in
the ambulatory sector. All members of statutory sickness funds (including pensioners and
unemployed) as well as people with full cover private health insurance were declared
mandatory members, making it the first social insurance with practically population-wide
membership. The long-term care scheme is administered by the sickness funds (as an entity
separate from the health insurance part but without any separate associations) and by the
private health insurers.
Outside the scope of statutory health insurance, legally established professional
associations exist for physicians, dentists, pharmacists and veterinarians. By law, all these
health care professionals must be a member of their respective associations at state level.
The associations are in turn regulated by the laws of the state. They are responsible for
secondary training and accreditation (specialist training), and continuing education, setting
professional and ethical standards as well as for community relations. To co-ordinate these
associations at federal level, there are federal associations which are based on private law
and can therefore only pass on recommendations. Professionals organised in associations
enjoy certain exclusive rights such as being able to maintain their own pension schemes.
Nurses, midwives, physiotherapists and other groups are not considered to be professionals
in the legal sense and are therefore not organised in associations.
2.4.4 Other actors
There are however numerous voluntary organisations outside the above-mentioned legal
actors, which can be distinguished along scientific, professional, political lobbying and
economic lines of interest. These organisations represent general practitioners, physicians,
nurses, physiotherapists, midwives, pharmacists, and the pharmaceutical industry. There is
also an organisation representing the providers’ side as the head organisation of the six
leading non-profit associations which own and manage hospitals, nursing homes, home care
agencies and ambulance transportation. On the payers’ side, the Association of Private
Health Insurance Companies, a powerful lobby group for defending the private health
insurance sector, represents the 52 major private health insurance companies. Of the 52
private insurers, 25 are listed on the stock market.
Insurees or patients are not represented by any powerful organisations. There is a small and
little known General Patients’ Association and a number of disease-specific self-help groups.
However the mainly publicly funded Foundation for the Testing of Consumer Goods has
recently turned towards the health care sector by investigating hospitals and other providers.Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 27
All the above organisations are politically independent and not associated with any particular
parties.
2.5 Regulation and management of health insurance
2.5.1 Federal level
Issues of equity, comprehensiveness and the rules for providing and financing social
services are regulated at the federal level. All statutory social insurance schemes are
regulated through the Social Code Book (SGB), the cornerstone of social insurance
legislation, but fall within the authority of different ministries. All parts of the Social Code
Book have regulated statutory insurance schemes in the new eastern states since 1991,
except for certain transitional regulations. The Social Code Book V (SGB V) which is
amended and supplemented by various reform laws, regulates the following issues:
•  Mandatory and voluntary membership in sickness funds
•  Contents of the sickness funds’ benefit package
•  Goals and scope of negotiations between sickness funds and providers (most notably
physicians’ association)
•  Organisational structure of sickness funds and their associations
•  Financing mechanisms including risk compensation between funds
•  Tasks and organisation of medical review boards
•  Collection, storage, use and protection of data
•  Special regulations for eastern Germany
The most important aspect of the Social Code Book is the self-regulated structure of the
statutory health insurance system. It defines what may be self-regulated through joint
committees of funds and providers, the level of these negotiations and how the composition
of such committees is to be decided. The Federal Ministry of Health is responsible for
supervising whether the federal associations of physicians, the sickness funds and the joint
committees comply with the SGB V rules.
2.5.2 State level
The state governments are responsible for maintaining hospital infrastructure through
funding hospital investments which are paid for independently of ownership of the hospitals
according to the priorities of the state government. While the responsibility for major
investments (buildings and large-scale medical technology) is undisputed, it is not clear
whether the states are responsible for building maintenance and repairs. As such, most
states have refused to pay for these since 1993 and the 2
nd Statutory Health Insurance
Restructuring Act had to introduce an annual flat premium of DM 20 to be paid by all insured
people for the restoration and repair of hospitals. This annual fee was however cancelled in
1998.
Otherwise states are responsible for public health services such as supervision and
monitoring of health care institutions, diseases, food, pharmaceuticals and drugs,
environmental hygiene, counselling and health education and promotion. Furthermore, they
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2.5.3 Corporatist level
The corporatist institutions on the payer side (the sickness funds) have a central position
within the statutory health insurance system. The Social Code Book defines their rights and
responsibilities such as their obligation to raise contributions from members and the right to
determine the contribution rate necessary to cover expenditure. Their responsibilities include
negotiating prices, quantities and quality assurance measures with providers on behalf of
their members. Services covered by such contracts are usually accessible to all fund
members without prior permission from the funds (except in the case of rehabilitative care
and short-term nursing care). Where there is doubt, the sickness funds must obtain an
expert opinion on the medical necessity of treatment from their Medical Review Board.
A reform to make these benefits (rehabilitative care and short-term nursing care, as well as
ambulance transportation and physiotherapy) optional, so as to leave individual sickness
funds to decide on their inclusion, failed in 1996 as the sickness funds threatened to remove
these benefits altogether as sickness funds without these benefits could offer lower
contribution rates and attract a healthier clientele. This would widen the gap in contribution
rates and force more generous funds out of the market since expenditure for voluntary
benefits would be outside the risk compensation mechanism between the funds.
On the provider side, the physicians’ and dental physicians’ associations have the
‘Corporatist Monopoly and the Mission to Secure Ambulatory Care’ which means that legally
their monopoly has to provide all personal acute health care services. Hospitals,
communities, sickness funds and others do not have the right to offer ambulatory medical
care. The legal obligation to guarantee provision of state-wide services in all medical
specialties includes the provision of sufficient emergency services within reasonable
distances. The physicians’ associations obtain a total, prospectively negotiated budget from
the sickness funds which they then distribute among their members. In return they must
provide a guarantee to the sickness funds that this provision meets the legal and contractual
requirements.
The Social Code Book V concentrates mainly on regulating the framework such as the
generic categories of benefits, the goals and scope of the negotiations between sickness
funds and physicians’ and dental physicians’ associations, the financing mechanisms and
the details of the ambulatory package. As a general rule, the scope of services which can be
reimbursed through the sickness funds and the financing mechanisms are tightly regulated,
sometimes legally, but mainly through negotiations between providers and sickness funds.
The most important body for the joint negotiations on the scope of benefits is the national-
level Federal Committee of Physicians and Sickness Funds established in 1923. It consists
of nine representatives from both sides, two neutral members proposed by each side and a
neutral chairperson who must be accepted by both sides. This committee has issued 16
guidelines to regulate the prescription of pharmaceuticals, medical aids and care by non-
physicians, ‘needs-based’ planning of the distribution of physicians in private practice and
the inclusion of new technologies and procedures in the ambulatory benefits packages.
The 2
nd Statutory Health Insurance Restructuring Act gave the Federal Committee new
competencies in 1997 such as technology assessment of ambulatory benefits, guidelines on
care by non-physicians, as well as decisions concerning the effectiveness of new diagnostic
and therapeutic methods.
Due to the absence of corporatist institutions in the hospital sector, hospitals contract directly
with the sickness funds. Usually all sickness funds with a more than 5 percent ‘market share’
in a particular hospital negotiate the contract with that hospital. The conditions regarding the
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valid for all sickness funds. After attempts by the Federal Health Ministry to corporatise the
hospital organisations failed, a regulation was included in the 2
nd Statutory Health Insurance
Restructuring Act which widened the hospitals’ legal powers by enabling them to negotiate
the schedule of prospective case and procedure fees with the sickness funds.
2.5.4 Features of the German health care system
The German health care system is therefore highly decentralised with large amounts of
delegation of state power to corporatist actors. Privatisation is another important feature of
the German health care system. Some health care sectors are based entirely on private
providers, such as office-based ambulatory and dental care sectors and private pharmacies.
In other sectors both private (profit and non-profit) and public providers co-exist, such as the
hospital sector (with a trends toward privatisation as shown in the table below) and social
care sectors. Private insurance companies also co-exist alongside statutory sickness funds.
Table 2: Public-Private Mix in Ownership of General Hospitals, 1990-1997
Public Non-profit Private Total
beds % share beds % share beds % share Beds
1990 387 207 62.8 206 936 33.5 22 779 3.7 616 922
1997 304 500 56.3 204 811 37.9 31 603 5.8 540 919
Change -21% -1% +39% -12%
Source:  WHO (1999a)
2.6 Health reform in the 1990s
The 1990s saw a rapid increase in health reform legislation relating to health insurance.
These included the Health Care Reform Act (1989), Health Care Structure Act (1992), the
Health Insurance Contribution Rate Exoneration Act (1996), the 1
st and 2
nd Statutory Health
Insurance Restructuring Acts (1997) and the Act to Strengthen Solidarity in Statutory Health
Insurance (1998).
The Health Care Reform Act renewed the 1911 social insurance legislation with the following
changes: new benefits for long-term care, the introduction of ‘no claim bonus’ models,
reference prices for pharmaceuticals, committees to regulate expensive medical
technologies and the right for sickness funds to selectively contract with hospitals.
The main elements of the Health Care Structure Act were to increase cost-containment
measures through, for example, legally fixed budgets or spending caps and increased
competition to enhance efficiency, especially between sickness funds and the hospital
sector.
The Health Insurance Contribution Rate Exoneration Act and the 1
st and 2
nd Statutory Health
Insurance Restructuring Acts represented a shift from cost-containment to a possible
expansion of private payments. Co-payments were now seen as a way to bring new money
into the system. These Acts included the cancellation of the budgets in ambulatory care and
the spending caps for pharmaceuticals, and increased co-payments for inpatient care,
rehabilitative care, pharmaceuticals, medical aids and transportation. In effect these acts
broke several traditional rules of the system such as uniform availability of benefits,
contributions being shared equally between employers and employees, financing depending
only on income and not on risk or service utilisation and provision of services as benefits-in-Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 30
kind. In addition there was an increasing shift of costs onto patients while easing financial
pressure on providers.
The abolition of these reforms was taken on as the most important programme of opposition
parties. Thus the Act to Strengthen Solidarity in Statutory Health Insurance reversed almost
all of the changes again in line with their aim of strengthening some of the basic principles of
solidarity in social insurance. In addition, co-payment rates were lowered and budgets or
spending caps re-introduced.
2.7 Health care financing
Contributions towards statutory health insurance with the 453 sickness funds constitute the
main mechanism for financing health care in Germany. Sickness fund membership is
compulsory for employees whose gross income does not exceed a certain level (around 78,
000 DM per year) and is voluntary for those above that level. Around 88 percent of the
population are covered by the statutory health insurance, 75 percent are mandatory
members and their dependants, 13 percent are voluntary members and their dependants, 9
percent are covered by private health insurance, 2 percent by free government health care
(police officers, soldiers) and 0.1 percent are not insured.
Contributions are income and not risk-dependant, based on current income only (not savings
or assets). The total sum of income of all insured up to the upper level (where they can opt
out or become a voluntary member), in other words the contributory income, is a very
important policy variable as its growth rate from year to year determines the level of cost
containment.
Contributions are shared equally between the insured and their employers, with 50 percent
coming from the employee’s pre-tax income below the threshold and 50 percent being paid
by the employer in addition to wages. In the case of retired and unemployed people, the
retirement and unemployment funds take over the financing role of the employer.
The majority of people have had little choice over their sickness fund and were assigned to
one based on geographical or job characteristics. This distribution of fund members led to
varying contribution rates due to different income and risk profiles. From 1996, the Health
Care Structure Act gave almost every insured person the right to choose a sickness fund
and to change funds on a yearly basis with three months’ notice. All general regional funds
and substitute funds were legally opened up to everyone. Only the farmers’, miners’ and
sailors’ funds remain with assigned membership, although company-based funds may also
choose to remain closed.
To provide all sickness funds with a level playing field for competition, a risk structure
scheme to equalise differences in contribution rates (due to varying income levels) and
expenditure (due to age and sex differences) was introduced in two steps in 1994 and 1995.
The compensatory mechanism requires all sickness funds to provide or receive
compensation for the differences in their contributory incomes as well as in average
expenditures (calculated retrospectively using actual expenditure data). The sum of the
average expenditures (for both sexes for benefits in the uniform, comprehensive package)
for all members of a sickness fund determines the fund’s ‘contribution need’. Actual
contributions and ‘contribution need’ are compared to assess whether funds should receive
compensation or make payments into the scheme.
The result of free choice, the risk structure compensation scheme, the actual movement of
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funds, has been that funds with higher than average contribution rates tend to lose members
while those with lower than average rates gain members. As a result, the AOKs have lost
several thousand members in 1997 and 1998, while the BKKs have gained several
thousand. The risk compensation scheme has however narrowed contribution rates between
funds, but the movement of members between funds has not equalised the different risk
structures (which would in turn diminish transfers between funds). The healthier younger and
better-earning people move more often and towards cheaper funds which increase the
transfer sums. This suggests that a risk compensation mechanism will be needed more
permanently until the risk structure has become equal.
2.7.1 Health care benefits and rationing
In the Social Code Book V, the benefits covered in the benefit package include: disease
prevention, screening, disease treatment (ambulatory, dental, drugs, physician and non-
physician care, medical devices, hospital, nursing and rehabilitative care) and transportation.
In addition to these benefits in kind, sickness funds give cash benefits of 80 percent for up to
78 weeks per period of illness. A third type of benefit is health promotion offered directly to
members.
All covered procedures are listed in the ‘Uniform Value Scale’ together with their relative
weights for reimbursement. The range of covered procedures, curative and therapeutic, is
extremely wide (such as home visits, ante-natal care, care for terminally ill, non-physician
care, surgical procedures and laboratory tests and imaging procedures including MRI) and
only from 1997 were exclusions possible with the mandate to re-evaluate technologies. The
range of services provided in the hospital sector is determined by the negotiations between
the sickness funds and each individual hospital. While the state government determines the
flow of capital for investments, the negotiations determine whether the costs for running
these services are reimbursed by the sickness funds. This dual financing is the result of the
1972 Hospital Financing Act.
Entitlement to benefits in the long-term care sector is given when care is expected to be
necessary for at least 6 months. The benefits of long-term care insurance are graded
according to the frequency of need for nursing care. Everybody with an entitlement to
ambulatory nursing services is given the choice between monetary support for home care
delivered by family members or professional ambulatory services as in-kind benefits. In
addition, caregivers who care for their family member at home can attend training courses
free of charge and are insured against accidents, invalidity and old age. For persons needing
institutionalised nursing care, benefits are available for day or night clinics as well as
institutional care in old age or special nursing care homes.
There are a number of inconsistencies in the different health care sectors with regard to
coverage decisions and the use of health technologies in Germany. In general, the
ambulatory sector appears to be much more regulated than the hospital sector. Explicit
coverage decisions regarding medical and surgical procedures are currently non-existent for
the hospital sector. This is due to the fact that coverage of medical devices and expensive
medical equipment falls under budget negotiations at hospital level and hospital plans at
state level. Diffusion and distribution of expensive medical equipment for supply to the
population is therefore now the task of self-governing corporate bodies to guarantee the
efficient use of expensive equipment via remuneration regulations. Closer co-operation
between the hospital and ambulatory care sector to ensure adequate coverage is therefore
needed.
Even though a number of population surveys have shown blanket rejections of any form of
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the east where the belief in equal treatment opportunities independent of age, income or
status is stronger), physicians and health care experts believe rationing is inevitable. Further
restrictions and limitations on therapeutic freedom are expected, as well as changes in the
coverage of new drugs, supplementary insurance policies (which are currently illegal) and
the introduction of a gatekeeper system with bonuses for yearly check-ups.
2.7.2 Other sources of finance
Sickness funds contribute around 60 percent of total expenditure, while retirement, accident
and long-term care contribute another 1 to 3 percent each, making up around 68 percent of
the total. Three other main sources of finance include taxes, out-of-pocket payments and
private health insurance (as shown in the table below). Taxes have more recently overtaken
out-of-pocket payments as the major complementary source of financing in the late 1990s.
Taxes are used for capital investment costs for hospitals, public health services, free
government health care, reimbursement of parts of the private health care bills for
permanent public employees and subventions for farmers’ funds.
Table 3: Main Sources of Health Care Finance in Germany, as a Percentage of Total
Health Expenditure, 1970-1995
Source of finance 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993 1994 1995
Public
Statutory insurance 58.3 66.7 67.0 66.3 65.4 66.0 67.0 68.2
Taxes 14.5 12.4 11.7 11.2 10.8 11.5 10.6 10.0
Private
Out-of-pocket 13.9 9.6 10.3 11.2 11.1 11.3 11.3 10.8
Private insurance 7.5 5.8 5.9 6.5 7.2 6.7 6.8 6.6
Other 5.8 5.6 5.1 4.9 5.4 4.4 4.3 4.4
Source:  WHO (1999a)
Out-of-pocket co-payments occur mostly for pharmaceuticals and while this grew
consistently over the 1990s to around 14 percent of expenditure for prescribed drugs (which
meant that more then 20 percent of drugs had to be paid entirely by the patients), the
government lowered co-payments through the Act to Strengthen Solidarity in Statutory
Health Insurance effective from 1999.
New areas for cost sharing in the 1980s were charges for inpatient days in hospitals,
rehabilitative care and ambulance transportation. These were measures of cost containment,
shifting spending from sickness funds to patients. The 1989 Health Care Reform Act
advocated cost sharing as a means to raise revenue (to reduce dental care expenditure,
physiotherapy and transportation and make patients liable for pharmaceutical costs above
reference prices) and to reward responsible behaviour (dental treatment). Cost sharing again
increased in 1997 when crown and denture treatment were removed from the benefits
package (for certain persons), pharmaceutical co-payments were increased and co-
payments for spa treatment and rehabilitative care introduced.
Except for crowns and dentures and inpatient care, yearly-cost sharing for each person has
an upper limit of around 2 percent of gross income while the unemployed, people with very
low incomes and chronic diseases are exempt.
Fully privately insured patients usually enjoy benefits equal to or better than those covered
by statutory health insurance. Premiums vary with age, sex and medical history and unlike
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it especially attractive for single or double income couples. Since premiums rise with age
and re-entry of privately insured people into statutory sickness funds is not permitted, private
insurers are obliged to offer a policy with the same benefits as the statutory scheme at a
premium that is not higher at least than the average maximum contribution in the sickness
funds. Privately insured people generally have to pay the providers directly and are
reimbursed by their insurer. The real fee-for-service reimbursement for privately insured
people has led to cost increases which are on average about one half higher than in the
statutory health insurance scheme and in some cases as much as twice as high.
There is also a growing market for private health insurers in supplementary insurance, such
as covering extra amenities in hospital, since sickness funds are legally not allowed to offer
such extra policies.
2.7.3 Health care expenditure
Germany’s health care system is expensive by international comparison as expenditure has
risen considerably since re-unification (see also Appendix A). The percentage of public
expenditure as part of total expenditure has however remained relatively constant since
1975 and is comparable to most other countries with statutory health insurance.
Table 4: Trends in Health Care Expenditure in Germany, 1970-1997
Total health care
expenditure
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997































Value in current prices,
per capita (US $ PPP)
175 375 649 979 1279 2128 2278 2339
Share of GDP (%) 6.3 8.8 8.8 9.3 8.7 10.4 10.5 10.4
Public as share of total
health care expenditure
(%)
72.8 79.1 78.7 77.5 76.2 78.2 78.3 77.4
Source:  WHO (1999a)
Expenditure on hospital care is low by international comparison, but has risen considerably
over the last thirty years. The high increases in hospital expenditure in the early 1970s can
be explained both by the introduction of hospital planning to address the shortage of hospital
beds and the full cost cover principle. Since 1975 hospital expenditure has been the area
that has been least constrained in growth with an increase from 1.9 percent of GDP per
capita in 1975 to 2.4 percent in 1995. This accounts for almost two-thirds of the increases in
sickness fund expenditure since 1975. Only recently has hospital expenditure been
controlled better with major cost-containment legislation.
Dual financing exists for hospitals which means financing of investment or capital costs is
done through states (länder) and general running costs through the sickness funds. In order
to be eligible for investment or capital costs, hospitals have to be listed in the plans set out
by the states which often list the necessary specialties and the number of beds per specialty.
As a cost containment measure, the 1984 Hospital Restructuring Act introduced
prospectively negotiated per-diem charges (from retrospective remuneration) which were
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investments would lower running costs in the medium or long term. Therefore dual financing
also meant dual planning with numbers of hospital beds being planned at state level, and
staff numbers and hospital day numbers subject to negotiations between hospitals and
sickness funds within the framework of negotiating per diem charges at the corporatist level.
2.7.4 Budget setting
Sickness funds do not have fixed pre-determined budgets but have to cover all expenses of
their insured members. This means that the contribution rate has to be adjusted if the
income does not match the expenditure. The main goal of cost containment policy was to
limit expenditure growth to the rate of growth of contributory income in order to keep
contribution rates stable. Therefore spending caps were introduced.
All budgets within the statutory health insurance system are on the providers’ side and not
the payers’ side. While some budgets limit expenditure of individual funds (capitation
payments to regional physicians’ associations for ambulatory care), others do not have that
effect (expenditure under a hospital budget or a pharmaceutical spending cap is divided
between funds according to actual utilisation of their members).
When the full-cost cover principle was abolished in the Health Care Structure Act (1992) and
hospitals were allowed to make both profits and deficits, fixed budgets were calculated for
each hospital. Prospective case fees and procedure fees were then introduced from 1996.
Fixed budgets were presented as an interim measure until this prospective payment system
took effect.
Case fees are supposed to cover all costs during a hospital stay while procedure fees are
reimbursed on top of per diem charges. Case fees are based on a combination of a certain
diagnosis and a specific intervention. Procedure fees are only based on an intervention and
more than one procedure fee may be remunerated per case. Points were set for the case
and procedure fees by the Federal Ministry of health while the states negotiated the
monetary conversion factor. Points were calculated by comparing costs and length of stay
with comparable DRG reimbursements in the USA. The percentage of cases reimbursed
through prospective case fees in Germany is less than a quarter, with wide variations
between specialties. While no case fees exist for medical, paediatric or psychiatric patients,
more than 50 percent of cases in gynaecology and obstetrics and about two-thirds of
ophthalmologic cases are reimbursed in this way.
The number of case-fees and procedure-fees is subject to the budget negotiations at
hospital level. Case fees, procedure fees and per diem charges are all part of the budget for
each particular hospital. These budgets are not budgets in the sense that the hospital will get
an amount of money independent of actual activity. Instead, the budgets are targets
established through negotiations between the sickness funds and the hospital. The target
budget establishes service numbers as well as per diem charges.
If the hospital reaches 100 percent of its target activity then no financial adjustment is made
since the sum of all case and procedure fees plus the per diems exactly equals the target
budget. If actual activity is higher than the target (the hospital has been reimbursed above
the target budget), then it has to pay back a certain part of the extra income. If actual activity
is lower than the target then it receives some of the difference.
All budgets in Germany are based on historical expenditure patterns and not according to a
needs-based formula. Legislation has aimed mainly to contain increases in expenditure.
Therefore budgets or spending caps were introduced which were based on actual
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2.7.5 Payment of health care professionals
Payment of physicians occurs through two steps, firstly the sickness funds make total
payments to the physicians’ associations for the remuneration of all social health insurance-
affiliated doctors. This releases them from the duty of paying the doctors directly. Total
payment is usually negotiated as a capitation per member or per insured person. The
capitation which usually varies between substitute and other funds within the state, covers all
services by all social health insurance-affiliated physicians of all specialties. The physicians’
associations then have to distribute these total payments among their members according to
a ‘Uniform Value Scale’ and additional regulations.
All approved medical procedures are listed in the Uniform Value Scale. While the coverage
decision is made by the Federal Committee of Physicians and Sickness Funds, a separate
joint committee at the federal level, the Valuation Committee, is responsible for the Uniform
Value Scale which lists all services which can be provided by physicians for remuneration
within the statutory health insurance system.
At the end of each quarter, every office-based physician invoices their physicians’
association for the total number of service points delivered (as attributed in the Uniform
Value Scale). The actual reimbursement will depend on a number of factors:
•  The number of reimbursable points per patient is limited
•  The total budget negotiated with the sickness funds is divided by the total number of
delivered and reimbursable points for all services within a regional physicians’
association so that the monetary value of each point cannot be predicted as it depends
on the total number of points. The monetary value is then used to calculate the
physicians’ quarterly remuneration.
•  The actual reimbursement may further be modified through the ‘Remuneration
Distribution Scale’ which is different for every physicians’ association so that minimum or
maximum point values for different specialties or service categories are regulated to
adjust for large variations between specialties.
There are also control mechanisms to prevent over-utilisation or false claims which are run
by utilisation review committees with an equal number of physicians and sickness fund
representatives. A physician’s level of service provision or hospital referrals per capita may
be randomly reviewed and if unjustifiable, financial penalties can be incurred.
2.8 Health care delivery system
A key feature of the German health care delivery system is the clear institutional boundaries
between the publicly provided health services, primary and secondary ambulatory care
through office-based physicians and hospital care which has traditionally been confined to
inpatient care. The separation between the latter two is stricter than in other countries and
only the Health Care Structure Act (1992) eroded this separation somewhat by allowing day-
surgery in hospitals and a limited amount of ambulatory pre- and post-inpatient care.
All ambulatory care has been organised almost exclusively on the basis of office-based
physicians who for the majority have a solo practice and finance their own premises,
equipment and personnel. They offer almost all specialties, though around 40 percent are
GPs. Of the 287 000 active physicians in 1998, 135 800 worked in hospitals, 124 600 in
ambulatory care (112 700 as social health insurance-accredited physicians, 7 800 as
salaried physicians and 4 100 purely for private patients), 10 500 in public health services,
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industry. Around 5 percent of all office-based physicians have the right to treat patients
inside the hospital. All other physicians transfer their patients to hospital physicians for
inpatient treatment. Office-based physicians again do post-surgical care. Germany has no
gate-keeping system and patients are therefore free to select a sickness fund affiliated
doctor of their choice, which means they frequently choose direct office-based specialists.
Because of different reimbursement profiles and the lower status of family practice in
ambulatory care, the number of office-based specialists has increased more rapidly than
numbers of general practitioners. As a result the sickness funds and private health insurers
introduced a three-year programme which offers financial incentives to GP-trainees and
senior family practitioners during the office-based training period. Physician’s associations
agreed with the programme despite scepticism about undue intervention in professional
autonomy.
German hospitals concentrate on inpatient care and only university hospitals have formal
outpatient facilities. Day cases are also new for German hospitals. Around 850 hospitals are
publicly owned, another 850 are private non-profit, while 380 are private for-profit, giving
around 70.7 beds per 10 000 population with an average occupancy of 80 percent. Until the
early 1990s, new beds in preventive and rehabilitative institutions largely compensated for
the decreasing number of acute beds. The increasing number of inpatient cases offset the
shorter length of stay so that occupancy rates and bed days per capita remained relatively
stable. After re-unification, hospitals were faced with a rapidly changing environment of fixed
budgets, the possibility of deficits and profits, ambulatory surgery and the introduction of
prospective payments from 1996. As a result the hospital sector in Germany today is much
less stable and by international comparison, ‘hospital’ beds (all beds including preventive
and rehabilitative), admissions and length of stay are well above average. However, while
expenditure per bed and day has risen in the last few years, expenditure per case has
actually declined since 1996, meaning that efficiency has increased.
2.9 Pharmaceuticals
Pharmaceutical expenditure has been relatively effectively controlled from the point of view
of the statutory sickness funds. Steep increases have always been followed by decreases
largely as a result of cost sharing measures, prescription limitation, reference prices
introduced in 1989 and the pharmaceutical spending cap from 1993 to 1997 and again since
1999.
The idea behind reference prices was to establish an upper limit for the costs that would be
reimbursable by the sickness funds. While the Federal Committee of Physicians and
Sickness Funds is responsible for the classification of drugs, the federal associations of
sickness funds undertake the price setting. Although the pharmaceutical industry partly
compensated for the lower prices of reference price drugs through above average increases
for non-reference price drugs, the savings for sickness funds was roughly 9 percent of their
pharmaceutical expenditure.
The share of reference priced drugs increased significantly to more than 60 percent by 1997.
The result for patients was a general increase in co-payments. For drugs priced below the
reference price, there was no co-payment, but if a patient wished to choose a more
expensive drug than that covered by the sickness fund, they had to pay the difference. For
drugs with no reference price, the patient had to pay a flat-rate co-payment per package of
DM 3.
The Act to Strengthen Solidarity in Statutory Health Insurance (1998) set tighter regulations
for setting reference prices such that they could not be higher than the highest price in the
lowest third of the market which would supposedly bring about lower prices and a large
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successfully sued. In 1999, a court argued that price setting by the sickness fund violates EU
cartel regulations. Therefore, the health minister plans to put reference prices on a new legal
basis by fixing them through ordinance from the Ministry of Health.
The spending cap for pharmaceuticals imposed a real reduction in pharmaceutical
expenditure primarily as a result of changes in physician prescribing behaviour. While the
regional spending caps were abolished in 1998 and practice-specific soft targets introduced
(with doubtful sanctioning mechanisms), the Act to Strengthen Solidarity in Statutory Health
Insurance re-introduced spending caps for pharmaceuticals at regional level. Physicians
associations were liable for any over-spending up to 105 percent of the cap.
The coverage of drugs by the statutory health insurance schemes is regulated in the
pharmaceutical guidelines of the Federal Committee of Physicians and Sickness Funds and
forms part of the contract at the federal level. The guidelines which are legally binding, either
limit the prescription of certain drugs to certain indications (such as anabolics to cancer
patients), specify that they may only be prescribed after non-pharmaceutical treatments were
unsuccessful or disallow any prescription at all (such as drugs to quit smoking).
In early 1999, the Federal Committee explicitly stated that licensing is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for coverage in the statutory health insurance system. The guidelines list
a number of reasons for not including drugs in the benefit package:
•  They are not necessary for treating diseases (for example ‘Viagra’)
•  Other pharmaceuticals are more effective and/or cost-effective
•  Non-pharmaceutical treatments are more effective and/or cost-effective
The number of drug groups for which prescriptions have been limited or prohibited has
grown enormously. The proposed Reform Act of Statutory Health Insurance of 2000 will
again likely introduce a positive list of reimbursable pharmaceuticals.
2.10 Conclusions
Since the 1970s, the main goal of sickness funds and providers has been cost containment
through maintaining a stable contribution rate. The basic principle behind ‘German-style’ cost
containment has been ‘income-oriented expenditure policy to guarantee stable contribution
rates. This has been an important objective in a time of economic restructuring and growing
international competition, since contributions cover all ambulatory care, pharmaceuticals and
all hospital care and are jointly paid by employers and employees. Increases in contribution
rates therefore became a question of international competitiveness.
While cost containment measures led to a moderation of health care expenditure growth and
stabilised sickness funds’ expenditures as a proportion of GDP, the contribution rate has still
increased slowly but regularly (from 10.4 percent in 1975 to 13.5 percent in 1999) with cost
containment measures having only minor and transient effects. Rising health care
expenditure (which rises in line with GDP) is not responsible for an increase in contributions,
but the shrinking proportion of GDP used for wages from which all social insurance
contributions are financed. Thus larger profits by employers, a higher level of unemployment
and wage increases below productivity have caused a relative reduction in the financial flow
to the social insurance system since contributions are based only on labour. It is therefore
now perceived that there is a financing crisis rather than an expenditure crisis.
However, due to re-unification, health care expenditure as a percentage of GDP has risen
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have been of varying forms and efficacy but have been generally more successful in
containing costs than any of the other supply or demand-side measures which have largely
failed. Another focus will be on changes to the reimbursement mechanisms that currently
favour unnecessary or excessive treatments such as per diem charges in hospitals being
replaced by an all-encompassing case-based system.
In spite of the cost-containment acts that have been passed, the German system places
more emphasis on free access, technology and high numbers of providers than cost-
effectiveness or cost containment per se. The public supports these priorities and waiting
lists and explicit rationing are almost unknown. Because all decision-making is through
negotiation, any cuts in health care benefits would have to be supported by both the
sickness funds and providers which is currently uncommon. There is however a slow shift
towards evidence-based medicine, health technology assessment and the support of cuts
according to such evidence.
One definite weakness in the German system is the fragmentation and separation between
the social health insurance and the social retirement insurance (which covers the majority of
rehabilitative care) on the one hand and between ambulatory care and inpatient care on the
other hand. There is potential for duplication of services and inappropriate referrals which
are made too early or too late. Related to the separation issue is the weak role of primary
care and the absence of gatekeepers (GPs). This would require strengthening the role of
GPs with respect to office-based specialists and increasing awareness in the population of
the ability of GPs to steer patients through the system. Office-based specialists will also
increasingly have to face competition with the hospital sector which will be opened for
ambulatory treatment.
True competition in the German health care system has not been possible since the
sickness funds have to offer almost all the same benefits for a very similar contribution rate
and the range of providers is also the same since they are contracted collectively. The funds
are therefore increasingly demanding greater flexibility for selective contracting. While policy-
makers are cautiously supporting this, they are also keen to retain a system with equal
access and service quality for all the insured population. The courts are slowly supporting
selective contracting with the reasoning that joint decisions of sickness funds constitute
monopoly power and the latest reform act has therefore removed the requirement that funds
must get an approval to contract from the respective physicians’ association.
The current government introduced the new medium- to long term reform into parliament in
June 1999 and it will be effective from 2000 onwards (The Reform Act of Social Health
Insurance 2000). This act has tried to pick up many of the system’s weaknesses. It includes
the removal of ineffective technologies and pharmaceuticals from the sickness funds benefit
list and the strengthening of health technology assessment. Decision-making under
corporatist arrangements is extended to the hospital sector by establishing a joint committee
of hospitals and sickness funds and a positive list of reimbursable drugs is to be approved by
the Federal Council. The act allows contracts between sickness funds and providers to cross
the line between ambulatory and inpatient care thus increasing co-operation of GPs,
ambulatory specialists and hospitals. In ambulatory care, the budget for GPs will be
separated from that of specialists.
Global budgets were proposed for sickness funds through which they are legally obliged to
spend only as much as they receive through contributions. Additionally the dual financing of
hospitals was proposed to be replaced by sickness funds having to cover all costs including
capital costs through a case-based fee system covering all patients. In the end, the act did
not contain the requirement for global budgets and the proposed change for hospital
financing also failed. As far as reimbursement of running costs is concerned, from 2003 aSocial Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 39
new payment system based on uniform case fees taking ‘complexities and co-morbidities’
into account will replace the current mixed system with per diems varying between hospitals
alongside uniform case and procedure fees.Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 40Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 41
3. Switzerland
3.1 Introduction and overview
Switzerland, officially known as the Swiss Confederation, is a federal republic made up of 23
cantons with a population of just over 7 million. There are four principal language
communities: Germans account for 65 percent of the population, the French 18 percent, the
Italians for 10 percent and the Romansch for 1 percent.
The senior executive body is the Federal Council which consists of seven ministers of equal
rank who are elected for a four-year term by parliament. Each year one of the ministers is
elected to be President of the Swiss Confederation, which as a position has no additional
power except to chair meetings of the Federal Council and to carry out representative duties.
Since 1959, the Federal Council consists of two representatives each of the Radical Free
Democratic Party, the Christian Democratic People’s Party, the Social Democratic Party and
one representative of the Democratic Union of the Centre which supports the interests of
farmers and the business community.
Executive bodies at all levels of authority are based on a collegial system. Although
members are from different political parties, they do not form a coalition and vote according
to their convictions, but all members must then uphold decisions collectively.
The parliament consists of two chambers, the National Council represents the population as
a whole where members are elected for four years and seats distributed according to the
number of votes per party, and the Council of States with 46 members which represent the
cantons. Each canton elects two members according to its own electoral system.
Cantons are sovereign in all matters that are not specifically designated the responsibility of
the Swiss Confederation by the federal constitution and each have their own constitution and
legislative authority. Members of the cantonal executives are directly elected by popular
vote.
Like the Federal Council, the individual members of a cantonal executive participate in
collective decisions of the cantonal government and take responsibility for one or more
administrative departments or directorates. The cantons finance the activities of their
administration primarily through income tax and property tax on individuals and corporations.
The cantons can allow for referendums on decisions to be approved by popular law and are
also responsible for the administration of the judicial system and civil and criminal court
matters.
Switzerland has about 2900 municipalities that have rights and duties that are laid down by
cantonal laws. The most obvious sign of autonomy is that municipalities are also entitled to
levy income tax and property tax on individuals and corporations. They are also free to set
the rate of tax. Some municipalities, depending on the rules of the canton, can formulate
policies in many areas such as on schools, cultural activities, energy supplies, building
regulations, transport, social care, adult education and sport.
The population is involved in the process of political decision-making more directly than in
most countries. Through popular petitions the citizens can make changes to the constitution.
This requires the signatures of 100 000 voters to be collected within a period of 18 months.
Any amendments to the Federal Constitution must be passed by popular ballot of the whole
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Federal laws are therefore passed by parliament (the National Council and the Council of
States) and must then be passed by referendum before they become legislation. The
government (Federal Council) passes ordinances, which elaborate laws. Federal decrees
also elaborate laws and can be passed by either parliament (in which case they must be
approved by referendum) or Federal Council.
Switzerland has attained prosperity mainly through technological expertise and export
manufacturing. Tourism and international finance are important sources of income. The
economy has grown in recent years with GDP increasing at an annual rate of around 1.6
percent. The unemployment rate was 5.2 percent in 1997, which declined to 3.4 percent in
1999. The dependency ratio (number of people aged 19 and under or 65 and over divided
by the number of people 20-64 years of age) was 59.4 in 1995 which is low compared to the
rest of the European Union.
3.2 Health status
Life expectancy at birth was 78.8 in 1994 while infant mortality was 5.1 per 1000 live births,
better than many other European countries (see Appendix A for national comparisons). The
leading causes of death are malignant neoplasms, followed by ischaemic heart disease and
cerebrovascular disease.
3.3 A brief history of the Swiss healthcare system
Switzerland has an extremely well developed health care system. In the early 1990s
substantial efforts were made to limit excess capacity and co-ordinate health care nationally
after it had undergone massive expansion in a largely uncoordinated fashion after the
Second World War. Until the early 1970s there were shortages of certain health
professionals and in some rural areas health care was inadequate. These shortages have
been addressed and today the number of doctors is instead considered to be too high by
Swiss policymakers.
The cantons and municipalities were for many years almost exclusively responsible for
health and welfare. At its inception in 1848 the Swiss Confederation had practically no
legislative powers in this area. This situation changed gradually and in 1877 the qualifying
examinations for doctors, pharmacists and veterinarians were standardised throughout
Switzerland. From then on several laws were passed regarding public health and safety at
federal level.
In 1890 the federal government was given a constitutional mandate to legislate on sickness
and accident insurance. An attempt to introduce a system of health insurance in Switzerland
was made as early as 1899 with the tabling of a health and accident insurance law. The first
proposal was rejected but after changes, was resubmitted and passed by referendum in
1911. The health insurance law required health insurance funds that wished to take
advantage of federal subsidies to register with the Federal Office for Social Insurance. The
rules of inclusion obligated funds to provide a defined package of benefits which included
ambulatory care, drugs and hospital stays of limited duration and to allow people a certain
degree of freedom to change funds (such as change of address or change of job). It also
imposed a limit of 10 percent on the difference in contribution rates for men and women and
prohibited funds from making a profit. The funds were subsidised by the federal government
according to the number of people they insured. The law left it to cantons to decide whether
the insurance was compulsory. The financial situation of the funds rapidly deteriorated as a
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Several attempts were made to completely overhaul the system but they all failed at
referendum, so from 1958 efforts were restricted to partial reform of the health insurance
system. This was completed successfully in 1964 and led primarily to improvements in the
financial position of the health insurance funds. The reforms included a revised system of
subsidies to the funds based on age and gender and the introduction of compulsory user
charges in the statutory health insurance system. The direct charges to patients included a
deductible for those over the age of 20 years and a coinsurance for all patients on all
services. The subsidies were calculated on the basis of health care expenditure in the
previous year and amounted to 10 percent of average total expenditure for men, 35 percent
for women and 30 percent for children. The financial problems which began as early as 1911
and continued until the partial reform in 1964 did not result in any funds going formally
bankrupt but the number of funds declined significantly.
The main area of concern in the 1970s and 1980s was the sharp rate at which expenditure
was rising in the health system. There were several further attempts at reform, including two
referenda in 1974 and 1987 but both failed. Both reforms contained a complex mix of
proposals relating to cost control, the benefit package, maternity insurance and compulsory
insurance. The revised health insurance law, which was passed by the parliament in 1994,
was approved by referendum and came into force in 1996. It pursued two fundamental
objectives, to strengthen solidarity and to contain costs.
3.4 Organisational structure and relationships of key actors
The health care system in Switzerland is characterised by both liberalism and federalism.
The liberal orientation means that state intervention will only occur when private initiative
fails to produce satisfactory results, thus it only acts as a safety net or provider of last resort.
This explains the relatively major role that actors outside the public sector play. Federalism
means that the Swiss Confederation can legislate only when empowered to do so by the
constitution. The constitution only grants limited powers to the Confederation over the health
care system. The cantons may also delegate tasks to the municipalities.
These principles result in a complicated system in which many different actors are involved.
Most of the changes in the system have entered into force with the health insurance law of
1996 and are continually being adjusted by further ordinances and revisions passed by
Parliament.
3.4.1 Federal level
The federal constitution lists the legally defined responsibilities of the federal government,
which relate to a number of different areas. One area of responsibility is the eradication of
communicable or widespread diseases of humans and animals. The Swiss Federal Office
handles most of the responsibilities for public health, although the task of implementing
these laws is delegated to the cantons. Another area of responsibility is the promotion of
exercise and sport through sports facilities, events and research.
Social insurance provision through the health insurance law, the accident insurance law, the
disability insurance law and the military insurance law is a further area of responsibility. The
Federal Office for Social Insurance is responsible for these except for military insurance,
which falls under the Federal Office for Military Insurance. This covers damage to health
sustained during service for the federal government such as military service, civil defence
duties, emergency relief and peacekeeping duties. The federal government is the sole
provider of disability insurance and military insurance. This contrasts with compulsory health
insurance and compulsory accident insurance, which are provided by a variety of insurance
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system of maternity insurance to cover women for loss of pay during pregnancy and
childbirth. All attempts to do so have however failed to pass in public referenda (1984, 1987
and 1999).
Regulations governing medical examinations and qualifications of health care professionals
are also a federal responsibility. Since 1877 when the federal law on the freedom of medical
personnel was enacted, the federal government has been responsible for the accreditation
of ‘scientific professions’ including doctors, dentists, veterinarians and pharmacists. They are
required to pass a federal examination to practice anywhere in Switzerland but then also
need to apply for a licence to practice from the cantonal authorities. The Swiss Medical
Association regulates specialist medical training.
There is a public consensus that federal government should have the main responsibility in
the areas of genetic engineering, reproductive medicine, transplant medicine and medical
research. The government has had constitutional mandates in several of these areas
(reproductive technology and genetic technology in 1992, transplant medicine in 1999) and
some laws have subsequently been passed (reproductive medicine in 1998).
The statistics law requires the federal government to compile data on health and the health
care system. The health insurance law contains additional regulations that empower the
Federal Council to collect statistical data (such as expenditure and utilisation data)
necessary to implement the law.
The legislation on labour and the protection of workers empowers the federal government to
compel employers to take the necessary measures to protect the health and safety of
workers. Responsibilities for environmental protection are embodied in a waterways
protection law, environmental protection law, radiation protection law and safety of technical
facilities and equipment law.
Finally, the Swiss Federal Office for Public Health collaborates with the World Health
Organisation and the Council of Europe as well as the Swiss Conference of the Cantonal
Ministers of Public Health to promote international co-operation.
3.4.2 Cantonal level
The health service is one of the areas where the cantons have a declining but still relatively
high degree of independence. The cantonal activities involve the regulation of health
matters, the provision of health care, disease prevention and health education and the
implementation of federal laws.
The regulation of health matters
The cantons determine the conditions under which health professions may receive a licence
to practice. They also authorise the opening of a medical practice or a pharmacy. Cantons
have established the Intercantonal Union for the Control of Medicines to standardise the
registration and control of medicines nationally.
The provision of health care
Most cantons operate their own hospitals and some also subsidise private patients. They
provide inpatient care in hospitals and residential nursing homes. There are also private
clinics that do not receive any state support. The revised health insurance law requires the
cantons to draw up plans for providing hospital care according to need and to produce a list
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insurance. This includes public and publicly subsidised hospitals but can also include private
providers. Global budgets for public and publicly subsidised hospitals were introduced in five
cantons in 1994 and have since been introduced in others. The exact way in which budgets
operate varies between cantons.
The cantons can provide nursing and home care or delegate this responsibility. Most
cantons delegate at least some of the tasks to municipalities. The cantons are in any case
responsible for licensing providers of nursing and home care services.
The cantonal government endorses the fee schedule negotiated and agreed between
service providers and associations of health insurance funds in each canton. If the parties
are unable to agree the cantonal government determines the fee schedule.
Cantons are also responsible for emergency, rescue and disaster-aid services including
emergency transport and ambulance services.
Basic and specialty medical training is provided at seven cantonal universities and public
hospitals and clinics. Training follows the federal regulations on medical examinations and
qualifications. The Swiss Medical Association regulates postgraduate training for doctors.
The cantons also regulate all major health-related occupations. Training is delegated to the
Swiss Red Cross.
Disease prevention and health education
The cantons’ activities in these areas vary widely in scope and nature. In 1989 the federal
government and the Association of Swiss Health Insurance Companies set up the Swiss
Foundation for Health Promotion. In 1996 the Foundation was designated as the national
institution responsible for initiating, co-ordinating and evaluating measures designed to
promote health and prevent disease in accordance with the health insurance law of 1994.
The Federal Office for Social Insurance supervises the Foundation but the management
body of the Foundation includes representation from the cantons.
The implementation of federal laws
In most of its areas of responsibility the federal government has delegated powers of
implementation to the cantons.
3.4.3 Municipal level
The cantonal health laws confer responsibility for health policy on the municipalities. The
responsibility for providing nursing care for certain groups is usually delegated to the
municipalities with the emphasis on home care, residential and nursing homes for elderly
people and community-based mental health services.
The municipalities in turn have delegated responsibility to independent organisations for
most home care services. Larger municipalities and associations of municipalities often run
their own residential and nursing homes for elderly. Municipalities run nursing homes and
hospitals either alone or in conjunction with other municipalities through hospital
associations or are represented on the boards of such facilities. The municipalities are also
responsible for supporting and counselling pregnant women and mothers, providing
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3.4.4 Health insurance companies
In 1999 there were 109 insurance companies that offered compulsory health insurance in
Switzerland compared to 207 companies in 1993 offering statutory health insurance. (Before
the health insurance law of 1996, officially authorised statutory health insurance existed, but
much of it was voluntary. Since 1996, however, health insurance has been compulsory.)
Only those insurance providers who comply with the requirements of the health insurance
law and are registered with the Federal Office for Social Insurance may provide compulsory
health insurance. These companies which are all non-profit, provide policies for occupational
and non-occupational accident insurance, old age and disability and maternity insurance.
They also dominate the market for supplementary health insurance policies known as
‘private’ and ‘semi-private’ policies, which cover additional benefits not covered by
compulsory health insurance, in other words free choice of hospital doctor and superior
levels of hospital accommodation. Non-registered insurance companies provide other types
of insurance and have a small share of the market for supplementary policies. In 1998 there
were 63 registered insurance companies offering supplementary policies compared to 61
non-registered companies.
The registered companies that are allowed to offer compulsory health insurance may be
federal, regional, religious or occupational based. They are not allowed to refuse an
individual’s application for compulsory health insurance coverage. The policies are also
uniform and cover the same package of benefits.
The regulation of the funds in relation to administration, accounting and premium
calculations intensified substantially in 1996 when the revised health insurance law came
into force. Many small funds could no longer participate in this drive for professionalism and
withdrew or merged with larger funds. This has not yet resulted in any action on monopolies
by the Swiss Competition Commission, as 109 companies were still active in the compulsory
health insurance market in 1999.
The health insurance companies have grouped together to form cantonal or intercantonal
associations that negotiate fees with service providers. Registered insurance companies can
request the canton to set a global budget for financing hospitals and nursing homes as a
one-off temporary measure to contain an excessive increase in expenditure although this
provision has never been exercised.
All health insurance companies in Switzerland are members of the Association of Swiss
Health Insurance Companies. The main functions of the Association are:
•  Representing the interests of the members to political bodies including influencing the
legislation process, reforming the fee schedule and representing the insurance
companies in federal commissions.
•  Compiling statistics including collecting data on expenditure and utilisation of members
which is used for fee negotiations.
•  Negotiating with service providers at the national level on fee schedules, quality
assurance and other matters.
•  Supporting the cantonal associations when they appeal against the decision of a
cantonal government to the Federal Council, and
•  Training in areas of health insurance accounting, administration and management.
When the revised health insurance law came into force in 1996 the registered insurance
companies established a joint organisation known as Foundation 18. Its responsibilities are
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responsible for risk adjustment between the registered companies and to meet international
obligations for reimbursing health care services. At present this concerns, for example,
people insured by a sickness fund in Germany who use health care services in Switzerland.
The joint organisation pays the service provider and is later reimbursed by the German fund.
For people insured in Switzerland using German health care services, the joint organisation
reimburses the German funds based on a special agreement between Germany and
Switzerland. As soon as the bilateral agreement between the EU and Switzerland comes
into force (around 2001), the joint organisation will extend its activities to all 15 EU countries.
3.4.5 Professional associations
Doctors are organised into cantonal medical associations. These negotiate fee levels with
the cantonal associations of health insurance companies. Everyone who is a member of the
Swiss Medical Association has to be a member of a cantonal association. The Swiss
Medical Association regulates and accredits postgraduate medical training for doctors and
confers qualifications for training on doctors who are members.
The Swiss Dental Association is also a professional and representative organisation. Part of
its function is legal advice, political representation and assistance in establishing and
developing dental practices.
Pharmacists are members of the Swiss Pharmacists’ Association. Its main functions are
similar to the other professional associations and include provision of scientific information
for pharmacies.
Other health-related professions are represented by organisations specific to their
occupation. These represent the interests of their members in dealing with employers and
are involved in drawing up training guidelines issued by the Swiss Red Cross. Various
occupational organisations also offer courses of specialist training. Most of the occupational
organisations are represented by an umbrella organisation, the Swiss Federation of
Healthcare Professional Associations, which represents its members' interests at the
national level. It has a seat on the federal government’s advisory committee that considers
proposals for extending the package of compulsory health insurance benefits.
3.4.6 Hospital associations
The Swiss Association of Hospitals is called ‘H+ The Swiss Hospitals’. Its main tasks are to
represent the interests of all hospitals, provide in-service training for managers, develop
management tools (such as cost accounting) and compile comparative statistics. It collects
both administrative statistics such as wage costs and input costs as well as medical statistics
about length of stay and service intensity. The private hospitals are also members of the
Swiss Association of Private Hospitals. The Association’s main functions are legal advice,
information provision and political representation.
At the cantonal level, the public and publicly subsidised hospitals have formed hospital
associations that negotiate fees with the health insurance companies. Private hospitals are
often also members of the cantonal hospital associations.
3.4.7 Other organisations
Patient and consumer organisations work on various committees to represent the interests
of the insured population. They have the right to be consulted in the process of negotiating
fee schedules between insurance companies and service providers. In general though, they
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3.5 Regulation and management of health care
Switzerland’s health care system is a liberal and decentralised system. Providers are free to
choose where to locate and patients are free to choose providers within a canton.
Federal and cantonal authorities have no direct planning controls over ambulatory services
but have significant controls over hospitals and residential nursing homes. Hospitals and
nursing homes can only be reimbursed for services under compulsory health insurance if
they are included in the canton’s official list of hospitals and nursing homes.  These lists are
drawn up as part of the canton’s planning. In most cantons the criteria are based on bed
requirements. The target number of acute beds per 1000 inhabitants varies between
cantons, between 2.6 and 3.5 beds per 1000 population for 2005. Planning objectives are
also not explicit and may vary between cantons and might include maximising efficiency,
containing inpatient expenditure, providing sufficient high quality inpatient care or meeting
the needs of the patients. The main aim of planning at the moment is to reduce excess
capacity and thus excessive costs. Some cantons might collaborate on planning.
Nevertheless a regional or even national consensus about hospital planning does not exist
at present.
The cantons’ decisions on hospital planning and lists can be challenged at the Federal
Council. Appeals are usually lodged by hospitals, which have been excluded from the list, or
by an insurance fund that considers the list to be too comprehensive. The Federal Council’s
decisions have mostly found in favour of the complainant and have thus resulted in
extension of the hospital and nursing home lists. The number of complaints regarding the
lists is falling, as there is greater convergence between the opinion of the federal state and
the cantons. Aside from the lists, some complaints also focused on the fees charged by the
hospitals, nursing homes, Spitex organisations (this term is used to describe organisations
which provide domiciliary care) and other providers of ambulatory services (such as doctors
and midwives). Many of these difficulties are attributed to start-up problems with a new
planning instrument.
Law defines the basic benefits package and the services covered by the compulsory health
insurance. The insurance provider will reimburse service providers if the services are
clinically effective, appropriate and cost-effective. These criteria also apply to
pharmaceuticals. Service providers are required to implement methods of assuring quality.
The National Association for Promoting Quality in Health Care, an independent network
made up of many of the key actors in the health sector, is the main body responsible for
developments in quality management and monitoring and co-ordinating work on a national
basis.
So far, the criteria that services must be clinically effective, appropriate and cost effective to
qualify for reimbursement has only been applied to services being considered to be added to
the benefits package. Existing services have not been subjected to these criteria. Quality
assurance measures vary greatly between cantons. Outline agreements have been reached
between insurance companies and service providers in the hospital sector, but implementing
such measures in ambulatory care are only just starting.
Due to the oversupply of doctors in Switzerland, some universities have set an entrance
examination for medicine which enables some control over the numbers entering the
profession. Neither the health insurance law of 1911 nor the revised law of 1994 has any
influence in the ambulatory care sector. Doctors can set up a practice in any location, the
only requirement being that they need to fulfil certain criteria such as a minimum period of
residence in the canton and postgraduate training so as to obtain cantonal licensing to
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per inhabitant. Similarly, there are no restrictions on pharmacists who want to open a
pharmacy.
Dentists, chiropractors and midwives are also reimbursed under the compulsory health
insurance scheme (in so far as their services are included in the benefits package).
Physiotherapists, nurses, speech therapists and dieticians who are self-employed, also need
a recognised qualification and a prescription from a doctor for any services carried out under
the compulsory health insurance system.
So-called Spitex organisations (providing domiciliary care) must meet certain requirements
as defined in the health insurance law, such as appropriate facilities and personnel with
recognised qualifications. They must also be licensed by the canton before they can work
under the compulsory health insurance system.
The Federal Department of Home Affairs decides which medicines are covered by
compulsory health insurance and what price they should be. It also decides which laboratory
tests, investigations or medical devices are covered by the compulsory health insurance.
The Federal Department of Home Affairs consults five commissions, four of which are
specialist commissions, (for example the Federal Commission for Pharmaceuticals) and the
fifth which is the Federal Commission for Fundamental Questions of Health Insurance. This
body has greater authority than the other four but is still only advisory. It has 17 members
with representatives from each of the four commissions, as well as the Federal Office for
Public Health, the Data Protection Agency, the Inter-cantonal Office for the Control of
Medicines, the Swiss Competition Commission and the cantons. It attempts to incorporate
ethical and practical considerations in defining the benefits package. The other commissions
have to comply with the decisions of this commission.
The regulatory powers of the federal government have increased considerably over the past
decades, in particular with respect to changes in statutory health insurance, which has
fundamentally affected the development of structures for the delivery of health care and how
the cantons finance health care services. The health insurance laws compel the cantons to
plan hospital provision and to limit the range of providers who will be reimbursed. It also
defines the general conditions by which all services will be assessed for reimbursement. In
this way there has been some centralisation of power at the federal level.
Reform proposals suggest that this process is intended to continue. The new federal
constitution adopted in April 1999 lays down the responsibility of the federal government for
the control of medicines and the training of health professionals other than doctors. Further
measures for transferring responsibility to the federal government are also under discussion.
At the same time, proposals have also been put forward to increase the powers of cantons
to intervene and to shift from state regulation to market regulation of health care provision.
3.6 Health care finance and expenditure
Switzerland’s health care system is largely financed through the compulsory health
insurance premiums. Since the revised health insurance law came into effect in 1996, all
permanent residents in Switzerland are legally obliged to purchase compulsory health
insurance policies. The premiums are community-rated (in other words they are the same for
each person taking out insurance with a particular company within a canton regardless of
individual risk rating). Prior to 1996, premiums were risk-rated, with the result that certain
individuals who were classed as high risk by the health insurance companies (the elderly
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Persons exempt from compulsory insurance under the new system are:
•  Public employees covered by military insurance,
•  Non-Swiss citizens residing for more than three months in Switzerland who have
insurance equivalent to the Swiss compulsory health insurance through a non-Swiss
insurance company or their employer, and who have written exemption.
Non-Swiss citizens are always treated in an emergency, who pays for the service is decided
afterwards. The cantons are obliged to inform their residents that they have to purchase
compulsory health insurance and they must also enforce this policy. Residents must obtain
insurance within three months of their arrival in a canton. If this is not adhered to, a
surcharge is calculated based on the premiums for a period twice as long as the time by
which the time limit is exceeded. If however the person is eligible for premium subsidies, the
municipality or canton will purchase the insurance and no surcharge is imposed. Individuals
who refuse to take out compulsory health insurance are forcibly assigned to a health
insurance company by the cantonal authority.
Compulsory health insurance can be purchased from a limited number of insurance
companies, both public and private, which are in turn monitored by the Federal Office for
Social Insurance to whom they must submit their accounts. The entire population is
guaranteed a free choice of insurance provider for compulsory health insurance and
insurance companies offering compulsory health insurance are not allowed to refuse an
individual’s application. Individuals can change their compulsory health insurance company
twice a year.
Insurance companies compete based on the level of the premium. There is no premium
fixing by the state; instead price competition appears to work with many people changing
companies on an annual basis depending on the premiums offered. The insurance
companies are not allowed to compete on the basis of benefits offered, as a package of
health care benefits is defined federally which all companies must offer. Opportunities for
competing on the basis of the quality of care are also fairly limited. Managed care and quality
competition are allowed under compulsory health insurance but are still not very common.
Compulsory health insurance contributions are community-rated, so that all subscribers to a
particular insurance company within a canton or canton sub-region, pay the same rate. The
insurance companies calculate their premiums based on estimates of health care
expenditure in a canton or sub-region. These premiums are audited annually by the Federal
Office for Social Insurance before they are introduced. If the premiums are too high, the
federal government can force the insurance company to reduce them before they are
introduced. In order to enforce this system of auditing, the cantons have a right to the
information held by the insurance companies about the calculations of the premiums. This
includes information on the method of calculation and the cost data used.
To reduce the impact of per capita premiums, the Confederation and the cantons subsidise
compulsory health insurance premiums through tax-financed allocations. In accordance with
the 1996 health insurance law, these public transfers must be used to provide a means-
tested subsidy which varies according to the income and wealth of the insured person. Prior
to 1996, the transfers were paid directly to the insurance companies, which reduced the level
of the premiums for all subscribers rather than targeting the subsidies.
The cantons have some autonomy to define the principles on which premium subsidies are
based. They are also free, within certain limits set at federal level, to choose the level at
which to fix the total cantonal (and federal) budget available for premium subsidy. In some
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their total income (such as 10 percent). In other cantons, premium subsidies vary according
to income and are phased out at a defined upper limit of income. For people on very low
incomes the entire premium, or a cantonal ‘reference price’, whichever is smaller, is paid
directly by the municipal or cantonal authorities.
Compulsory health insurance covers a broad range of services as defined in the health
insurance law. Supplementary health insurance cover (or direct payments) can fund the
services not covered by compulsory health insurance. Estimates suggest about one in four
people in Switzerland have one of the major supplementary health insurance policies known
as private or semi-private. In contrast to the community-rated compulsory schemes,
supplementary health insurance premiums are usually risk-rated.
Per capita premiums for compulsory health insurance require some risk adjustment between
health insurance companies in order that those with high risk subscribers are not penalised.
With the revised health insurance law of 1996, new mechanisms for risk adjustment have
been created. The formula is based on the age and sex of the insured persons. Some health
insurance companies are currently proposing a revised formula that would also take account
of the number of hospital treatments in the past year. Foundation 18 is responsible for
calculating and making the transfer between insurance companies.
The structure of health care expenditure has changed considerably in the past 20 years as
shown in the table below.
Table 5: Main Sources of Health Care Finance in Switzerland, as a Percentage of Total
Health Expenditure, 1980 - 1997
Source of finance 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Public 65.1 63.3 65.2 65.8 66.3 67.9 57.8 57.4 58.8 59.1
Taxes









- 6.3 6.0 6.2 6.6 7.0 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7
Private 32.4 33.6 32.4 31.8 31.4 30.4 40.3 40.7 39.5 38.7
Out of pocket
4,5 32.4 33.6 32.4 31.8 30.1 29.1 28.8 28.8 27.4 27.6
Supplementary
health insurance
  For profit
5 - - - - 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.2
  Not for profit
6 - - - - - - 10.2 10.9 10.9 10.0
Other payments
7 2.5 3.1 2.4 2.4 2.3 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.7 2.1
Note: 
1 Financing from central, regional and local public authorities as subsidies to hospitals, nursing homes
and home care, to compulsory (until 1996 statutory) health insurance, military insurance and public
health expenditures (such as prevention and administration).
2 Compulsory health insurance since 1996, statutory health insurance before 1996.
3 Occupational and non-occupational accident insurance, old age and disability insurance.
4 Direct payments from households to health care providers for services not covered by any compulsory
or supplementary private health insurance and cost sharing in the compulsory health insurance system.
5 Insurance companies (for profit) offering only supplementary private health insurance. Before 1992,
data included in Out of pocket.
6 Not for profit companies offering supplementary private insurance and also statutory health insurance
until 1996 and since 1996 also compulsory insurance. Data not available before 1994.
7 Payments from residents of other countries.
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•  Tax financing has decreased since 1980 from 31.7 percent of total expenditure to 24.9
percent in 1997.
•  Health insurance financing (the sum of compulsory and not for profit supplementary
health insurance) has increased since 1980 from 33.4 percent of total expenditure to
37.5 percent (27.5 + 10.0) in 1997.
•  Direct payments (the sum of cost sharing in the compulsory health insurance and for
profit supplementary health insurance) have decreased since 1980 from 32.4 percent of
total expenditure to 28.8 percent (27.6 + 1.2) in 1997.
3.6.1 Complementary sources of finance
Federal, cantonal and municipal tax revenues are a major source of financing. These cover:
•  Cantonal subsidies to private and public hospitals
•  Cantonal and municipal subsidies to nursing homes and home care providers
•  Cantonal and federal subsidies for compulsory health insurance premiums
•  Premiums for military health insurance paid by the federal government
•  Public health expenditures (disease prevention and health care administration)
In 1997, these subsidies paid out of taxation accounted for 24.9 percent of total health care
expenditure, whereas compulsory health insurance financed 27.5 percent. Before 1996 this
insurance was statutory (but not compulsory) and up to 1994 also included expenditure by
supplementary health insurance. Occupational and non-occupational accident insurance, old
age and disability insurance financed 6.7 percent of total health care expenditure in 1997.
Employers are obliged to insure their employees for compulsory accident insurance or it can
be purchased on a supplementary basis by those not in employment and covers ambulatory
and inpatient treatment costs and transportation costs as a result of occupational and leisure
accidents. Military insurance is paid by the Swiss Confederation (through federal taxes) and
covers health care, accident and transportation costs. Employers and employees pay old
age and disability insurance and finance pensions and health care costs of the elderly and
people handicapped since birth.
The above table shows that direct out-of-pocket payments amounted to 27.6 percent of total
health care expenditure in 1997. This resulted from a combination of co-payment under
compulsory health insurance (previously statutory health insurance) and direct out-of-pocket
payments for services not covered by the benefits package.
Most insurance policies require that people pay a fixed part of the costs in the form of a
deductible. This is set annually and varies between compulsory health insurance policies.
The minimum is Sw. fr. 230 whereas there is usually no deductible for children up to the age
of 18 (and for some insurance companies, 25 years). Insurance companies are allowed to
offer higher deductible rates (up to Sw. fr. 1500 for adults and Sw. fr. 375 for children). The
individual may then choose the level of deductible they wish to pay, but the premium is
higher if a lower level of deductible is chosen.
In addition to the deductible, there is a 10 percent co-insurance on the price of all services
covered by compulsory health insurance which has to be paid by patients in the form of a
direct payment. The upper limit for co-insurance was Sw. fr. 600 for adults and Sw. fr. 300
for children (in 1999). The co-insurance may apply to a standardised price for one item of
service or it may apply to the price of a specified number of treatments (an episode of care).
In some cases, part of the cost is only reimbursed if the frequency of utilisation of services is
within specified limits, otherwise the full cost of the service will have to be borne by the
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services that are excluded from compulsory health insurance cover must be financed by
direct payment by the patient (unless covered by supplementary health insurance).
In 1997 supplementary health insurance financed 11.2 percent of total health care. The most
popular supplementary health insurance policies are those that allow free choice of doctor
and cover for superior inpatient accommodation (private and semi-private cover). Others that
are less popular cover treatments and repatriations for people leaving Swiss territory,
complementary medicine, dental care and drugs which are not expressly mentioned in the
lists of medications and pharmaceutical products.
The insurance companies which provide compulsory health insurance, are also the main
providers of supplementary health insurance. There are no tax incentives to encourage
people to take out supplementary insurance. The number of people with supplementary
insurance is actually declining due to the rising level of premiums and the expansion of the
compulsory health insurance benefits package which makes supplementary insurance less
attractive.
3.6.2 Health care benefits and rationing
The revised health insurance law defines the basic package of health care services covered
by compulsory health insurance. This has been enlarged to now include inpatient and
outpatient care for the elderly and physically and mentally handicapped. The other main
additions were unlimited stay in nursing homes, home care, unlimited stay in hospitals,
accidents (if not covered by accident insurance), diagnostic and therapeutic equipment,
transport, limited dental treatment, and disease prevention and health promotion such as
mammography, screening for newborn babies and hepatitis vaccination. Since July 1999 the
package includes alternative therapy or complementary medicine (provided the latter is
offered by doctors). Acupuncture is covered and homeopathy, neural therapy, phytotherapy
and Chinese medicine will be covered provisionally until 2005 when a final decision will be
made.
The health insurance law also defines which medical aids and devices are covered by
compulsory health insurance. The list indicates the maximum price the insurance provider
will pay for the aids and devices. The Federal Department of Home Affairs consults the
Federal Commission on Medical Aids and Devices and then decides what specific aids and
devices are to be covered by compulsory health insurance.
The following services are not included in the compulsory health insurance package:
•  Routine dental care such as check-ups, fillings, extractions or dentures. (Most dental
care is funded privately by the patient or through supplementary health insurance).
•  Psychotherapy provided by non-medically qualified practitioners and hypnosis.
•  Medicines not mentioned in the approved list of medicines and pharmaceutical products.
•  Non-essential interventions such as plastic surgery not related to accidents.
•  In vitro fertilisation.
The following services are only partly financed by compulsory health insurance according to
certain restrictions:
•  Spectacles
•  Therapies in thermal baths
•  Medical aids
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In general, services covered by compulsory health insurance must meet criteria of clinical
effectiveness, appropriateness and cost-effectiveness. The health insurance law states that
“for services provided over and above the level that is in the best interest of patients and
necessary for treatment, reimbursement may be denied”.
Rationing came under discussion with the use of extremely expensive orphan drugs
(developed to treat rare diseases) in university hospitals which had to be financed by some
cantons which had university hospitals.
Cost-containment measures undertaken since the introduction of the revised health
insurance law include:
•  Reducing the number of public and publicly subsidised hospitals and hospital beds
•  Merging public and publicly subsidised hospitals
•  Global budgeting for cantonal subsidies of hospitals
•  Regulating the retail price of drugs (fixed by the Federal Office for Social Insurance) and
health services by setting maximum limits
•  The introduction of Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs)
•  Managed care policies such as the establishment of health maintenance organisations
(HMOs), and
•  Referral through general practitioners.
Future cost containment policies are not intended to affect the extent and quality of benefit
coverage, they are intended to make the health care system more efficient.
3.6.3 Health care expenditure
Health expenditure as a share of GDP has continued to grow over the last two decades with
spending in 1996 reaching just over 10 percent of GDP (as shown in the table below). Only
Germany spends more on health care than Switzerland in the European region (see
Appendix B). In 1970 Switzerland spent a smaller proportion of GDP on health care than
France, Italy and Germany, but by the 1980s and mid 1990s, it outstripped all but Germany.
However, when calculated as per capita expenditure in US $ PPP, Switzerland tops all
countries (2547), exceeding even Germany (2339) and Luxembourg (2340), as well as
France (2103), the Netherlands (1825) and the United Kingdom (1347) (see Appendix A).
Table 6: Trends in Health Care Expenditure in Switzerland, 1970-1997
Total health care
expenditure
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997
Value in current prices
(Sw. fr. mill)
4697 9810 12373 18383 26308 35050 36940 37200
Value in constant 1990
prices (Sw. fr. mill)
14651 17537 18445 21196 26308 29039 30033 30024
Value in current prices,
per capita (US $ PPP)
252 483 801 1250 1760 2403 2499 2547
Share of GDP (%) 5.7 7.3 7.3 7.8 8.3 9.6 10.1 10.0




- - 65.1 63.3 65.2 57.4 58.8 -
Note: 
1 Public health expenditures since 1994 exclude supplementary health insurance and cost sharing for
compulsory health insurance. From 1994 onwards this includes compulsory health insurance, taxes and
other statutory insurance schemes such as accident insurance, old age and disability insurance.
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This is most likely a result of the high levels of supply (Switzerland has the highest hospital
density, concentration of high technology equipment and one of the highest doctor to
population ratios in Europe) and utilisation. Variation of expenditure and consumption within
the country is partly a result of cultural differences in utilisation rates with the predominantly
French speaking cantons consuming more services. It also relates to the density of providers
which is greater in urban areas.
The proportion of total health expenditure from government or public sources is one of the
lowest in the European region with 70 percent of total expenditure from public sources (see
Appendix A). The proportion of health care expenditure funded through public financing is
low relative to other western European countries because a large proportion of health care is
financed directly by patients or by supplementary insurance.
Switzerland’s health care system consumes significant resources but also offers a broad
range of high quality services. Nevertheless, the problem of increasing health expenditure
and controlling it is one of the main concerns of government.
The table below shows the proportion of total health expenditure that is spent on different
aspects of health care. The proportion spent on pharmaceuticals has slightly decreased from
1975 to 1996. Though this is not particularly significant in policy terms, it is due to several
factors:
•  The amount spent on inpatient care increased relative to pharmaceuticals.
•  Pharmaceuticals were more expensive in 1975 than in 1996 relative to other European
countries.
•  There was heavy regulation of the pharmaceutical industry by the Federal Office for
Social Insurance through the revisions to the drug list and the reduction in retail prices.
Table 7: Health Care Expenditures by Categories in Switzerland (as Percentage of
Total Expenditure on Health Care), 1970 - 1996
Total expenditure on 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1994 1995 1996
Inpatient care (%) 44.5 47.9 47.9 47.1 48.4 49.6 48.4 48.1
Pharmaceuticals (%) 17.3 12.9 13.6 12.6 11.5 11.0 11.2 11.1
Public investment (%) - 5.8 3.3 2.6 3.3 3.3 3.2 2.8
Source:  WHO (1999b)
3.6.4 Budget setting
Providers are mostly financed by payments from insurance companies or by direct payments
from patients (about 75 percent of health expenditure in 1997). Federal, cantonal and
municipal subsidies from tax revenue are used to fund hospitals, care for elderly and
handicapped people and means-tested premium subsidies for compulsory health insurance
(about 25 percent of health expenditure).
The Federal Parliament approves the budget for the contribution to subsidies for compulsory
health insurance premiums every four years. It has an annual budget-setting process for
federal disease prevention and health promotion activities.
Cantonal parliaments approve budgets annually for the cantonal contribution to compulsory
health insurance premium subsidies, prevention programmes and subsidies to public and
private hospitals. In some cases budgets are also set for the elderly and handicapped care
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Similarly municipalities approve budgets for subsidies to inpatient and outpatient care for the
elderly and handicapped and for disease prevention and health promotion. All the above
budgets are indicative rather than hard budgets.
Services provided in the ambulatory sector and outpatient and short-stay inpatient care in
the hospital sector are paid for under a fee-for-service payment system under compulsory
health insurance. Payment is based on a relative value scale similar to that used in
Germany. The point values are agreed upon annually and appear in a fee schedule. The
price attached to the point value is negotiated at cantonal level for compulsory health
insurance and at federal level for other types of insurance.
Within each canton negotiations take place between providers and insurance companies
about the price to assign to the nationally agreed fee schedule and to determine the fee
value and price of other services left to cantonal discretion. As a result, different fee values
can be agreed for selected services in different cantons. The cantonal government or the
Federal Council must approve the fee schedule for those fees which should be the same in
all cantons. If the providers and insurers cannot agree on the terms of a fee schedule, the
cantonal government fixes the level of fees.
Insurance companies usually pay hospitals per diems. Financial negotiations take place
between insurance companies and hospitals and can vary considerably between cantons.
For inpatient services provided under compulsory health insurance the fee charged is a per
diem rate (though DRGs are slowly being introduced). For those services covered by
supplementary health insurance a higher per diem rate is charged (for hotel costs and
itemised charges). Payments based on DRGs are already being implemented in some
cantons, although this varies substantially between cantons. A Swiss version of DRGs called
AP-DRGs (All Patient Diagnosis Related Groups) released in 1998 lists the categories of
DRGs as well as a preliminary version of cost weighting for Switzerland. These are average
relative weights that make explicit the cost structure of the DRGs.
Cantons are mainly involved in the financing of capital costs. Public hospitals, which are
owned by the cantons or municipalities, and selected private hospitals, which are subsidised
by the cantons, come under control of the cantons. The capital investment costs for public
hospitals are usually fully financed by cantonal tax revenues. The cantons also finance about
a third of the running costs of these hospitals. Since the enactment of the revised health
insurance law the cantons finance 50 percent of the recurrent costs of selected private
hospitals plus the other costs that are not paid by compulsory health insurance such as
capital investment, education and research.
The revised health insurance law also allows the cantons to impose fixed budgets for the
subsidies paid to public and publicly subsidised hospitals and nursing homes. Global
budgets for public hospitals were introduced in 5 cantons in 1994 and have since been
introduced in others. The way in which these budgets operate varies between cantons. In
some the deficit will be carried over to the next year. It also depends who runs the hospital or
nursing home as to how the budgets operate in practice and how strongly they are applied
(for example with or without penalties for exceeding the allocation).
Future financing considerations for hospitals being discussed for future revisions of the
health insurance law, include:
•  whether cantons should subsidise all Swiss hospitals for inpatient treatment,
•  whether cantons should instead channel all tax-financed subsidies towards reducing
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•  whether cantons should also subsidise ambulatory and short-stay treatment, and
•  whether insurance companies should also pay part of the capital investment required.
3.6.5 Payment of health care professionals
Doctors in ambulatory care itemise services on an invoice after completing an episode of
care whereupon third-party payers reimburse the doctor or the patient. Doctors are paid
under a fee-for-service system as are most other health care professionals. The fees are
determined through a point value system which is usually negotiated annually by
associations of insurance funds and professional associations and is set out in a fee
schedule. All medical-related professions have such a nationally agreed fee schedule. For
accident, military, old age and disability insurance, not only is the fee schedule set nationally
but also the actual price attached to the point value. Under compulsory health insurance, the
price is negotiated on a cantonal level. Even in the private sector where actors are free to set
prices, they are usually based on the nationally agreed fee schedule.
Most hospital doctors are employed by the hospital and receive a salary. These doctors also
receive additional payments for services provided to people with supplementary health
insurance but have to pay part of this income to the hospitals.
The introduction of health maintenance organisation (HMO) style insurance models similar to
those in the USA has changed the payment methods of some ambulatory doctors. The
HMOs in Switzerland are mostly still insurance-owned group practices in which the doctors
are employed on a salary basis. In doctor-owned HMOs (which are still very new), doctors
receive performance-related payments as well as guaranteed minimum income. A global
budget (usually based on capitation) is agreed between the doctor-owned HMOs and the
insurance company which is then adjusted for age, sex and other characteristics of the
insured population.
Under the GP model of ambulatory care provision all the doctors are paid by fee-for-service.
Some GPs and insurance companies also negotiate a “risk” payment which is paid by the
GPs if the savings target is not met.
3.7 Health care delivery system
3.7.1 Ambulatory care
Doctors in independent practice provide most ambulatory health care. Most doctor contacts
take place in office-based practices, most are individual practices, although some group
practices exist. Of the 23 679 active doctors in Switzerland in 1998, 13 357 (56 percent)
were private office-based doctors, about 36 percent of these were general practitioners and
46 percent specialists. The number of doctors is in line with the EU average but within
Switzerland is considered to be very high and is still growing (by 3 percent in 1996-7).
Patients are free to choose any doctor, although most have a regular doctor. Patients also
have direct access to specialists in an ambulatory care setting, but most are referred to
hospital-based specialists. University teaching hospitals often run polyclinics which offer
direct access to outpatient services for which patients can register themselves.
Ambulatory care is mostly financed by compulsory health insurance, around two-thirds, with
the rest being financed by other statutory insurance schemes (accident, maternity, and so
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The revised health insurance law allows people to purchase insurance policies that cover
benefits from a limited range of suppliers (similar to health maintenance organisations
(HMOs) or a general practitioner system). HMOs are group practices that mainly employ
general practitioners and specialists in internal medicine, plus other health care personnel
such as public health nurses, physiotherapists and practice assistants. A few employ
gynaecologists and paediatricians. The doctors in HMOs and general practitioner systems
refer patients to specialists and hospitals, but the patient still has a free choice. An estimated
74 doctors are working in HMOs covering about 98 400 insured people and around 3792
doctors are in the general practitioner system covering 350 000 people.
The number of doctors per person varies between regions with a higher density of doctors in
urban areas where there is a concentration of them around university hospitals and higher
numbers of specialists in ambulatory care where the market for such services is larger.
Switzerland also has the highest number of doctor contacts in western Europe at 11 contacts
per person in 1997, above the European average of 7.4 contacts per person (see Appendix
A). The following factors contribute to this exceptionally high number of doctor consultations
per person:
•  A high density of doctors and free choice
•  The fee for service payment system
•  A relatively limited range of non-doctor providers of primary health care such as nurses
•  A culture that emphasises a high level of utilisation of health services, and
•  A lack of negative financial incentives for individuals to reduce utilisation.
There is little evidence though that the freedom of choice and high levels of utilisation
actually lead to higher levels of satisfaction among the population, as some studies have
found no significant differences between those insured by HMOs and those enrolled in
traditional policies.
Managed care systems and gatekeeper systems are very much in vogue and people believe
they are a good method of controlling costs. Expansion of managed care systems and future
primary care provision will largely depend on consumer choice, but it is likely that managed
care systems will grow even further as cost control becomes an increasingly important
factor.
3.7.2 Secondary and tertiary care
There are public, publicly subsidised and private hospitals. The public hospitals may be
operated by the canton, (individual or associations of) municipalities or independent
foundations. Private hospitals receive no subsidies and are financed solely by payments
from insurance companies and patients. Those private hospitals which are included in the
cantons’ hospital list can however receive reimbursement for services under compulsory
health insurance.
The most recent data indicate that there were 406 hospitals in Switzerland in 1997 of which
272 were public or publicly subsidised. The table below shows the number and type of
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Table 8: Number and Type of Hospitals in Switzerland, 1997









Other specialist hospitals 53
Total 179
Total 405
Source:  WHO (1999b)
Switzerland has a very well developed infrastructure of hospital care. However, for planning
and funding purposes, secondary care can be divided into two parts. The federal
government has no planning authority for outpatient and short-stay inpatient care (one night
or less) and nor does it provide subsidies for it. Inpatient hospital care (longer stay) on the
other hand, is subject to state planning and receives public subsidies.
This results in a system that does not always provide incentives for treatment that is optimal
for health and economically efficient. Health insurance providers, for example, will tend to
favour inpatient treatment since some of the cost is borne by the state. The incentive
structure affecting hospitals and doctors is complex. Their preference for either inpatient or
for short-stay or outpatient treatment is determined by many different factors such as
capacity and occupancy rates more often than solely health considerations. The Federal
Council has proposed revising the health insurance law to attempt to remove the perverse
incentives.
Switzerland lies in the upper quartile of countries in western Europe in terms of the duration
of hospital stays, even though the duration has dropped continuously since the 1980s from
around 25 to 13 days in 1997 (see Appendix A). This above average figure is slightly
compensated for by a below average number of hospital admissions, giving a capacity
utilisation which lies around the mid range in the ranking of western European countries (see
Appendix A). Switzerland has also not followed the trend in bed reduction seen in most other
western European countries as a result of the general decline in length of stay in hospital,
following technological development and the desire to increase efficiency through a
reduction in excessively long stays.
University hospitals, some large cantonal hospitals and private clinics operating with or
without subsidies provide highly complex and specialised treatment. This situation has
developed over time in a largely uncoordinated way and it is generally agreed that
Switzerland will have to reduce excess capacity in high technology medicine and specialised
treatments. This will necessitate inter-cantonal and national planning of delivery structures.
Two alternatives are being discussed for how this planning should be implemented. In the
first instance, the federal government will create the necessary regulation for intervening in
the planning of high technology health care and centres of excellence and would ensure that
hospital planning is carried out at the federal level. The other option leaves the responsibility
for tertiary health care with the cantons, which would then co-ordinate delivery structures
throughout the country. The co-ordination would be enforced by a legally defined inter-
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3.7.3 Social care
The organisation of nursing care outside hospitals is still less developed in some cases. The
revised health insurance law has brought about improvements by expanding cover for home
nursing care and care in nursing homes (known as “Spitex” services). However, the
providers of health insurance are not yet fully obliged to pay in full the cost of home nursing
care. Large proportions of people are still looked after by informal carers.
The formal nursing care network provides outpatient, short-term stay and inpatient services.
The two main categories of ambulatory care provider are practising doctors and Spitex
services. The high density of doctors means the capacity exists to provide home medical
care services throughout the country. Coverage by Spitex services is fairly comprehensive
although there is regional variation. In most cantons, the municipalities are responsible for
nursing homes and often commission private organisations to build and run such facilities.
Various indicators suggest the capacity of the available inpatient services is sufficient to
meet current needs (with regional variation).
There has been a massive shift towards out-of-hospital care for the elderly, but despite this
change, some elderly people requiring nursing care are probably still being admitted to
hospital because not enough nursing beds are available. Before the revised health
insurance law with extended cover to include reimbursement of nursing care, there was also
a financial incentive to hospitalise patients requiring nursing care. In contrast to stays in
nursing homes, the health insurance companies paid for hospital stays in full. Now with the
extended benefits package of the revised health insurance law (covering Spitex services),
insurance companies will pay nursing costs in full as long as a standardised fee schedule is
agreed based on submissions of costs by service providers. In recent years, nursing homes
and Spitex services are the two areas where expenditure by health insurance companies
has risen the most.
However, until health insurance companies pay for these services in full, the balance will
continue to be funded by out- of pocket payments, other social insurance systems, accident
insurance, old age and disability insurance, supplementary benefits and if this is not
sufficient, by the welfare system. It is the municipalities’ responsibility to finance the costs of
nursing care that cannot be covered either by the individual or supplementary benefits.
(Supplementary benefits make up the shortfall between costs of care of pensioners or state
disability recipients and the money they have available). The cantons may also make top-up
payments to the welfare system in addition to the supplementary benefits, either alone or in
conjunction with municipalities.
3.8 Pharmaceuticals
The Inter-cantonal Office for the Control of Medicines is responsible for registering drug
products. Any company wishing to bring a product to market must therefore initiate and pay
for the registration procedure. The Federal Office for Social Insurance draws up a positive
list of pharmaceuticals for which the compulsory health insurance system will pay (the
specialty list). Maximum prices are also set for these products.
The price structure for pharmaceuticals is determined by the “Sanphar” pricing code which
governs manufacturers’ selling prices, wholesale and retail prices. Sanphar is an association
representing manufacturers and wholesalers in the pharmaceutical industry. Pharmacists
and dispensing doctors receive a regressive margin determined by the retail price (the
higher the price, the smaller the margin).Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 61
About 62 percent of medicines are sold through pharmacies, about 20 percent through
dispensing doctors, about 12 percent through hospitals and around 6 percent through
drugstores. Cantons determine whether doctors are allowed to dispense and many of the
cantons have no restrictions over dispensing doctors.
The amount spent on pharmaceuticals as a proportion of total health expenditure has
increased from 11.1 in 1996 to 11.6 in 1997 (although it was decreasing prior to that). This is
due to the current financial incentives to prescribe a lot of drugs and expensive products.
Consideration is therefore being given in the health insurance law to promote the use of
generic products. The pharmacists’ loss of income will then be replaced by a payment for
services rendered (filling a prescription, providing information, advice and patient care).
There are also plans to replace the existing Inter-cantonal Office for the Control of
Medicines’ agreements with a federal law on pharmaceuticals in 2000. This body would then
be dissolved and replaced by the Swiss Pharmaceutical Institute which would exist as a
separate federal entity. The aim would be to eliminate overlapping areas of responsibility
which result from the current combination of regulations that are not clearly defined.
3.9 Conclusions
Switzerland’s health care system reflects its political system to a certain extent,
characterised by federalism and liberalism. State intervention at the federal level has
traditionally been kept to a minimum and much of the responsibility for financing, organising
and delivering health care has fallen to other actors such as cantons, municipalities, private
insurance companies and private providers. There have been few major reforms, mainly as
a result of the political system of referenda which make comprehensive reforms difficult to
pass. The system evolved in a largely fragmented and uncoordinated way. However rising
health care costs and a lack of solidarity between insurance companies, meant reform
became inevitable. 1994 saw the most comprehensive change to the system when the
health insurance law made purchasing health insurance compulsory and made significant
changes to the systems of subsidies. It expanded the benefits package and changed
premiums from risk- to community-rated. It also eliminated cream-skimming by making it a
legal obligation for insurance companies to accept anyone applying to them for compulsory
health insurance. Problems associated with differential risk pools with some insurance
companies attracting higher or lower risks are being dealt with through a solidarity
organisation, Foundation 18, which is responsible for risk adjustment and transfers between
companies.
As with many other countries the cost explosion in health care has been the subject of
concern and debate for some time. In addition there has been a great deal of controversy
about the measures that need to be enacted to achieve the aims of reform (particularly
relating to containing costs) and the relative roles of government and the market in
regulating the provision of health care. Alternatives to the present mixed system of regulation
are being put forward but most strongly emphasise the role played by either government or
the market.
Despite the many changes there are still some important questions which have to be
resolved. These include:
•  The relative roles of the state and the market. How should hospitals and other health
care services be financed? Should the state withdraw from the planning process?
•  The extent of centralisation. Should planing be done at federal level? If not, how can
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•  Cost containment versus comprehensive health care benefits. Can a comprehensive
benefit package be maintained? How is managed care going to develop? Will rationing
be necessary?
Since 1996, the revised health insurance law has set in motion several reforms, however not
all have been fully implemented. Some of the barriers include the lack of data and
information and the lack of appropriate regulatory bodies (with the necessary power). Some
of the reform proposals include an introduction of global budgets for outpatient care (which
has been met with enormous resistance), promotion of generic dispensing and an increase
in federal subsidies for compulsory health insurance premiums (which are largely
unchallenged).
Other proposed changes that would affect hospital funding include a proposal to extend the
cantons’ responsibility to include subsidising private hospitals on the cantonal hospital list.
This would mean considerable extra expense for the cantons. Furthermore, the cantons’
responsibility would be extended to cover short-stay inpatient treatment. This would mean
that only hospitals on the hospital list would be able to provide short-stay services and be
reimbursed under the compulsory health insurance. This would impose the same planning
and funding requirements on both inpatient and short-stay care. The intention is to eliminate
some of the undesirable incentives in the current system. However the problems that
occurred between inpatient and the short-stay sector might just move to the interface with
the ambulatory sector, where cantons will not have any planning or funding functions. This
proposal will also place a greater financial burden on them.
A further proposal is that hospitals will have to cover capital expenditures from income (and
thus take this into account in the process of setting fee levels). This change would reduce
the burden on the cantons which currently fund capital investments, but increase the burden
on health insurance companies and in turn could lead to increases in premiums.
The federal government’s view is that per diems currently used to pay hospitals are not
ideal. Instead standardised per case payment (such as DRGs) has been proposed. Future
changes in the system include the basis for defining which health services are covered and
for agreeing the fee schedule for the reimbursement of services. The revised schedule has
to be agreed by 2001. The proposals will attempt to remove some of the perverse incentives
which exist and that distort the care settings used, for example patient shifting between
short-stay inpatient or outpatient care and long-stay inpatient care which shifts some of the
costs from the insurance providers to the cantons. There are also likely to be changes in the
payment structures for doctors to improve the relative position of GPs to specialists in
ambulatory care.
This legislation has so far been rejected by the cantons on the basis that it places an
unacceptable financial burden on them, but the final version of this draft legislation still has
to be submitted to Parliament and it cannot be determined what the content of the final
version will contain. Several other proposals have been submitted before Parliament as well
as a number of popular petitions which will be subject to referenda.Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 63
4.  The Netherlands
4.1 Introduction and overview
The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy with a written constitution (last revised in
1983). Executive power lies with the Crown and legislative power rests with both the
Crown and the bicameral Parliament. Members of the Provincial States elect the Upper
Chamber of Parliament while the Second Chamber is elected by direct universal suffrage
with proportional representation. Both Chambers are elected for four years. The
Sovereign appoints the Formator, who decides on a majority coalition with the parties in
Parliament. The Formator and the parties in the coalition then decide on the appointment
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The Sovereign has the power to dissolve both
Chambers. The Council of State is appointed by the Crown and can be consulted on all
legislative matters. The Government and the Second Chamber propose bills which the
Upper Chamber can approve or reject but cannot amend.
The Netherlands is a highly decentralised country, with 12 provinces and 646
municipalities. Each province has its own representative body, the Provincial State,
whose members are directly entitled to issue ordinances concerning the welfare of the
provinces and to raise taxes. Each municipality forms a corporation with its own interests
and rights subject to the general law, and is governed by a municipal council directly
elected for four years which has the right to issue by-laws concerning municipal welfare
and to levy certain taxes. These decentralised levels of government are responsible for
most of the organisation of the health care system.
The Netherlands is a founder member of the EU. It has a population of 15.3 million
people (in 1997) where 5.1 percent of the population are foreigners. It has a GDP per
capita of 46409 guilders (see Appendix A for national comparisons) which has grown at
a rate of 4.3 percent on average in the 1990s. However, the country has also seen rising
unemployment over the same period.
4.2 Health status
Both infant and maternal mortality have decreased less than for other EU countries and
the maternal mortality rate is one of the highest. Cancers and cardiovascular diseases
are the most frequent causes of death.
Although the total fertility rate has slightly increased it is still below replacement level with
population growth therefore very low (0.53 percent in 1994), despite the flow of
immigrants. On the other hand, as a result of increasing longevity, the proportion of the
population aged 65 years and over is rising steadily and now accounts for 13 percent of
the population. This ageing process is even more pronounced for women and set to
continue rising.
4.3 A brief history of the Dutch health care system
In 1986, the then Centre-Right government appointed a committee chaired by Dr. W
Dekker to advise on strategies for reforming the structure and financing of the health
care system in the Netherlands. The proposals for a market-oriented reform of the health
sector as set out in the Dekker Report in March 1987 were widely discussed and
debated during that year. While there was general agreement about the need for reform,
many individuals and organisations expressed reservations about the feasibility of
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‘willingness to change’ was not as widespread as the Dekker Committee implied. As a
result, the government organised a series of public hearings at which views and opinions
could be expressed. Despite some fears, the main elements of the Dekker proposals
were accepted by the Dutch parliament in 1988.
These were probably the most radical health care reforms in any OECD country and
included:
•  A uniform scheme of national health insurance for all residents in the Netherlands.
•  Integration of both health care and related social services under the scheme, and
•  A decisive movement away from direct government involvement in the determination
of the volume and price of health services towards regulated competition, both in the
market for health insurance and in the market for health care itself.
Two years later a new government comprising a Centre-Left coalition replaced the pro-
reform Centre-Right coalition, but the main lines of the reforms continued to be accepted.
It was noticeable though that the 1990 proposals (known as the Simons Plan) placed far
less emphasis on market-based terminology than the earlier Dekker Report. For
example, ‘competition’, ‘markets’ and ‘incentives’ was replaced by emphasis on ‘shared
responsibility between parties’, ‘consumer choice’ and ‘decentralisation’. From a political
point of view the two key elements of the reforms were well balanced. The compulsory
health insurance was attractive for those on the left, while regulated competition was
attractive for those on the right. This political balance of the reform proposal explains
why both a Centre-Right and Centre-Left coalition cabinet supported the proposal.
According to the 1988 proposals, the reforms were due for completion by 1992. The
1990 proposals extended the implementation period for three years until 1995, however
even this was over optimistic. In 1993, Parliament set up an enquiry into the decision-
making process in relation to health care reforms. In their 1994 report the Committee
concluded that parochial interests and a lack of clear political consensus for restructuring
had hampered reforms. As a result, neither of the fundamental proposals relating to
basic insurance and regulated competition were realised.
A general election held in May 1994 resulted in a major loss for the two-party Centre-left
coalition which was replaced by a three-party coalition comprising the Labour Party, the
Liberal Democrats and the Liberal Conservatives. In September 1994 the new coalition
presented its programme for the health sector. This departed from the route taken by
their predecessors with greater emphasis being placed on centralised regulation and
planning. Thus a return to the pre-Dekker policy approach was again signalled and a
withdrawal from a market approach.
Prior to the Dekker reform proposals in 1987, the government argued that there were a
number of health sector failings which needed to be addressed. These included:
•  Unco-ordinated finance
•  Few incentives for efficiency
•  Unworkable government regulation, and
•  Insurance market failures.
Different sources of health finance made it difficult to monitor, co-ordinate and control
expenditure. Thus, for example, the compulsory national insurance scheme under the
Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ) had limited ability to control expenditure and
nursing home care when it had no control or leverage over the decisions of individual
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responsibilities hampered attempts to increase efficiency through substitution of different
forms of care. Therefore, because there were several funders responsible for the same
patient at different points in an episode of illness, and different funders of health and
social services, there were barriers to substitution at critical points and a tendency for
some providers to try to offload patients on other providers.
Another problem was that the system contained few financial incentives for stimulating
efficiency among providers, users and insurers. The fee-for-services system provided no
incentive for hospital doctors to review their practice in order to eliminate unnecessary
and inappropriate procedures. It in fact encouraged over-supply. The formula through
which hospital budgets were set made inpatient treatment more attractive than lower
cost day surgery. Most patients had little concern about the appropriateness and costs of
their treatment, as their charges were close to being fully met by their insurers. Individual
sickness funds received full reimbursement for their expenditures from the Central
Sickness Fund and therefore had little incentive to improve their own efficiency or to
seek to improve the efficiency among the providers from whom they purchased services.
Moreover, they were obliged to contract with any local provider who wished to provide
services to their members which meant that they acted as passive funders of care rather
than as active cost-effective purchasers of services.
Government regulation had been used extensively in an effort to contain costs with a
complex and highly centralised apparatus of regulating prices, volume and quality. This
had included efforts to reduce the number of hospital beds, limits on hospital budgets
and investments in new facilities, licensing of new technologies for reimbursement
purposes and the regulation of doctors’ earnings through the negotiation of fee
schedules. However during the 1980s, concerns were expressed about the effectiveness
of this approach as it was complex, costly and rigid. Regulations were often unable to
cope with the complexity of the health sector involving multiple groups often with
conflicting interests. Moreover, it often introduced perverse incentives rather than
encouraging efficiency, for example cost-increasing avoidance strategies and unintended
distortions in resource allocation. Planning and financing decisions were made
separately with the result that none of the parties involved were fully responsible for the
consequences of their decisions.
Insurance market failures in the Netherlands arose because of adverse risk selection
and management inefficiency among the sickness funds. Adverse risk selection occurred
because private insurers tended to cater for low risk individuals while sickness funds
provided insurance for higher risk groups. A concern with equity meant that a complex
system of compensation existed for transferring revenue from the private to the public
sector. Management inefficiencies occurred among the sickness funds because they
operated as local monopolies with little need to compete for subscribers. There was
huge variation in per capita expenses between the lowest and highest cost sickness
funds and a widening divergence in premiums in the private market reflecting the
differences in risks.
The Dekker health reforms therefore set out to address these sources of market failure.
4.4 Health care reform
The health reform proposals set out in the Dekker Report in 1987 represent some of the
most comprehensive and coherent approaches to managed competition in the EU. The
main elements in the programme are based upon both demand and supply-side
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The reform programme which began in 1989 was based on three principles. First, there
should be a basic health package available to all funded through social insurance. All
existing financing should be channelled through a single system with sickness funds and
private insurers competing for enrollees. Second, there should be a shift from
government regulation to managed competition as a means of encouraging greater
efficiency with appropriate financial incentives offered to users / consumers, insurers and
providers. Third, government regulation would still be used to ensure an acceptable
quality of care and to meet various equity objectives such as local accessibility and
solidarity between social groups.
4.4.1 Health care reform after 1994
Although the then government had announced several major steps to be taken in 1993
and 1994 in order to further implement the proposed reform, in reality the implementation
process in these years virtually ceased. At that time there was much confusion as to
whether the Simons Plan was dead or not. In May 1995 the new government announced
its health care policy for the coming years.
The major change that was announced was that within the compulsory health insurance
system there should be two regulatory regimes rather than one as in the Dekker and
Simons Plan. The new government stated that it would continue the same Dekker-
Simons type of reform but only for the non-catastrophic risks (like hospital care,
physician services, drugs and physiotherapy). For the catastrophic risks (like nursing
home care and long-term institutional care for mentally and physically handicapped
persons) and health care related social welfare (old age homes) there would be direct
government regulation with respect to planning, budgeting and prices. For these types of
care there would be no role for competing risk-bearing insurers. In order to contain costs
and improve efficiency in that sector, the government announced the introduction of a
system of personal budgets for certain categories of patients, so that these patients can
buy their care out of their own budget. The Dekker-Simons Plan was therefore to be
discontinued for catastrophic risks but not for non-catastrophic risks.
 For non-catastrophic risks, the dominant regulatory regime would be the Dekker model
of regulated competition among insurers as well as providers. The government
announced plans to deregulate hospital planning, although they still continue to bear the
responsibility with respect to large-scale investments related to hospital building. But for
the remainder, the government was of the view that competing risk-bearing insurers
would be more able to contain costs and improve efficiency than government. For this
reason, government announced a critical competition or anti-trust policy in health care
with which it hopes will come commensurate increases in financial responsibility among
insurers and sickness funds. Consequently the government will also increase the
insurers’ tools for improving efficiency by taking away the existing legal regulation
concerning hospital budgeting. The government also decided to implement proposals by
the Biesheuvel committee, chaired by former Prime Minister Biesheuvel. This committee
advised the government to promote the participation of specialists in the management
structure of hospitals, to stimulate the integration of specialists and hospitals into one
organisation and to replace the fee-for-service payment system with a remuneration
system that encourages less over-supply. With respect to the remuneration of GPs, the
committee advised the introduction of a flexible system of bonuses related to efficiency
and other performance indicators.
As a result of the decision to have two regulatory regimes instead of one, within the
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implementation path. During the last seven years the implementation path of the reform
has been as follows:
•  All non-catastrophic risks (to be included in the compulsory health insurance) should
be transferred from the sickness fund insurance and the private health insurance to
the AWBZ (Exceptional Medical Expenses) which was intended to become the
‘carrier’ of the reformed health insurance system.
•  The regulatory regime of the AWBZ should be reformed.
•  Ultimately all different regulatory regimes for sickness fund insurance and private
health insurance would be abolished.
•  Sickness fund organisations and private health insurance companies should all
become ‘care insurers’ with the same rights and duties.
Because the new government decided to have two strictly separated regulatory regimes
for the catastrophic and the non-catastrophic risks, it no longer made sense to continue
the process of transferring non-catastrophic risks to the AWBZ. Instead the government
proposed to restrict the AWBZ to only the catastrophic risks, and to transfer all non-
catastrophic risks covered under the AWBZ (for example prescription drugs) to the
sickness funds and private health insurance. In addition, the government announced a
convergence of sickness fund and private health insurance. For the time being the
distinction between sickness fund insurance and private health insurance will be
maintained but over time the differences between these two types of insurance will
disappear.
In the sickness fund sector the government proposed to drastically increase the financial
risk for the sickness funds. In 1995 the sickness funds received risk-adjusted capitation
payments based on age, gender, region and disability. Currently it is a partial capitation
system in the sense that the sickness funds are responsible for only about 3 percent of
the difference between their actual expenses and the predicted expenses based on age,
gender, region and disability. The remaining 97 percent is retrospectively reimbursed.
The new government announced that the 3 percent figure will be increased to 100
percent by 1998 (except for the fixed hospital costs).
In the private health insurance market the government announced the following changes:
•  The introduction of a compulsory health insurance for all insured people not in
sickness funds,
•  Open enrolment requirements, and
•  Premium regulation involving a minimum and a maximum premium.
Because the regulatory regime of the AWBZ, despite all the reform proposals since
1988, has not been much affected in the last seven years, in practice the adjustment of
the reform proposal does not imply great changes with respect to the AWBZ. Major
changes can however be expected in the coming years as a result of the proposed
changes within the sickness fund and the private health insurance sector.
4.5 Organisational structure and relationships of key actors
The cultural belief underpinning the Dutch health care system combines a commitment
to social solidarity and a simultaneous concern for individualism. The commitment to
solidarity results in the belief that health care should be collectively funded on the basis
of ability to pay and that access should be based on patient need, while at the same time
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care system is based on a system of compulsory social insurance and discretionary
private insurance.
The key actors in the Dutch health care system form part of a corporatist administrative
structure within the Netherlands. There are a number of key characteristics to this
structure which influence decision-making and the reform process. First, within Dutch
society there is an absence of a legitimised power centre for taking important decisions
and implementing them. Second, there is a high degree of professional and
organisational autonomy. Third, the administrative system is marked by a high degree of
mutual dependency. This means that within the health care sector, the government,
providers of care and insurers are all dependent on one another to meet their own
objectives. It has been argued that this structure has come under pressure in recent
years as individualism and decentralisation have assumed greater importance. There
has also been a partial shift in the balance of power towards insurance companies and
providers of care.
4.5.1 Social insurance providers
Everyone resident in the Netherlands is covered by a compulsory national insurance
scheme for chronic health care risks and for catastrophic health expenditure under the
Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ) which came into force in 1967. Initially, this
Act covered long-term and high cost care, but over the years its scope has been
extended. In recent years the services it has covered include long-term hospital care
exceeding one year, nursing home care, residential care for people with learning
disabilities or mentally and physically handicapped persons, vaccinations, day care in
nursing homes, psychiatric outpatient and non-residential care and medicines. Insurance
under the Act is compulsory with practically the whole of the population making income-
related contributions out of compulsory additions to wages by employers. The self-
employed have to make their own contributions. There is a small tax subsidy and
patients or relatives have to make a smaller flat rate payment towards their cost of care.
Providers are reimbursed directly for services provided in kind. The individual’s usual
insurer handles the administration of benefits. Negotiations with providers about
individual beneficiaries are handled by a designated liaison fund (sickness fund) in each
locality. A central payments office makes the payments.
The following table shows the contributions to the AWBZ for 1991 and 1992.
Table 9: Contributions to the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ) in the
Netherlands, 1991-2
Employees & persons on
social security benefits
Flat rate: Adult Flat rate: Child
a
(as % of income) (guilders) (guilders)
1991 5.8 - -
1992 7.3 133.20 44.40
Note:
aFor all children under the age of 18 years
Source:  Hoffmeyer & McCarthy  (1994)
Those people on an annual income below a yearly adjusted specific level (approximately
two-thirds of the population) are also compulsorily insured under the Health Insurance
Act (ZFW) of 1966, for normal medical risks such as general practitioner services, dental
care, specialised medical care, maternity services, hospital services and transport.
Compulsorily insured members can also opt for supplementary voluntary insurance for
higher standards of hospital accommodation. There are about 30 non-profit sickness
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related percentage contribution, a part of which is payable by the employer (which
covers around 85 percent of the cost of the basic package of care), and a flat-rate
contribution (of around 15 percent of the cost), set by the sickness funds. An insurer is
obliged to quote the same flat rate premium to all insured people who choose the same
insurance contract. The insurers’ revenues consist of a risk-adjusted per capita payment
from the Central Sickness Fund, supplemented by the flat rate premiums to be paid by
insured people. The difference between the actual costs and the risk-adjusted payment
will not be the same for all insurers and will be reflected in the flat rate premium that the
competing insurers quote. This creates an incentive for insurers to be efficient and
represents one of the main sources of competition.
The table below shows the contributions to the Health Insurance Act fund from 1987 to
1992.










Flat rate: Adult Flat rate: Child
a
(% of income) (% of income) (% of income) (guilders) (guilders)
1987 9.80 2.95 9.80
1988 10.20 3.10 10.2
1989 8.10 1.90 8.10
1990 7.90 1.85 1.90 186.00 93.00
1991 7.80 1.90 7.25 225.60 112.80
1992 6.35 0.75 6.35 198.00 99.00
Note:
aUp to a maximum of two children
Source:  Hoffmeyer & McCarthy  (1994)
Contributions for both AWBZ and ZFW are collected from households and enterprises
and paid into a Central Sickness Fund. There is also a tax subsidy. Furthermore, the
scheme is funded by an annually determined government grant. To obtain benefits,
individuals must register with a local sickness fund and a GP with whom the sickness
fund has a contract. ZFW provides for a system of benefits in kind. To this end, sickness
funds contract with health care providers and make direct reimbursements to the
providers for services supplied to their members without any financial involvement on the
part of the patient. They may also provide supplementary private insurance for extra
services such as higher classes of hospital care.
There is also a statutory medical insurance scheme for local and regional civil servants
and corresponding retirees (5 percent of the population) but not for national civil
servants. This is also a compulsory scheme with benefits similar to those provided by
sickness funds. Contributions are income-related and shared between employers and
employees. Dependants are also covered. Like private insurance, these schemes
provide indemnity payments rather than benefits in kind.
There is also a separate programme for social care which covers the whole population,
including domiciliary care and old people’s homes. A mix of sources including AWBZ,
general taxation and out-of-pocket payments finances these services.
Contributions made under the AWBZ and Health Insurance Act are administered by the
Central Sickness Fund (Ziekenfondsraad) which makes payments to the individual
sickness funds on a partially risk-adjusted capitation basis. As well as acting as a central
pool for contributions, it receives a government subsidy. The council has 37 members
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and employees as well as representatives of consumers and patients’ associations.
Although the government sets contribution rates, payments by the Fund are potentially
open-ended. Deficits or surpluses can be carried forward.
The individual sickness funds are non-profit, originally regionally based organisations,
often with charitable origins. They may now sell policies on a nation-wide basis rather
than being restricted to a single regional area. They are responsible for making
payments on behalf of patients to health care providers. Enrolment with sickness funds is
open (at least every two years) which reduces the incentive for preferred risk selection.
Some people may therefore choose a traditional health insurance contract with free
choice of provider, while others may prefer a limited provider plan with a lower premium.
Furthermore, the premium paid will reflect the efficiency of the contracted health care
providers. It is therefore expected that insured people will be rewarded for choosing
efficient insurers and cost-effective providers. Providers are also rewarded for effective
and efficient provision of care and insurers, acting as intermediaries, are stimulated to
contract efficient providers.
In the late 1980s there were over 40 regional sickness funds but since then they have
been subject to rationalisation and amalgamation. Today about 60 percent of the
population is enrolled in approximately 25 sickness funds operating nation-wide. It is
expected that eventually there will probably be only between 10 and 15 funds remaining.
Since 1994, sickness funds can selectively contract with physicians and pharmacists
whereas before (since 1941) they had a legal obligation to contract with each provider in
their working area. Thus sickness funds do have an element of competition between
them as suggested in the Dekker proposals based on their flat rate premium, quality, and
providers with whom they contract. They have therefore made large moves from being
administrative bodies to being competitive, risk-bearing enterprises.
Since the early 1990s there has been a reorganisation of the internal structure of
sickness funds. Administration-oriented chief executives who go on early retirement are
replaced by entrepreneurial, market-oriented managers. The service to members is
being improved, such as better opening hours and mobile offices and there have been
several other innovative activities. For example, sickness funds have broken the price
cartel of providers of some medical devices which brought prices down. Insurers are
developing mail order firms as an alternative distribution method of pharmaceuticals and
all kinds of electronic data interchange (EDI) projects are being developed, aimed at
improved co-operation among providers and a more efficient relationship between
providers and insurers.
4.5.2 Private sector
People with an income above a certain eligibility level (approximately one-third of the
population) for coverage under the Health Insurance Act, can take out private insurance
for acute health care risks with one of the 40 or more private insurers. Supplementary
insurance covers items not included in the basic package such as dental care for those
over 18 years, physiotherapy and some medicines. Approximately 60 percent of private
insurance is in the form of individual contracts, with the remainder on a group contract
basis. Private insurance is voluntary and individuals can carry some of the risks for
themselves but very few do not insure at all. Privately insured patients have to pay for
treatment and then seek reimbursement from their insurers.
Supplementary insurance is financed by fixed premiums set by insurers. Premiums are
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desired level of hospital accommodation (first, second or third class). Private insurance
premiums are tax deductible only to the extent that they exceed an amount equal to an
imputed compulsory contribution to a sickness fund on the income of the individual
concerned. Traditionally private insurance premiums were community-rated but this
arrangement began to break down in the 1970s. High-risk individuals, especially the
elderly were faced with steep rises in premiums. Rather than leaving the sickness funds
to act as insurers of last resort, the government has obliged private insurers since 1989
to provide standard cover at set premiums, below cost, for people over 65 who were
previously covered by private insurance. A system has been devised to spread the
corresponding outgoings among other privately insured persons. In effect, this imposes
social insurance conditions on private insurers. This increases the financial risk of private
insurers especially for the expenditures of persons over the age of 65. Currently all
expenditures for these persons are fully reimbursed retrospectively. Therefore the
insurance companies have no financial incentive for efficiency with respect to these
costs.
Private insurers are required under the Medical Insurance Act to offer a standard
insurance package with statutory regulations partly governing acceptance, the extent of
the risk insured and the maximum premium to be charged. Therefore, to ensure financial
access to private health insurance for everyone, the government has announced open
enrolment and premium regulation (minimum and maximum premiums) in the private
health insurance market. In a competitive market with risk-bearing insurers, such
regulation has to be supplemented by a risk-equalisation scheme in order to compensate
insurers for the predictable losses on high risk insured people, especially when the
proportion of high risk insured people varies between insurers as is currently the case in
the Netherlands. In practice the implementation of such a risk-equalisation scheme is not
only technically complicated but also a very sensitive issue politically.
Although the private insurance industry serves that section of the population not eligible
for coverage under the Health Insurance Act, there is a good deal of collaboration with
the non-profit sickness funds. In fact the largest private insurance company, Silver
Cross, which has over 600,000 subscribers, was originally founded in 1948 following an
initiative on the part of the sickness funds. At the time the funds were concerned about
the problems facing their members when their incomes rose above the ceiling level
making them ineligible for insurance by the funds. In response to this situation, Silver
Cross was developed with the aim of offering high quality services at affordable premium
levels.
4.6 Regulation and management of health care
In a system based on private institutions and independent practitioners, the
determination of the volume and price of services was originally placed on decentralised
bargaining between individuals, insurers and providers. However, since the 1970s with
the high rate of growth in health care expenditure, the government has become
increasingly involved in detailed regulation of prices and volume. The result is that both
private and public sectors are now heavily regulated. Since the Dekker reforms however
there was a greater move toward managed competition given the difficulties of detailed
government regulation.
Although the government does not control the overall health budget, legally, both the
compulsory and voluntary insurance schemes remain open-ended, it does intervene in
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•  It publishes an annual health expenditure plan which carries considerable weight and
has for all practical purposes assumed the role of an indicative budget.
•  It closely regulates the two compulsory insurance schemes and has become
increasingly involved in regulating private insurers.
•  The Government has responsibility for and financial control over most aspects of the
health services.
•  The Central Agency for Health Care Tariffs, established in 1982, exercises strong
control over the fees and charges set by providers for both public and private patients
and oversees the setting of hospital budgets. It also tries to regulate doctors’ incomes
by defining so-called “target incomes”.
•  There are selected volume controls over the numbers of physicians admitted to
training and the numbers of GPs allowed to practice and efforts to reduce hospital
capacity. Since 1982 hospitals have not been allowed to expand unless such
expansion had been planned by local government and approved by the Ministry.
•  There are wage controls for non-medical employees, and
•  The government has sought to apply quality controls in health care via medical
inspectors and a system of hospital accreditation.
The emphasis of the Dekker reforms was on managed competition, such that consumers
would be able to choose the insurer and provider they wished based on the quality of
care and service they received. The ability of consumers to express their preferences in
this way was expected to act as a signal for the efficient allocation of resources. The
emphasis was therefore to shift from regulated quality assurance to consumer demand,
although it would still be necessary for government to lay down minimum standards. For
example, it was planned to use the Hospitals Facilities Act to provide for the monitoring
of large residential institutions. Beyond this, there was also discussion of the need for
government to support quality assurance through the development of accreditation
schemes and other regulatory initiatives.
The problem is that consumers rarely possess good information about health care
services, particularly in relation to quality of care. The absence of well informed
consumers places limitations on the efficient regulation of a market system. Furthermore,
the fact that prices within the Dutch health care system have been determined by
negotiations between providers and insurers and by government regulation means that
they have been poorly related to costs. As such, they could not be immediately relied
upon to provide the right signals for achieving an efficient allocation of resources. This
requires a heavy investment in information technology and costing systems.
A factor complicating the implementation of the reforms was the difficulty of determining
a risk-adjusted capitation formula for paying individual insurance funds from the central
fund. Because all insurers are obliged to accept all applicants, the risk-related
contribution from the Central Sickness Fund would eliminate the incentive for the insurer
to compete on the basis of the individual’s risk (and therefore they would only compete
on the flat-rate levy). Ideally each insurer should receive a premium payment which
reflects the risk category of the individual that insures with it. If these categories are set
too broadly, as was done by the government, on the basis of age, sex, region and
disability, which they believed to explain a reasonable proportion of the variance in
health care expenditure, the potential for preferred risk selection or ‘cream-skimming’ is
increased. In 1993 and 1994 sickness funds received only an age-gender adjusted
payment, but in 1995 region and disability were added as risk-adjusters. The effective
prevention of this ‘cream-skimming’ (selecting good risks and rejecting poor risks) was
necessary for reaping the benefits of competitive health insurance within a regulated
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proportion of the explainable variance in individuals’ annual health care expenditure. If
the previous year’s expenditure incurred by individuals is added to the equation as well
as further indicators of health status and background characteristics, the proportion of
the explainable variance that can be predicted rises, although it still remains relatively
low. This suggests that these variables might be added to the capitation formula
although such developments would require substantial investments in data collection and
administration which is still some way off in the Dutch health care system. Since the
1990s however there has been a major investment in cost-accounting systems by
hospitals and other health care institutions. Knowledge about the nature and real costs of
the different services is necessary in a more competitive market to make the necessary
risk adjustments. It also prevents providers from selling products below cost and it
enables insurers to be prudent purchasers of care and to make appropriate trade-offs
between substitute products.
Because of the imperfection of the risk-adjusted capitation payments, sickness funds are
responsible for only about 3 percent of the difference between their actual expenditure
and the normative expenditure level on which the risk-adjusted capitation payments are
based. The remaining 97 percent of their expenses are still reimbursed retrospectively.
Therefore the sickness funds’ incentive for efficiency and stimulating managed care is
still very low. However the proposal by the new government to increase the financial
responsibility of the sickness funds from 3 to 100 percent of the difference between their
actual expenses and risk-adjusted predicted expenditures (except for fixed hospital
costs) will undoubtedly bring new dynamics into the health care sector. It will yield
premium competition among sickness funds and also more managed care activities.
However, as long as the risk-adjusted capitation payments do not sufficiently reflect an
individual’s predictable future expenditures, sickness funds might be inclined to cream
skim with all its adverse effects. Therefore government needs to strike a balance
between increasing the sickness funds’ financial risks and simultaneously improving the
risk-adjusted mechanism. This will stimulate sickness funds to make long-term
investments in managed care.
It appears to be technically feasible to develop a sufficiently risk-adjusted capitation
formula for the non-catastrophic risks (like hospital care, physician services and drugs),
but the technical possibility of finding a risk-adjusted capitation payment formula for
catastrophic risks like long-term nursing care and long-term institutional care for mentally
and physically handicapped persons, appears to be much more problematic.
Various other types of regulation could be deployed to discourage ‘cream-skimming’
including allowing differentiation, within limits, of the voluntary flat-rate part of the basic
insurance premium on grounds of risk, risk-sharing between the Central Sickness Fund
and the insurers, and the promulgation of ethical codes for insurers. Some combination
of these measures could further help combat risk selection.
Another problem which slowed the pace of reforms, is that Dutch health policy is
characterised by a diffuse decision-making structure without a clear-cut centre of power.
Hence, government cannot impose changes without the consent of major interest groups
such as the organisations of physicians, health insurers, employers and employees. The
employers opposed the Simons Plan because they were afraid that the government
would pay more attention to the compulsory health insurance with a broad benefits
package. This would increase total health care costs (because of moral hazard) rather
than promote cost containment and improve efficiency. Because the premium is partly
paid by the employers, increases in health expenditures would increase their labour
costs and therefore affect their competitive position. The insurers opposed the Simons
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the Central Sickness Fund and other government regulation that reduces their
entrepreneurial freedom. The physicians opposed the Simons Plan because they found
the description of the benefits package too general, leaving too much room for
competition among providers of care. While labour unions and consumer associations
supported the extension of health insurance, they were concerned about the income
distribution consequences of the flat rate premium payment component of the scheme
and what effect this would have on low income groups and social solidarity. As such
these powerful lobbies and interest groups presented strong resistance which delayed
implementation and change.
Because of the complexity of the reforms and in order to be politically acceptable, they
had to be implemented in a step by step fashion, but this introduced a new complexity.
For example the political right, supported by the employers, strongly opposed some
steps because in their opinion more emphasis was being placed on the implementation
of the compulsory health insurance than on cost containment efforts. Another political
problem was that the introduction of compulsory health insurance for the whole
population would create negative income-distribution effects for relatively young and
healthy middle class people with private health insurance. They would have to subsidise
the poor and the unhealthy by paying an income-related premium instead of their
current, considerably lower risk-related premium.
The major adjustment from the Dekker-Simons proposals made by the new government,
to have two regulatory regimes instead of one, appeared to have broad support in
Parliament and in the health care sector. A fundamental discussion can however be
expected in the coming years on the advantages and disadvantages of having one or
two regulatory regimes within the compulsory health insurance scheme. In the previous
seven years the government at the time put forward the following arguments against
having two regulatory regimes instead of one:
•  Where would one draw the line between types of care for which insurers bear and do
not bear financial responsibility?
•  How can one prevent insurers from encouraging substitution of expensive care for
which they do not bear any financial responsibility for less expensive care for which
they do bear financial responsibility?
•  How can one prevent closely inter-related forms of care being artificially separated by
different financing mechanisms and different regulations?
•  How does one deal with the complexity of two regulatory regimes?
Although the new government gave no clear arguments for the two regulatory regimes,
there are some compelling reasons for choosing it. Firstly, there is little prospect that in
the foreseeable few years a workable system of risk-adjusted capitation payment for
catastrophic risks will be in place. Secondly, even if there was a good risk-adjusted
mechanism, a major problem would be that competing risk-bearing insurers would have
the financial incentive for reducing the quality of certain types of care. Although there are
several arguments why a regulated competitive market for health insurance may
increase the quality of care (especially in the market of non-catastrophic risks), these
arguments may not hold for other categories of care. In particular, this includes care that
is regularly used by individuals who do not have the ability to make the trade-off between
price and quality of care, about which many people are indifferent regarding quality
because of the low probability of needing it in the foreseeable future. Examples include
institutional care for people with mental handicaps, long-term institutional care for
physically handicapped people, chronic psychiatric care, long-term care for alcohol and
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risks. Therefore, at least for the time being, two regulatory regimes is sensible although
decisions about the exact boundaries of the two regimes is needed.
4.7 Health care finance and expenditure
4.7.1 Health care benefits and rationing
When the government in 1988 finally confirmed their intention to proceed along the lines
of the Dekker Report towards a system of compulsory health insurance for all the
population, its proposed reforms differed slightly from those originally proposed. In
particular, it was decided to extend the package of basic insurance to include artificial
aids and appliances. The minimum level of care to be provided under basic insurance
would be described in legislation.
When the new government took over in 1990 and reconsidered the reforms some
important changes were proposed. These were based on policy considerations (the
basic insurance was to cover all essential care) but also on legal requirements
originating in international treaties (ILO and others) as well as European Community
regulations. As a consequence the content of the basic insurance package would be
enlarged to cover about 90 to 95 percent of total health care expenditures instead of 85
percent. The content of complementary insurance, which would be privately funded,
would be correspondingly restricted.
The current AWBZ benefit package includes cover for long-term hospital care exceeding
one year, nursing home care, residential care for people with learning disabilities or
mentally and physically handicapped persons, vaccinations, day care in nursing homes,
psychiatric outpatient and non-residential care and pharmaceuticals. The Health
Insurance Act benefit package covers general practitioner services, basic dental care,
specialised medical care, maternity services, hospital services and transport.
Supplementary insurance covers items not included in the basic package such as dental
care for those over 18 years, physiotherapy and some medicines as well as optional
higher quality hospital accommodation.
One of the main problems since the Dekker proposals has in fact been the content and
the appropriate definition of the benefits that should be covered by compulsory
insurance.
4.7.2 Sources of finance
In 1992, the different sickness funds covered 81 percent of the total health care bill.
Compulsory health insurance contributions account for the largest component of health
expenditure, although this figure also includes supplementary (voluntary) health
insurance premiums. Government subsidies out of general taxation amounted to 10
percent and patients paid 8 percent.
The following table shows the sources of financing in the Netherlands over the period
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Table 11: Sources of Health Care Financing in The Netherlands, 1987-92
Sources of finance (as % of total) 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Health Insurance Act Fund (ZFW) 35.3 35.3 32.6 32.8 32.9 23.9
Exceptional Medical Expenses Act
(AWBZ)
23.8 23.8 30.7 31.3 31.4 45.6
Government 14.1 13.8 10.6 10.6 10.6 10.7
Other sources 26.8 27.1 26.2 25.3 25.0 19.9
Source:  Hoffmeyer & McCarthy  (1994)
There is some cost-sharing for long-term care facilities which accounts for about 10
percent of the costs. Public health services are managed by municipalities and financed
out of taxation. Domiciliary health services are run mainly by “Cross Associations” which
are independent foundations set up by private initiative but financed mainly through
taxes, the Exceptional Medical Expenses fund and to a small extent by direct payments.
4.7.3 Health care expenditure
In 1997, the Netherlands spent 8.5 percent of its GDP on health which is comparatively
lower than several other EU countries. This has also remained relatively stable since the
1980s, as has the share which is spent on ambulatory medical care and hospital care.
Within spending categories, a relatively large share of the budget is spent on nursing
which is in line with the relatively high number of nursing professionals. On the other
hand a relatively lower share of the total expenditure is spent on medications and
ambulatory medical care as well as dental care.
The Netherlands has relatively low consultation rates with physicians, a very low
prescribing rate, a relatively low acute hospital admission rate and a relatively high
average length of stay in acute hospitals. Following the introduction of global budgets for
hospitals, there was a sharp fall in the rate of growth of expenditures in hospitals and a
pronounced fall in admissions. There was also an increase in waiting lists for elective
surgery. The government has had some success in containing the rate of increase of
doctors’ fees below the rate of inflation, but the effect on overall cost containment has
been less pronounced because of increases in the numbers of doctors per capita and in
volume of services per doctor, especially for specialists.
4.7.4 Budget setting
Government policy has sought to contain the rate of increase in hospital cost through
changes in the financial arrangements governing hospital behaviour. Until 1983,
hospitals received full retrospective payment for all of the services they provided.
Combined with the fee-for service system through which doctors were paid, this provided
a strong incentive to maximise the number of inpatient days. The result was both high
admission rates and long lengths of stay (see Appendix A for comparative data).
To remedy this situation a new system of prospective global budgeting was introduced in
1983. Under this arrangement, hospitals received a fixed budget allocation for the
financial year ahead. Because any overspends would have to be met from within the
hospitals’ own resources, it was hoped that this system would offer stronger incentives
for cost containment.
Subsequent experience cast doubt on whether this aim was achieved. Many hospital
budgets increased rather than being reduced as official policy implied. The policy failure
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would be undertaken for which additional revenues were automatically approved or off-
budget services were developed which were beyond the regulators’ control.
4.7.5 Payment of health care professionals
While providers are generally paid directly by private patients, they are paid directly by
sickness funds for public patients. The sickness funds pay GPs by capitation for their
members. They pay specialists for each patient referred to them by a GP. The patient is
given a referral card which entitles him or her to treatment for one month. However,
specialists are paid over and above this by fee for service for a long list of specific
diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. The various fees and capitation allowances are
negotiated in a complex way between representatives of the physicians and of the
insurers with the involvement not only of the Central Agency on Health Care Tariffs but
also the government. There are separate negotiations over the personal income of
physicians and over payments for practice costs. There has been discussion about
bringing in global budgets for payments to specialists which would have the effect of
reducing automatically fees per item if the volume of services went up more than had
been allowed for in the budget.
Traditionally, most hospital specialists worked as independent practitioners and were
paid on a fee-for-service basis, however there has been a rapid move towards salaried
medical specialists so that they currently represent approximately 50 percent of the
profession. Wages for non-medical hospital employees are decided by central bargaining
between the representatives of hospitals and labour unions. This process is subject to
government directives on the maximum annual growth of labour costs per employee
which leaves some scope for bargaining about pay rates, hours of work and fringe
benefits.
4.8 Health care delivery system
4.8.1 Primary health care
Primary health care is regarded as an important priority and is constructed around
different facilities. General practitioners, the public health services, district nursing, home
help and social work can be regarded as the central provisions which are accessible to
everybody across the country.
Owing to the ageing population there is an increasing demand for care in the home
which is much preferred by patients to care in institutions. Since 1989, home help and
district nursing have been jointly financed to increase co-operation between the two
services and thereby avoid duplicating care.
The following table shows the number of health care workers and institutions providing
health care in the Netherlands in 1986 and 1990 and the number of providers per
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Table 12: Health Care Providers and Institutions in The Netherlands, 1990
Number of providers 1986 1990





Pharmacies 1320 1453 9.7 15.8
GPs with pharmaceutical
facilities
826 718 4.8 7.8
GPs 6285 6573 43.8 71.3
Maternity care 5624 5860 39.0 63.6
Home care services 10638 11800 78.6 128.0
Dentists 5057 5206 34.7 56.5
Physiotherapists 9686 9972 66.4 108.2
Speech therapists 2340 2619 17.4 28.4
Medical specialists 7117 8250 55.0 89.5
Ambulatory mental health care 6394 7022 46.8 76.2
Dental specialists
-oral & maxillary surgery 123 135 0.9 1.5
-orthodontists 207 238 1.6 2.6
Source:  Hoffmeyer & McCarthy  (1994)
The number of doctors per 1000 population is slightly below the EU average (there is a
numerus clausus or restricted number of places for medical students in the first year of
study). On the other hand, there are large numbers of nurses, reflecting the country’s
commitment to nursing. At around 9 nurses per 1000 population this is one of the highest
rates in the EU (see also Appendix A).
General practitioners
The Netherlands has an extensive system of primary health care based upon
approximately 7,000 general practitioners that play a key role, since they provide most of
the primary medical care and act as gatekeepers to specialist services. GPs work as
independent contractors for the sickness funds and private insurers. Some GPs have
licensed dispensaries and a few will deliver babies, especially in the rural areas. GPs are
accessible 24 hours a day and they arrange out-of-hours services among themselves.
Most GPs are independent contractors, more than half work in single practices, around
40 percent have partnerships and less than 10 percent are in group practices (health
centres with community nurses and social workers). Until 1992 GPs needed a license
from the municipality to start a practice, but now they are free to open a practice
wherever they want. Sickness fund patients must register with a GP contracted to the
fund, and cannot change or register with another GP inside a year. The sickness fund
pays the GP on a capitation basis and the GP provides free care to the patient.
Recent reforms of the insurance system mean that private patients as well as public
employees also have to register with a GP and GP referral is required before access to
specialist services. However, in the case of patients covered by private insurance, they
generally pay their GPs a fee-for-service per consultation and then claim reimbursement
from the insurance fund.
With the trend towards more primary care, the role and functions of GPs, especially their
gatekeeping role, are expected to increase. GPs’ professional groups have therefore
developed a quality control policy with standards for good GP care as the central point,
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Specialists
About one-third of medical consultations are with specialists which is less than many
other EU countries. Specialists are usually associated with hospitals, but some have
independent practices. Most specialists are paid for their services at fee levels which are
controlled by the Central Agency for Health Care Tariffs. This applies to both private and
sickness fund patients. Specialists in public and academic hospitals and junior doctors
are salaried. Again, for sickness fund patients the bill is paid direct to the specialist by
the sickness fund, but privately insured patients have to pay and claim back their fees
depending on their insurance cover.
Primary health care nurses and midwives
There are approximately 7,000 community nurses who have to undertake specialist
training. The approximately 60 “Cross Associations” are the main employers of nurses.
There is no distinction between a district nurse and a health visitor. Community nurses
nurse patients at home, do home calls for mothers with babies as well as for the elderly,
hold open office / surgery hours and play an important role in health prevention and
education. There has been an important effort to substitute home care for hospital care
and to integrate the provision of home care services with nurses playing an important
role in this change. Care provided in primary or community settings is organised on a
national basis through regional organisations and local teams with each local team
comprising 10 nurses. These nurses concentrate on child health care and nursing care
for the elderly.  Patients have direct access to community nursing which is insured under
AWBZ. Most midwives work in independent practices and are in partnerships. Some 72
percent have their own practices while 28 percent work in institutions.
Physiotherapy
In 1995, 14 percent of the population consulted physiotherapists. 70 percent of the 11
7000 physiotherapists working in primary care were in private practice. The remainder
were in paid employment with other physiotherapists or health centres. Some 40 percent
of the 4578 practices were individual, the rest were group practices.
Since 1996, cover for physiotherapy under the Health Insurance Act and the Medical
Insurance (Access) Act has been limited to a maximum of nine sessions per indication
per year. However, a list of complaints for which a longer course of physiotherapy is
necessary has been drawn up, and insured people diagnosed by a doctor or a
physiotherapist as suffering from one of these complaints are entitled to the appropriate
number of sessions. The insurers’ authorisation for these treatments must be given in
writing. Many health insurance funds are also offering a complementary policy to cover
forms of physiotherapy which have not been reimbursed since 1996.
Physiotherapists are paid a fee per session for patients with statutory health insurance.
Other people pay a fee for each treatment according to an agreed schedule. Preventive
and patient education activities are supposed to form part of therapy, but they are not
valued separately in the schedule of payments.
Primary dental care
Almost all dental care is provided from a general dental practice setting. All dentists are
private practitioners who have, in most cases, a contract with the public health care
system.  Since January 1995 dental cover under the Health Insurance Act has been
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surgical treatment and, in certain cases, the fitting of dental implants and related X-rays.
This step was taken because it was felt that the Dutch public had become much more
aware of the importance of oral hygiene and of individuals’ responsibility for the state of
their teeth. Regular visits to the dentist are the norm in the Netherlands and as such the
cost of dental treatment to the individual is generally affordable. Dental care for children
includes preventive maintenance work, fluoride applications, sealing, restorative care
(excluding crowns and bridges), periodontic care and surgical treatment. At the age of
two years children receive a dental card which is valid for one year at a time. Children
over 13 years who have no dental card have to pay 50 percent of the cost of treatment
up to a maximum of 500 guilders a year. Adults are entitled to preventive care, provided
they go for a check-up at least once a year.
As a result, compared to other European countries, the costs for the provision of dental
care are rather low in the Netherlands and oral health is generally very good.
4.8.2 Hospital care
Many social institutions in the Netherlands have been developed on either a religious or
a political basis. The hospital sector reflects this emphasis with the majority of the
country’s hospitals retaining a religious character. All these hospitals are owned and
operated on a non-profit basis by private, locally controlled independent boards. Law in
fact, prohibits private for-profit hospitals. Very few acute hospitals are public. Hospital
associations or organisations, municipalities or provinces maintain hospitals. Local and
regional authorities are responsible for ensuring that the health services they provide
comply with national standards. The hospital system is well developed comprising a
network of general, single specialty acute and university hospitals. Psychiatric hospitals
are in a category of their own and are complemented by a wide range of community
facilities and services. There are also institutions for the handicapped and nursing homes
which provide beds.
The following table shows the number of health care institutions, the number of beds and
the number of beds per 1,000 population in 1986 and 1990.
















General hospitals 143 55360 3.79 120 52164 3.50
Specialised
hospitals
45 5408 .37 36 4660 0.31
University hospitals 8 7715 .53 9 7292 0.49
Psychiatric
hospitals




119 30461 2.08 121 31561 2.12
Nursing homes
-somatic 134 15099 1.03 105 11919 0.80
-psycho-geriatric 81 11692 0.80 72 11212 0.75
-combined 110 22877 1.57 148 28723 1.93
Total 173110 11.84 172262 11.57
Source:  Hoffmeyer & McCarthy (1994)
Since 1983 hospitals have had prospective annual global budgets fixed by the
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for Health Care Tariffs. Budgets cover both public and private patients and they cover
most costs with the exception of fees for specialists. Initially global budgets were based
on past activity. They were based on historic costs with additions for inflation, the
revenue consequences of approved capital projects and across-the-board deductions of
1 or 2 percent per annum for assumed productivity gains. This tended to penalise the
more efficient hospitals. Since 1988 an effort has been made to equalise the costs
across acute hospitals.
Now global budgets are based on a formula which includes the catchment population
(about 25 percent of costs), the number of specialties and beds (determined by planning)
(about 35 percent of costs) and the expected volume of services in various categories
(about 40 percent of costs) and prices per item of service. This includes the number of
admissions, patient days, day cases and first outpatient attendances (negotiable with the
insurers). Certain categories such as interest, depreciation and maintenance, are kept
out of the model. Under this formula, money follows the patient to the extent that
changes to catchment populations and volume are agreed in the annual negotiations
about budgets.
This provides a method of dividing the actual payments to a hospital (which should equal
the budget) between the insured population (or their insurers). It also provides a
continuing set of price signals in the market. Any surplus or deficit remaining at the end
of the year is eliminated in the subsequent year by price adjustments. There is scope for
hospitals to negotiate changes to volume between years. If, for example, volume
exceeded the planned level for two years running, a hospital might persuade the
sickness funds and insurers to adjust the budget accordingly.
Most hospital investment is private and hospitals usually borrow from the banking system
to finance acquisitions. Investments are subject to planning approval by provincial
government. If planning approval is given, depreciation and interest on new investments
can be included in prices and are automatically covered by sickness funds. Initially the
government guaranteed hospital investment loans, but this was scrapped with the
Dekker proposals. Academic hospitals are public and their investments have been
financed by government grants. The Dekker reforms also established capital charges for
academic hospitals to put them on the same basis as private hospitals and hospital
depreciation was put on a replacement-cost basis.
During the 1980s, government policy encouraged a series of mergers between hospitals
in the belief that this would reap economies of scale and lead to reductions in excess
capacity. However, this policy was criticised that it was likely to stifle competition and
was abandoned in the early 1990s.
4.9 Pharmaceuticals
Pharmacies do not have a monopoly on drugs. Most drugstores can sell general
products and have an 85 percent share of this market. The pharmacist or dispensing
doctor is reimbursed by the sickness fund for drugs prescribed to sickness fund
members. Pharmaceutical coverage falls under the AWBZ.
Drug prices set by manufacturers are not controlled when the drugs first go on sale but
subsequent prices are regulated. Pharmacists’ profit margins are controlled and their
dispensing fees are set through negotiation between representatives of the insurers and
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Drugs dispensed by prescribing GPs or by pharmacies are free to all sickness fund
patients. Privately insured patients have to pay and claim reimbursement. The drug
reimbursement system aims to replace expensive new drugs with cheaper existing
alternatives, through reimbursements up to the level of the cheaper but equally effective
generic alternative. This system applies to everybody.
In 1991 a list of reference prices for pharmaceutical ingredients was introduced for the
sickness funds and part of the private insurance market. The fixed refund price is based
on the average list price for ‘therapeutically interchangeable’ drugs (within the same
group). The manufacturer will remain free to charge higher prices and the doctor will
remain free to prescribe a higher priced drug, but the patient will have to pay the
difference.
4.10 Conclusions
One of the lessons from the Dutch health care system is that it is very hard to make a
realistic time frame for the full realisation of such radical reforms as have been proposed
in the Netherlands. Although the implementation of the reforms is far behind schedule,
from a historic point of view radical changes have been realised within a relatively short
period of time. For example, in the first part of the century there was great disagreement
between sickness funds and physicians as to whether sickness funds should have the
option to selectively contract with physicians. From 1941 until 1991 physicians won this
battle and sickness funds had the legal obligation to contract with each physician
established in their area. Creating the opportunity for selective contracting since then
represents a fundamental change, although putting it into practice has been problematic.
Given the resistance from interest groups and the technical and political complexity of
the reforms, a time schedule for sensitive issues like health care and its financing is hard
to realise for a cabinet that is in office for only four years. Had the government
announced a more realistic time scale for the reforms, say 10 or 15 years, probably
nothing would have changed. And therefore in the shorter time-span, even the credible
threat of competition generated a great change in behaviour among parties.
There has been no urgent pressure for quick reform because the reorganisation of the
health care system is aimed at anticipating the problems of the next century such as
advances in medical technology, an ageing population, and an expected increase in the
share of GDP going to health care.
The proposal for market-oriented health care is not a proposal for a free health care
market. A free market would yield results that most societies would deem undesirable as
low-income people and chronically ill people would not have financial access to all the
care they need. The Dutch proposal is for regulated competition. Government regulation
will not fade away, but its emphasis will change dramatically. Instead of direct
government control over volume, prices and productive capacity, the government will
have to create the necessary conditions to prevent the undesired effects of a free
market. The emphasis of government regulation will therefore be primarily on
compulsory health insurance for everyone, on the risk-adjusted capitation payments to
insurers, anti-cartel measures, quality control and disclosure of information.Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 83
5. France
5.1 Introduction and overview
France is a republic with a constitution with the latest revision dated October 1958.
Elected for seven years by direct universal ballot, the President of the Republic sees that
the constitution is respected and ensures the regular functioning of the public authorities
as well as the continuity of the State. The President appoints a prime minister and on the
latter’s advice, appoints and dismisses other members of the government.
Legislative responsibility rests with the bicameral Parliament, consisting of the National
Assembly and the Senate. The National Assembly is elected by direct ballot and the
senate by indirect determination. The Constitutional Council, with nine members
appointed for nine years, oversees the fairness of elections and referenda, and the
constitutional conformity of the basic laws.
The country is divided into 22 regions comprising 100  départements for national
development, planning and budgetary policy. The regions,  départements and
municipalities are each governed by local assemblies elected by universal suffrage.
Their responsibilities in healthcare are however limited to preventive activities, despite
the post-1982 political and administrative decentralisation.
France is a founder member of the EU. It has a population of just over 58 million and a
GDP per capita of Fr. fr 138839 (see Appendix A for national comparisons). France has
also had a relatively high unemployment rate at 12.5 percent of the labour force in 1994.
Young people and women are especially at risk of unemployment and regional variations
are considerable.
A comprehensive system of social welfare benefits covers most of the unemployed
population, providing family allowances and old age, disability, sickness and maternity
benefits. Nevertheless there has been a growing problem of social exclusion in recent
years with an alarming increase in the number of people falling through the social
security safety net.
5.2 Health status
Female life expectancy at both birth and the age of 65 years is the highest in the EU
countries. Male life expectancy at birth is just above the EU average, but at the age of 65
years, is also the highest. The difference between male and female life expectancy
which is the widest in western Europe, reflects a high excess mortality among men in the
younger age groups.
As in most EU countries, the total fertility rate is below replacement level. As a result, the
population growth rate is small: 0.43 percent in 1994. Low fertility and decreasing
mortality (particularly among people over aged 65 years) has lead to an ageing of the
population and forecasts are that the elderly population will continue to rise. This will
indeed affect the future costs and organisation of health care.
Cardiovascular diseases and cancers are the most frequent causes of death.Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 84
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5.3 A brief history of the French health care system
Since the 1970s, the reduced rate of growth in economic activity and increasing
unemployment have led to a fall in social security revenue, particularly of the Assurance-
maladie, the statutory health insurance which is a part of the social security system.
Faced by financing difficulties and the recurrent deficit in public accounts, the
government and the Assurance-maladie took measures aimed to control health care
expenditure. During the last 20 years, rationalisation plans (often named after the
ministers who proposed them) have been issued on average every 18 months, with
limited effectiveness. These have been aimed at either increasing revenues or reducing
expenditure or the public deficit or limiting the growth of the health sector. The table
below gives a summary of the main cost containment measures introduced between
1975 and 1995 when the comprehensive reform programme under the Juppé Plan was
introduced.
These reforms can be grouped as follows:
•  Governments have generally preferred to increase the amount of resources available
to the Assurance-maladie in order to limit their deficit in the short-term. This strategy
is less risky politically than reducing benefits and was achieved by enlarging the
salary base of payroll contributions as well as by progressively increasing
contribution rates from both employees and employers (for example the Veil Plan,
1977 and the Bianco Plan, 1991). To complement payroll contributions new
resources from taxes and other levies on revenues have also been allocated to the
Sécurité Sociale (for example the Barre Plan, 1975 and the Beregovoy Plan, 1983).
These new resources have gradually been adopted as new sources of financing.
Salary contributions rose from 1.5 percent to 6.8 percent between 1975 and 1995.
During the same period employers’ contributions increased from 2.5 percent to 12.8
percent.
•  Measures which affect the degree of public financing of health care expenditure are
often opposed by public opinion. An overall increase on co-payment rates in 1967
had to be reviewed the following year after public demonstrations of social
discontent. After this experience, the government waited 25 years before proceeding
with another measure of this kind, establishing a general increase in patients’
financial contribution to their health care expenses in 1993. Prior to this reform, the
Assurance-maladie reduced its obligations to finance certain expenses through
partial measures with direct or indirect effects. Those having a direct effect include
the limitation of exemptions from co-payment (Seguin Plan, 1986), the introduction of
patient charges to cover hospital hotel costs (Beregovoy Plan, 1983) and successive
adjustments of pharmaceutical reimbursement rates to a level as low as zero, varying
according to the type of drug (for example the Barre Plan, 197, the Veil Plan, 1977,
the Beregovoy Plan, 1983, the 1990 Convention, the Bianco Plan, 1991 and the Veil
Plan, 1993). A measure which had an indirect effect on the share of health care
expenditure financed by the Assurance-maladie, was the creation of a sector of
doctors with unregulated fees under the 1980 Convention (office-based  secteur II
doctors).
These restrictive measures have led to a fall in the participation of the Sécurité Sociale in
financing health expenses. As a result, a growing number of people have resorted to
supplementary private insurance. The declining role of the Sécurité Sociale / Assurance-
maladie has certainly affected the equity of access to health care. The French insurance
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The estimate of 0.4 percent of the population is certainly below the real figure in view of
the unknown number of illegal immigrants.
The current system of payroll deductions has a number of disadvantages. They
discriminate against labour-intensive sectors in favour of capital-intensive ones and in
this way may affect the international competitiveness of French industry. Their basis is
narrow: only a minority of the population pays the full rate. Furthermore, income from
investments is not taxed at all. The rates are not progressive and weigh more heavily on
the poor. They also take no notice of family size or other responsibilities.
The possibility of extending the range of incomes on which payroll deductions could be
charged or of subsidising health care from general taxation has been raised on several
occasions. An example was in 1991 when a general tax of 1.1 percent was proposed on
all incomes under the Contribution Sociale Generalisée (CGS) to meet the anticipated
deficit in the social security budget. This was met with considerable opposition,
especially from pensioners, although it was nevertheless imposed. However when
employee contributions to the sickness funds was raised by 0.9 percent (Bianco Plan,
1991), this aroused little opposition.
There is general agreement that French public opinion is hostile to taxation  per se and
strongly attached to the independence of the social security system. Payroll deductions
for the latter are seen as contributions rather than taxes and arouse less hostility. In
political terms the difficulties of moving away from such a system are seen as
overwhelming. The French therefore prefer to pay for health care by means of ear-
marked contributions rather than from general taxation. This is seen as insulating health
care spending from other financial pressures.
Controlling costs or at least prices, has been the favoured strategy of French
governments both on the left and the right. The most successful initiative in this respect
has been the system of global budgets for hospitals. Although crude and not without
disadvantages they have undoubtedly reduced the growth of expenditure. Along with the
1970  Carte sanitaire to plan hospital beds and the diffusion of high technology
equipment, it had a positive effect in restraining the growth of hospital capacity. Although
the fee-for-service system still prevails, the only way to control costs has been through
the negotiation of the actual fees. In 1991 a bill was introduced to limit the growth in all
forms of primary care expenditure to a fixed percentage. If this was exceeded then the
increase in standard fees would be reduced in the following year. The system was also
to apply to private hospitals. The bill was subsequently withdrawn due to opposition from
the medical profession. A somewhat watered-down version was however reintroduced
again in 1992 and became law (Bianco Plan).
Controls over medicine prices have been in place for many years, but the competitive
position of the pharmaceutical industry has been adversely affected while consumption
has continued to rise rapidly. A new approach was unveiled in 1991 which set a global
limit on medicine spending by the sickness funds and by negotiation, a limit for each
company. There would be a limit on sales and if the company exceeds its target, it would
be obliged to refund a proportion of the overshoot. The prices of other products could be
adjusted annually provided that permitted total sales were not exceeded. This bill also
aroused great opposition and was subsequently shelved.
5.4 Health reform
By 1995 the growth rate of Assurance-maladie expenditure was very high (3.2 percent in
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1994). The lower growth in 1994 was partly due to a generalised increase of co-payment
rates implemented in 1993 and the economic effect of the introduction of treatment
guidelines (RMOs) in 1994. The higher growth in 1995 again was also because of the
upgrading of doctors’ fees at the beginning of the year within a pre-election context
which was unfavourable to restrictive measures.
As a result, in November 1995, Prime Minister Alain Juppé, aware of the expected
deficit, presented the Assemblée Nationale with a programme of reforms of the Sécurité
Sociale, which would affect the three branches of sickness, family benefits and pensions.
On the one hand, the Juppé Plan announced emergency measures aimed at covering
previous deficits, while on the other, it set out the guidelines for a financial and
operational revision of the health care system in the medium term. It was an ambitious
reform plan which proved extremely controversial, provoking social turmoil at the end of
1995. Its central proposals were nonetheless preserved and it has been gradually
implemented since 1996. The implementation of the measures set out in the Juppé Plan
entailed a complex process of legislative reform: first a constitutional reform, then a law
authorising the government to pass legislation through decrees, and finally the adoption
of 5 decrees between January and April 1996 with other decrees specifying the details of
the implementation process thereafter.
The Juppé Plan offered some standard, short-term measures which were aimed at
increasing social security revenues or curbing the progression of expenditure in a
number of ways:
•  Increasing contributions by pensioners, the unemployed and private doctors,
•  Reducing coverage rates with an increase in the hospitalisation co-payment rate from
FRF55 to 70,
•  Imposing an exceptional tax of FRF2.5 billion on the pharmaceutical industry, and
•  Targeting the growth rate of hospital and general medical expenditure for 1996-97 to
equal general inflation (2.1 percent).
There were also further plans to introduce reinforced control mechanisms. These
measures started to be implemented at the beginning of 1996. In 1997 Parliament voted
for a cap of 1.7 percent on health care expenditure increases.
As a long-term measure, the Plan instituted an ‘exceptional’ income tax for a period of 13
years aimed at discharging the debt of the Sécurité Sociale (FRF 250 billion). The tax of
0.5 percent of total income was introduced in 1996.
The Plan also aimed to introduce universal coverage by the  Assurance-maladie, a
progressive widening of its sources of finance (including a switch from payroll
contributions to general tax revenue) as well as the control of its expenditure. To these
ends, a number of structural measures (more innovative but requiring more time to be
implemented) related to different areas of the health and social security system. These
included the health care system’s general management, the financing and management
of the Assurance-maladie and the organisation of health care delivery. New supervisory
and management bodies were set up, operating above and below existing bodies:
councils supervising the finances of the  Sécurité Sociale, the  Agence nationale
d’accréditation et d’évaluation en santé ( ANAES), the  Unions regionales des caisses
d’Assurance-maladie, and the regional hospital agencies ( Agences Regionales de
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In addition, the French Parliament now participates in the general management of the
health care system. It deliberates on the revenue and expenditure trends of compulsory
social security regimes by voting laws on the financing of the system. The role of the
state has also been strengthened by new measures regulating the management of the
Assurance-maladie. Trade union representation within the new management boards has
been modified in favour of employers’ representatives. Mandatory targets have also
been set for the activities of the Assurance-maladie.
Long-term agreements on objectives and management have been signed between the
state and the sickness funds of the  Sécurité Sociale, accompanied by annual
amendments after the publication of the Sécurité Sociale finance law. These agreements
and their amendments concern first, the instruments and expected results of the internal
management of funds, second, long-term government strategies in the field of public
health, medical workforce and pharmaceuticals, and finally, the compliance to the cost
objectives for general practice. The conditions of implementation of these agreements
are examined by the Conseil de Surveillance.
The decree referring to the ‘medically driven control of health expenditure’ presented a
long list of measures concerning different aspects of care: access, supply, quality, prices
and expenditure. Some measures are ready for implementation while others require
further action by the government, the managers of the  Assurance-maladie, and those
who represent the medical profession.
The most important innovation in the field of access to care is the introduction of the
carnet de santé (medical records in the form of a small booklet) which patients must
present when seeking medical attention, and in which doctors should record the
information relevant to any follow-up. The introduction of patients’ records started in
1996. It is anticipated that this will effectively limit the number of visits and redundant
prescriptions.
In an effort to reduce medical staff in the short-run, private doctors are being encouraged
to retire early, starting from the age of 56. Another measure with a similar aim is the six
month extension of GP training. Continued medical training has now been made
compulsory.
Several measures have set criteria for the reimbursement of services provided by private
doctors under the Assurance-maladie. These include:
•  Inclusion of a list of reimbursable services,
•  Electronic transmission of information,
•  Compliance to treatment guidelines (RMOs), and
•  Reference to the contractual agreements on the expenditure of the  Assurance-
maladie for determining the volume of activities and prescriptions.
Though the application of global or individual sanctions for non-compliance with the
above criteria has been established, the exact nature and details of how these sanctions
should be applied have yet to be fixed. Decisions on the application of sanctions will be
determined by instruments which will contribute towards enhancing the information
available on medical activities, such as the coding of services, prescriptions and
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The Juppé Plan allows for experimental projects on new ways of delivering health care.
These projects must be accepted by the sickness funds and, although they may cover a
wide variety of plans, only volunteers (doctors and patients) may participate.
Under the Juppé Plan, in the field of hospital care, the issues of quality and cost
containment are similar to those in ambulatory care, but the role played by the funds of
the  Assurance-maladie is less important and the state’s supervision is more direct.
Regional hospital agencies are responsible for the planning of facilities and the allocation
of resources to both private and public hospitals under the direct supervision of the
ministries in charge for health and social security. The accreditation of hospitals and
services, as well as the production of guidelines for good medical practice, are ensured
by the  Agence nationale d’accréditation et d’évaluation en santé ( ANAES), whose
president and director are nominated by the health minister. The Juppé Plan emphasises
the co-operation between public and private facilities and encourages hospitals to
promote alternatives to hospitalisation as well as to develop health care networks with
private doctors.
The Juppé Plan also touches on pharmaceutical products. A drug can only be prescribed
for the therapeutic purposes for which it was registered in the list of reimbursable
products. Prescriptions must comply to treatment guidelines (RMOs). However, despite
the encouraged use of generic products, there are no clear defined guidelines as to how
this should be achieved.
5.5 Organisational structure and relationships of key actors
The French health care system is an attempt to reconcile two conflicting ideologies. The
first is social solidarity, the duty to make sure that all citizens are adequately covered
against risks such as sickness and medical care. The second is liberal-pluralism, the
desire for those who supply health care and those who consume it to retain the
maximum amount of independence. Both are deeply entrenched in French life and have
profoundly shaped the nature of health care.
5.5.1 Sickness funds
The concept of solidarity underpins the financing of the French health care system,
which is based on a national universal and compulsory health insurance system, linked
to employment and financed by employers and employees. The population is almost
universally covered by statutory health insurance (Assurance-maladie), a branch of the
social security system Sécurité Sociale.
Affiliation to the  Assurance-maladie is through different schemes according to
occupation. Membership to one of the occupational schemes is compulsory and they
typically cover not only the subscribers but also their non wage-earning dependants,
children, unemployed and pensioners, although details may vary between schemes.
There is one general scheme, Régime Général, for salaried workers from trade and
industry and their families. They make up 80 percent of the population and the scheme is
financed mainly by payroll contributions paid by both employees and their employers
(respectively 6.8 percent and 12.8 percent of gross salaries). There is also a scheme for
farmers, agricultural workers and their families, and one for independent professionals
(artisans and so on) which together make up the national health insurance system.
Smaller funds cater for specific professions. In turn, each of these funds is divided into
several branches, providing pensions ( Assurance Vieillesse), family benefits ( Branche
Famille) and medical care (Assurance-maladie). Those who move from one occupation
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funds do not compete with one another since they are organised along strictly
occupational lines. They are however under considerable pressure from government to
control their spending.
The sickness funds have to be self-supporting (they do not have reserves to draw on to
prevent deficits occurring), but there is a system of compensation by which those funds
with a lower number of beneficiaries per contributor transfer funds to the others (risk-
sharing). In practice this means the Régime Général, which accounts for 80 percent of
total income, supports the other smaller funds.
Patients initially pay the provider directly and are reimbursed later, but in most cases
only partially. The difference is expressed through a patient cost-sharing scheme (ticket
modérateur) which charges patients different amounts depending on the type of care and
treatment necessary. There are however exceptions to these general rules for certain
patient groups or types of diseases and treatments which are serious or long-lasting and
for certain social and economic reasons. The state provides co-payments for those
whose income falls below a certain level. Those who are employed support a large
number of the unemployed, children, chronically sick, and pensioners, even though
these groups may account for the majority of expenditure. The number of beneficiaries
therefore outnumbers the contributors, which is in line with the principle of social
solidarity.
The contribution rates however are fixed so that they are the same for all individuals and
employers within a regime but vary between regimes. Contribution rates are fixed by
negotiation between the state, representatives of employees and employers and the
sickness funds themselves.
5.5.2 Private insurance funds
Eighty-seven percent of the population are also members of voluntary, supplementary
sickness funds ( mutuelles) (co-operative non-profit societies), or purchase private
insurance through commercial insurance companies offering sickness insurance policies
which complement the compulsory insurance and covers to a varying degree the
charges that the  Assurance-maladie does not reimburse. There are currently about
6,500 mutuelles, organised by work-place, by occupational group or by geographical
area. Like the sickness funds they must balance income and expenditure and adjust
premiums accordingly.  Mutuelles mostly cover co-payments, but also some health-
related activities like public clinics. In most cases they charge a flat rate or a proportion
of earnings. There is no overt selection of members according to health and no
discrimination against the elderly.
In 1990 there were 79 commercial health insurance firms with perhaps 8 million
customers. Estimates of the proportion of health care spending that they provide range
from 2 to 6 percent, but it is agreed that they are increasing in importance. Most of such
insurance is arranged by firms for their employees and covers everyone without
discrimination. There is however an incentive to cream-skim as they exploit a growing
market. Once again the role of commercial insurance is to supplement provision of the
sickness funds and focuses mostly on co-payments.
The profitability of private health insurance is apparently low. There is however some
competition between the  mutuelles and the commercial companies. Because the
commercial companies offer company-wide agreements, they very much resemble the
mutuelles and both therefore have an interest in promoting economy in health care. Thus
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reimbursement and the use of generics. Some also limit the extent to which they will
cover patient co-payments. The  mutuelles wish to avoid raising their contributions
unduly, while private insurers want to remain profitable.
5.5.3 Health care providers
The supply and consumption of health care, on the other hand is dominated by the
concept of liberal-pluralism. There is almost total freedom for people to choose and use
private and public health care services without a referral system. Private practitioners
who are subject to relatively few controls provide primary care. Most medicines are
supplied by privately-owned retail pharmacies. Public and private hospitals coexist in
large numbers and all these categories of providers, although subject to overall health
planning, otherwise manage their own affairs to a considerable extent. The supply of
health care is therefore in the hands of a large number of independent actors.
The laws concerning the  Sécurité Sociale are voted by Parliament and government
agencies play a major role in deciding the payments for medical treatment through the
sickness funds. However the government has little influence over the volume of primary
care supplied although its powers over hospitals and their services are more substantial.
The practice of medicine is largely outside official control. The ability of the government
to regulate expenditure is therefore relatively restricted.
Hospitals
Patients are admitted to hospital on reference from their primary health care physician
and although they are free to choose between public or private, if they choose a public
hospital they must go to the one in their catchment area. Public hospitals are attached to
municipalities or regions and although legally distinct from the localities where they are
sited, policy is decided by hospital boards comprising representatives of the sickness
funds and medical and administrative staff of the hospital. They are obliged to provide
equal treatment for all patients.
Following the introduction of the hospital law in 1991, local hospitals have been given
relative autonomy. Hospitals may make their own investments and hospital directors
have authority over all staff. The Government has control of development programmes,
the creation of new medical posts and the budget. The Minister of Health appoints
hospital directors and physicians. Since 1996 they have reported to the regional
hospitalisation agencies.
At a local level, the mayor is often president of the hospital’s administrative board and
thus the biggest employer in the locality. There is therefore a strong local political
pressure to keep hospitals running which sometimes conflicts with central government
interests and those of the health insurance companies.
Private doctors
The private sector is highly developed in accordance with the basic principles of the
health insurance system and patients’ freedom of choice. The reforms which have
affected private doctors during the last 20 years, have had no effect on the three
distinctive features of the French health care system, namely the patient’s free choice of
doctor, free access to specialists and the direct payment of doctors’ services by patients.
GPs have no gatekeeper role and patients can bypass them and go straight to
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departments and specialists also provide primary health care. Although patients are free
to consult any specialist or out-patient clinic, in practice first contact is mostly with GPs in
80 percent of cases. Private doctors who are paid on a fee for service basis provide most
ambulatory care. Their density is high by European standards, 1.5 per 1,000 population
(see Appendix A for national comparisons) and there is a good deal of competition
between them. Most practice alone and in 1988 only 3 percent of GPs and 9 percent of
specialists were members of group practices.
Patients pay first and are then reimbursed by their insurance schemes. However GPs
can choose not to contract with the social security system. Only very few choose not to
do so. Doctors who contract with the social security system can either:
•  Agree to abide by the negotiated fee schedule in exchange for free pension
packages and personal health insurance, which in turn guarantees the patient
reimbursement at 75 percent (secteur I), or
•  Set their own fees but not benefit from the pension and health package and by so
doing expose patients to extra, non-reimbursed charges (secteur II).
A problem of equity of access has now appeared in the big cities where there are very
few secteur I GPs. The extra charges can be a problem for underprivileged people. To
overcome this obstacle increasing use has been made in recent years of public
hospitals’ outpatient departments in big city centres.
The relationship between private doctors, their patients and the Assurance-maladie, is
regulated by contracts (conventions), the last of which was signed by two doctors’ trade
unions in 1993, later joined by a third in 1995.
5.5.4 Central government
The central government exercises a powerful though not overwhelming influence on the
health care system. It does so primarily through the Ministries of Health and Social
Affairs. At times these ministries have been combined and at times they have been
separate as at present. The Ministry of Social Affairs has a more direct influence as far
as finance is concerned with close links to the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Social
Affairs is primarily concerned with ‘costs’ whereas the Ministry of Health is concerned
with the location of hospitals, the licensing of pharmaceutical products and public health.
There is therefore some tension between the aims of these two ministries. The ministries
exert their powers directly and indirectly and are able to act freely but inevitably a
decision as to where a hospital will be built or what price a medicine will be, exerts
political pressure into the final decisions. Ultimately, the initiative lies with the
government. Thus the Conventions between sickness funds and private doctors are also
in principle freely negotiated but must be approved by the government before they can
come into force.
The Sécurité Sociale is nominally independent and its income and expenditure are not
subject to parliamentary control and form no part of the national budget. However, the
Ministry of Social Affairs exerts a powerful influence in so far as it determines the rates of
contribution, partly through its legal powers of supervision and partly through its role as
arbitrator when there is a disagreement between negotiating parties. Ultimately the
Ministry is the master over the financing of all aspects of social security including health
care. Even though it provides little direct money, it in effect underwrites the financial
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Nevertheless there are limits to the role of government. There is no national health care
budget as such. Where hospital expenditure is concerned, the ministries have limited
powers. They can regulate such spending on a retrospective basis by engineering
increased payroll deductions but they cannot do so on a prospective basis. This is the
main source of the financial problems of the French health care sector.
5.6 Health care finance and expenditure
The national health insurance system accounted for 74 percent of all expenditure in
1995, while the smaller insurance companies ( mutuelles) accounted for around 6
percent. Less than 1 percent of the non-reimbursed costs were paid by the state and the
local authorities, although the state pays for part of the training and much of the medical
research. In other words, patients (households and their private insurance funds) pay
18.5 percent, one of the highest shares in Europe. The role of the sickness funds is
particularly marked in the provision of inpatient care, where it accounts for 89 percent of
total spending and in sick pay, of which it is the sole source. It is less overwhelming in
the cases of primary care, medicines and spectacles and other prostheses in which it
provides respectively 59 percent, 60 percent and 41 percent of expenditure.
The poorest segment of the population can however apply to Medical Aid, which entitles
them to free health care. This is mostly financed by the state and earmarked taxes on
alcohol. Unemployed people and their families qualify for health care but problems arise
when they no longer qualify or have never qualified for unemployment. The RMI
(revenue minimum d’insertion) was introduced to tackle this problem in 1988. Since
1992, people eligible for the RMI have been entitled to free medical care where the state
pays the premiums.
5.6.1 Health care benefits and rationing
The French health care system provides a large range of services, including not only
medical and dental care, but medicines, medical appliances and home care and
rehabilitation services. In addition a variety of cash benefits are available, notably sick
pay, maternity benefit and death benefit.
Table 15: Benefits Offered by the French Sickness Funds
Benefits in kind Benefits in cash
•  Prevention •  Sickness benefit
•  Regular check-ups •  Maternity benefit
•  Immunisation •  Death benefit
•  Ambulatory services
•  Medical care




•  Hospital care
•  Medicines
•  Medical aids and appliances
•  Rehabilitation
Source:  Burstall & Wallerstein (1994)
The services and goods covered by the  Assurance-maladie must be provided by
registered health providers to come under the list of reimbursables. A doctor must
prescribe these goods and services. In certain cases, such as eye-glasses andSocial Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 95
physiotherapy, prior approval is needed for reimbursement. Under these circumstances
there is no limit to the number of services covered. Private doctors can prescribe any
treatments or diagnostic tests for their patients.
Table 16: Sources of Financing Different Types of Health Care in France, 1975-95
Percentages 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Expenditure for medical goods and services
Health insurance 73.2 76.5 75.5 74.0 73.9
General and local taxes 4.1 2.9 2.3 1.0 0.8
Supplementary health insurance (mutual
funds)
3.8 5.0 5.1 6.1 6.8
Private expenditure 18.9 15.6 17.1 18.8 18.5
- of which direct payments - - - - 13.9
Total financing 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Hospital care
Health insurance 83.0 87.0 87.6 89.3 89.4
General and local taxes 7.0 4.6 3.5 1.4 1.0
Supplementary health insurance (mutual
funds)
1.1 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.1
Private expenditure 9.3 7.0 8.5 7.4 7.5
- of which direct payments - - - - 6.1
Total financing 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total ambulatory care
Health insurance 67.6 66.7 63.9 59.0 57.1
General and local taxes 1.4 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.6
Supplementary health insurance (mutual
funds)
6.2 8.9 7.5 9.1 10.8
Private expenditure 24.7 23.5 27.7 31.3 31.5
- of which direct payments - - - - 23.0
Total financing 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Services provided by office-based doctors
Health insurance 75.1 74.3 69.3 61.6 58.7
General and local taxes 1.9 1.3 1.5 1.0 0.9
Supplementary health insurance (mutual
funds)
7.4 9.4 7.4 8.6 10.5
Private expenditure 15.7 14.9 21.8 28.8 29.9
- of which direct payments - - - - 22.4
Total financing 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Dental services
Health insurance 50.7 48.5 43.8 36.0 31.5
General and local taxes 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2
Supplementary health insurance (mutual
funds)
5.2 9.4 7.9 10.4 13.6
Private expenditure 43.7 41.7 48.0 53.4 54.8
- of which direct payments - - - - 40.1
Total financing 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Pharmaceuticals
Health insurance 62.8 63.6 65.0 60.2 60.4
General and local taxes 1.9 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.6
Supplementary health insurance (mutual
funds)
6.4 8.5 10.6 12.0 12.4
Private expenditure 28.9 26.8 23.4 27.0 26.6
- of which direct payments - - - - 19.8
Total financing 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Lancry & Sandier (1999)
5.6.2 Sources of finance
Since 1980, the modification of the reimbursement scheme has led to an overall
decrease in the contribution of compulsory health insurance towards health care
expenditure, from 76.5 percent in 1980 to 73.9 percent in 1995. In 1995, healthSocial Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 96
insurance still contributed up to 90 percent of hospital expenditure, but only about 60
percent towards doctors’ fees. An equal percentage was attributed to pharmaceutical
expenditure and less than a third to dental care expenditure.  On the other hand,
supplementary health insurance (mutuelles) and the private sector (families and private
insurers) play a more important role in financing ambulatory care expenditure and
pharmaceutical consumption. Between 1980 and 1995, the component of health care
expenditure financed by the mutuelles increased from 5 percent to 6.8 percent of overall
health care expenditure and from 8.5 to 12.4 percent for pharmaceutical expenditure.
Due to the combined effects of the compulsory and complimentary coverage, different
payers contribute differently to financing health care expenditure according to the type of
services provided. Where direct payments (by the patient) only cover 13.9 percent of the
overall expenditure, the amount rises to 22 percent in the case of physician services, 20
percent for pharmaceutical products and reaches 40 percent for dental treatment, as
shown in the table. Patients must pay 22 percent of their GP bill unless they are covered
by a voluntary complementary insurance scheme or if because of the severity of their
illness they belong to one of the exempted categories covering 10 percent of the people
insured. For those patients without complementary insurance (mutuelles) who have to
make large direct payments, the issue of equity of access to care arises.
However, despite the high levels of co-payment, the consumption of health care is still
high. Because only 10 percent of the population are exempt from co-payments (those
receiving prolonged or expensive treatment, pensioners, chronic invalids, those unable
to work, pregnant women and those living in residential homes), the other 90 percent of
the population are still liable for the burden of co-payment (almost half of patients over
80 still have to pay, as do almost all children aged less than 15). However, most people
are insured against these payments which amount to approximately 2 percent of
household income, either through mutuelles or private firms, so they have little effect on
demand. The effect of co-payment is to create a second tier of insurance (or source of
finance), not to reduce demand. In fact, an attempt in 1980 to limit supplementary cover
to 5 percent of the total paid was met with strong opposition from the public and dropped
in 1982.
The other reason for the modest impact of co-payment on the level of usage is that the
10 percent who are exempt account for nearly half of spending by the sickness funds.
5.6.3 Health care expenditure
The French health care system is comparatively expensive at 9.6 percent of GDP in
1997 spent on health care, which was third highest among the OECD countries (see
Appendix A). In the 1980s this figure showed the highest increase amongst EU
countries. In 1995, expenditure for medical goods and services represented 87.2 percent
of total expenditure with the remainder consisting of research, training, preventive care
and administrative costs. Medical expenditure rose with an average growth rate of 3.2
percent per year at constant 1995 prices between 1980 and 1995, as shown in the table
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Table 17: Expenditure for Medical Goods and Services and Different Types of Care
in France, 1975-95
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Expenditure for medical goods and
services
Total value, current prices (million FRF) 91126 192327 363454 528401 681959
Value per person, constant prices (FRF
1995)
5828 7370 8758 10422 11728
Percentage of GDP 6.2 6.8 7.7 8.1 8.9
Share of different types of health care
(%)
Hospital care 46.7 53.0 51.4 48.4 49.3
Ambulatory care 27.9 26.3 27.4 29.4 27.8
- medical services 13.2 11.9 12.5 13.3 13.1
-dental services 6.6 6.9 6.4 6.6 6.1
Pharmaceuticals 22.2 17.5 17.7 18.2 18.5
Source: Lancry & Sandier (1999)
A number of factors were responsible for this rapid growth in expenditures:
•  The health insurance system up to 1996 gave little incentive to reduce the demand
for health care.
•  The fee for service reimbursement of doctors has provided a powerful incentive for
growth in the volume of certain types of care (prescribing, diagnostic tests and so
on).
•  A combination of the highest prescribing rates with some of the lowest prices of
pharmaceuticals, and
•  Global budgets for public hospitals where money does not follow the patient,
alongside a thriving private sector that has managed to shift towards ambulatory
care.
However, in terms of share of expenditure allocated to each sector within healthcare,
there is little difference between France and the EU average except for the higher
amount spent on hospital care and the lower amount spent on nursing care in France.
This could be linked to the medico-social role of hospitals, some of which still care for
long-term patients, as well as the failure of alternative care to keep up with the growing
needs of an ageing population. In 1987 those aged 60 and over accounted for 41
percent of total expenditure by the sick funds, although they made up only 19 percent of
the population. Similarly, those with serious or chronic illnesses make up 11.6 percent of
patients, but absorb 46 percent of all sick fund spending. The distribution of expenditure
has however changed over time where the proportion spent on hospital care has fallen,
while that spent on primary care has risen.
In April 1996 legal regulations were brought in aimed at limiting the growth of health
expenditure (public and private hospitals and ambulatory care) reimbursable by the
health insurance.
5.6.4 Payment of hospitals
Public hospitals have been financed according to a global budget since 1984 and were
the first sector where they were introduced, while private hospitals are still paid on a per
diem basis within a framework where expenditure targets are set. In principle most
patients are required to pay for public hospital care and to seek reimbursement but since
a new system was introduced in 1996, the Sécurité Sociale reimburses the hospital
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a lump sum (forfait hospitalier) that is not reimbursed. The reason is that hospital bills are
infrequent but large. In public hospitals patients pay FRF 30 per day (1990) towards their
hotel costs. In addition, for a stay of less than 30 days, the large majority, and for certain
minor operations they are liable to a co-payment of 20 percent of the total cost from
which the day payment is deducted. In private hospitals patients are also charged a co-
payment of 20 percent of the standard charges for medical treatment. In addition they
have to find the balance of the other costs. Due to the high proportion of hospital
spending that is accounted for by people who are exempt, co-payments account for only
9 percent of expenditure in public hospitals and 12 percent in private hospitals (a much
lower proportion than in the case of primary care or pharmaceuticals).
All publicly financed hospitals are therefore no longer paid on a per diem basis (a
method deemed to generate inflation) but are allocated a global budget aimed at
covering most of their costs. They are allowed to spend this predetermined sum of
money to within a 2 percent margin. The budget is calculated on the basis of past
expenditure, allowing for a rate of growth set at the start of the financial year (11.8
percent in 1980, 5.7 percent in 1985, 4.2 percent in 1990 and 2.1 percent in 1996). The
possibility of introducing a complementary budget for those expenses which cannot be
predicted at the start of the financial year (such as salary rises or new treatments) has
yet to be explored. Capital payments are met by the sickness funds.
It seems that while global budgets played a significant part in the decrease of hospital
expenses, since the growth rate had already slowed prior to their introduction, other
factors must also have had an effect. The annual growth rate in the volume of care
provided by public hospitals dropped from 7.4 percent (on average) between 1975 and
1980 to 2.2 percent between 1980 and 1982. Other factors also influenced this trend, but
the most important was the reduction in general inflation rates. Certain technical
advances and new pharmaceutical treatments, as well as the high number of private
doctors, contributed to the practice of shortened hospital stay, strengthening primary and
home care.
Between 1982 and 1995 the hospital share of expenditure for medical goods and
services fell from 53 to 48 percent. Despite this, after ten years of experience, global
budgets were judged unsatisfactory. Hospital expenditure and its contribution to total
expenditure decreased, but the allocation of resources according to a uniform rate of
growth did not reduce the disparities between hospitals. This measure failed to take into
account the volume and quality of the output produced. Combined with this, a low
allocation of resources can act as a brake on the introduction of new technologies and
constitute an incentive to the selection of patients. Thus global budgets have led to
allegations of shortages of resources, rationing and even corruption, with certain patients
getting preferential treatment.
A new system (Programme de Medicalisation de Systemes d’Information PMSI), aimed
at enhancing the medical component of information systems and outcomes, based on
the US DRGs (Diagnostic Related Groups), was set up in order to measure hospital
outputs. The information collected is used as a basis for hospital planning, where the
notion of output replaces the administrative notion of hospital bed. This new system is
expected to contribute to the harmonisation of methods of payment between private and
public hospitals.
Private hospitals which have assumed the same responsibilities as the public hospitals,
also receive an overall budget. Those who have not done so may nevertheless be
supported by the sickness funds. Almost all of them have signed the national agreement
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are reimbursed on a per diem basis with fees which reflect the general standard of
services and accommodation offered by the hospital. These are also set by the Ministry
of Health and the medical associations.
5.6.5 Payment of health care professionals
GPs are paid on a fee-for-service basis and patients are later reimbursed by their
insurance company. They are paid according to a negotiated fee schedule. One of the
main reforms was the introduction of  secteur II doctors in the 1980  Convention. This
gave about 30 percent of doctors (secteur II) the opportunity to exceed these negotiated
fees, in exchange for reduced benefits (sickness benefits, pensions) and made patients
or their private insurers liable to pay the difference between actual and negotiated fees
which is on average about 9 percent higher. The advantages to the Assurance-maladie
were that it created divisions amongst doctors making them less aggressive during fee
negotiations, since those belonging to secteur II could increase their prices beyond the
negotiated fees, and the expenses of the  Assurance-maladie would only be partly
affected by real price increases. In 1980 the Assurance-maladie defended itself from the
critics of a ‘two-tier health care system’ saying that in a context of excess supply, market
mechanisms would limit the number of doctors in the  secteur II, as well as the price
increases.
It is true that since it was introduced, secteur II has contributed to containing the increase
in doctors’ fees, keeping growth rates between 1980 and 1995 at an average of 0.24
percent per year in constant 1995 FRF. However, the development of secteur II has
posed a threat to the principle of equal access to care. The difference between actual
and negotiated fees has widened from 5 to 10 percent of negotiated fees over the same
period. Hence the 1990  Convention attempted to limit the development of secteur II,
which had proven undesirable from an equity point of view and ineffective in decreasing
the amount of services provided. As a result restrictive measures were introduced
regulating access to secteur II. In 1994 the proportion of doctors in this sector had
dropped to 28.5 percent (19 percent of GPs and 39.5 percent of specialists).
In 1995, expenditure on private office-based doctors accounted for approximately 14
percent of spending on medical goods and services. However, their prescriptions for
treatments and diagnostic procedures provided by other professionals, affect virtually all
health care expenditure.
5.7 Health care delivery system
The compulsory insurance system finances a large private sector which provides most of
the ambulatory care services. However, despite the numerous private hospitals
contracted by the sickness funds, most hospital care is also still in the public sector.
5.7.1 Ambulatory care
As far as ambulatory care is concerned, health professionals and health care facilities
are mainly in the private sector.
General practitioners and specialists
The number of physicians per 1000 population is high compared to the European
average at 1.5 but there are important regional variations, raising issues of geographical
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Private general practitioners (GPs) provide the largest share of ambulatory care and
house calls. There were 57,700 GPs compared to 48,000 specialists in 1990. The
introduction of a numerus clausus (restriction on number of places) has been successful
in reducing the number of students graduating every year from medical faculties. The
growth rate of the medical workforce has declined from 5 percent in 1988 to 0.7 percent
in 1995. However, this has also had a serious drawback in reducing the number of junior
doctors available for hospital work and there are concerns about their working
conditions. Currently the number of private doctors is stagnant, whereas the proportion
of specialists is growing (44 percent in 1975 and 47 percent in 1995).
GPs carry out only a limited range of procedures. They visit their patients, they consult,
diagnose and prescribe, but do little else. In 1990 the average GP was paid for 4500
consultations and visits and for only 250 other items of activity. Unlike their German
counterparts, they do not do much minor surgery as the tariffs for doing so are not
attractive. Specialists receive fewer callers but carry out a wide range of more technical
and highly paid activities, including more elaborate forms of investigation, diagnosis and
treatment.
Although the total consumption of primary care by patients in France has risen quite
considerably since the 1980s, the GPs are under some financial pressure. Their
numbers have increased, to an increasing extent their activity consists of less well-paid
duties and their per capita rates of activity actually fell between 1980 and 1990 by about
4 percent. At the same time their density rose and specialists took an increasing share of
the market. As a result their gross incomes have remained almost static in real terms
with 1990 incomes below 1970 levels.
Competition is therefore on the basis of quality of service and relationship with the
patient. The patient is often in a buyer’s market where time spent waiting and time spent
during the consultation are important. As a result, 30 percent of the contacts between
GPs and patients take the form of house calls and doctors prescribe freely and heavily.
In the absence of higher fees, GPs can only improve their position by seeing patients as
often as possible and treating them as intensively as possible.
In contrast, in recent years, patients have increasingly preferred to visit specialists rather
than GPs. Specialists benefit from the higher fees and their numbers have increased
more rapidly than those of GPs. Their per capita activity rose between 1980 and 1990
and their average real income also increased during this period.
Several reforms made explicit reference to the activity of doctors and a number of new
concepts were introduced from the 1980s onwards. These included statistical tables of
doctors’ activities, including average prescription patterns, cost containment, appropriate
use of services, and global budgets for health services in 1990. However these
measures did not have sanctions and were rather vague with the result that they had
only a limited impact on regulating the volume of medical activities.
In 1993, three measures were introduced to rationalise the provision of health care.
These also had the effect of challenging doctors’ professional autonomy by introducing
controls:
•  The possibility of forcing doctors to prescribe the most appropriate services, without
duplication, according to treatment guidelines (Références Médicales Opposables –
RMOs) produced with reference to treatments and interventions. Sixty five RMOs
were produced in 1994 and 147 in 1995. These are expected to cover, progressively,
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principle, subject to financial sanctions varying according to the frequency and gravity
of negligence. However, controls by the Assurance-maladie are still limited and there
are several ways of appealing against a sanction.
•  The introduction of ‘carnet de santé’ (medical records in the form of a small booklet
carried by patients) aimed at limiting the access to multiple doctors and avoiding
conflicting and redundant prescriptions.
•  The setting of a prospective target growth rate (3.4 percent in 1994) for private
doctors’ fees and prescriptions expenses.
During the first few months of their introduction, RMOs appeared to be an effective
measure in curbing the expenditure of the Assurance-maladie and did indeed influence
pharmaceutical prescriptions, however a subsequent acceleration in the rate of growth of
health care expenditure proved its effectiveness was temporary. Medical records have
also had a limited effect. During the first phase of their introduction they were targeted at
4 million people aged over 70 who suffered from more than one disease. In fact medical
records were given to only 45,000 people before this measure was suspended with the
introduction of the Juppé Plan in November 1995. It was reintroduced as part of the
Juppé Plan in autumn of 1996. There is however no evaluation of the impact of medical
records on health outcomes or medical practices.
Over 2000 health centres with salaried doctors provide services mainly for the poorer
segment of the population. The “priority population” (unemployed people and their
dependants, as well as pensioners) are offered free periodic health checks. Moreover,
they are the target population of screening, health education and prevention campaigns.
The health clinics are operated by municipalities, voluntary bodies such as the mutuelles,
or by humanitarian organisations and are remunerated on a fee-for-service basis.
Various programmes such as mother and infant protection and national school health
services are also available.
Primary dental care
Private dentists are the main providers of primary dental care. Their reimbursement from
the sickness funds is normal for specified services with standard fees being set by
agreement between payers and suppliers and co-payments imposed on patients. The
scope of such agreements has steadily been extended over the years. For dentists there
is more scope for providing services at a higher price than that reimbursed by the
sickness funds.
Nursing care
There is a shortage of nurses in hospitals, despite improvements in working conditions
and pay following action taken by the unions in the late 1980s. Nursing care includes
preventive, curative and palliative care. At the primary care level, nurses can work in a
municipal health centre, with a private association of health professionals (doctors,
physiotherapists and nurses), or be self-employed. Some 12 percent of nurses are self-
employed and they only work according to a doctor’s guidance. In addition there are
around 5000 occupational health nurses with preventive, clinical administrative and
social duties, as well as school nurses. Community psychiatric nurses care for the
mentally ill in a specific geographic area (defined by the number of inhabitants) in close
co-operation with the specialised service of the area. Other primary care nurses include
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Pharmacists
Most pharmacies are privately owned although a few are operated by non-profit
organisations. Approximately 90 percent of medicines by value are supplied through
retail pharmacies. Qualified pharmacists have a legal monopoly for selling products and
there is a legal restriction on the number of retail pharmacies in each area (one
pharmacy for 2,500 inhabitants). Currently there are 22,150. Of the total amount of
medicines sold, doctors working in the primary sector prescribed 80 percent and 7
percent were bought over the counter (OTC). The remaining 13 percent were prescribed
in hospitals. Under pressure from patients, doctors may add what should be OTC
products to their prescriptions. Medicine prices are strictly controlled and low by
European standards, but there are few restrictions on what may be prescribed and per
capita consumption is high.
5.7.2 Secondary and tertiary care
Hospital care accounts for approximately half of total health care expenditure. In the field
of hospital care, the public sector dominates.
Inpatient care is provided by both public and private hospitals (with public hospitals
having three quarters of hospital beds and the remaining quarter in the private sector).
Hospital provision is generous. In 1990, there were 559,000 beds or 9.9 beds per 1,000
population. Public sector hospitals are considerably larger (and generally better
equipped) than those in the private sector, on average they contain 350 beds as
opposed to 70 in both non-profit and for-profit private hospitals. They have a much
higher proportion of medium and long-stay and psychiatric patients, but also lower
occupancy rates. They also carry out a larger proportion of major surgical interventions
and high-technology treatments. This is reflected in the higher costs per patient day.
Private hospitals tend to specialise in minor and elective surgery.
Table 18: Changes in Utilisation of Hospital Facilities in France, 1984-1990
1984 1986 1988 1990
Beds, 000
- public 388 378 371 363
- private, non-profit 112 95 91 88
- private, for-profit 94 107 108 108
Admissions, 000
- public 6418 6953 7120 7534
- private, non-profit 1754 1335 1295 1353
- private, for-profit 2709 3332 3655 3972
Patient days, m
- public 110 109 105 103
- private, non-profit 31 29 27 26
- private, for-profit 33 36 36 36
Expenditure, 1990 FRF
- public 165411 170437 176665 188670
- all private 49425 51353 54086 59385
Cost/patient day, 1990
FRF
- public 1504 1564 1683 1832
- all private 741 790 859 973
Source:  Burstall & Wallerstein (1994)
Although medical staff in public hospitals are salaried and do not have the same
incentives as private hospital doctors under the fee-for-service system to offer the
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audit has developed only slowly and cost-effectiveness and cost benefit studies are only
few. French hospitals carry out a large number of probably unnecessary operations. The
appendectomy rate is five times higher than anywhere else in Europe and the number of
X-rays and biological tests is also large.
A planning instrument, the  Carte Sanitaire, was introduced in 1970, based on the
assumption that the availability of hospital beds induces greater demand (as doctors
have a tendency to fill beds if available). As a consequence, the step taken for containing
hospital expenditure was the rationalisation of hospital capacity. Changes in the number
of beds or hospital equipment must abide by the Carte Sanitaire. It defines the regions
into which the health care system is divided, as well as the nature and role of the
facilities available to the population. It also defines standard ratios of hospital beds or
inpatient capacity and medical equipment to local populations (per capita) and broad
specialties (medicine, surgery, obstetrics, and so on) for both the private and public
hospital sectors. It also defines the norms regulating the use of costly medical equipment
and the geographical distribution of medical equipment and activities within each region.
On the one hand, the Carte Sanitaire has effectively contributed to limiting the growth of
hospital beds. However, beds are only one of the factors in hospital supply. Thus it did
not prevent the rapid increase of hospital expenditure which took place before the 1980s
due to staff and salary increases which are approximately 70 percent of hospital costs. It
has however been successful as a good planning tool. Many beds, especially in
psychiatric hospitals were shut down, although the total number of beds today still
remains comparatively high.
In 1991, a new law introduced a complementary planning instrument called the Schéma
Régional d’Organisation Sanitaire (SROS), which regulates the geographical distribution
of equipment and activities at a regional level. The SROS tasks include reorganisation of
the emergency services, networking health care facilities, and reducing or converting the
use of hospital beds. A law, approved in July 1994, allowed for the closure of hospital
services with limited activity. This measure is however often opposed by local political
interests because of the sensitivity about the issue of access to health care and the
effects on local economic and employment levels.
Public hospitals have three functions: preventive and curative care and rehabilitation.
Medium and long-stay hospitals are devoted to follow-up treatment and also look after
patients who can no longer live alone. However, as in most European countries, despite
a major effort to develop alternative solutions to long-term hospital stays, general
hospitals still have an important, if ill measured, medico-social function. Public hospitals
have a duty to provide emergency treatment. There are 29 regional hospital centres
(teaching hospitals) with medical equipment of a very high standard. Specialised
hospitals include psychiatric hospitals (the vast majority of them) and rehabilitation
centres.
Private hospitals represent 25 percent of hospital beds. 60 percent of these are in for-
profit hospitals and are principally dedicated to elective, short-term stay. Patients are
partly reimbursed by the national social security scheme according to the fee schedule.
The hospitals have ad hoc agreements with the sickness funds based on fee-for-services
supplied and per diem charges for the stay. They are largely staffed by private doctors.
Non-profit private hospitals represent the other 40 percent of the total number of private
beds. Most private hospitals are reimbursed on a per diem basis for inpatient care, with
separate fees for physicians’ services under the same agreement applying to ambulatory
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In contrast to primary health care, hospitals are subject to a good deal of official
regulation. All hospitals require accreditation by the Ministry of Health which places them
in a certain category and determines the types of reimbursable treatment they may give.
Their standards are periodically checked by the medical inspectorate while another body
of inspectors maintains control over reimbursement for unusually costly treatments.
5.8 Pharmaceuticals
Pharmaceutical expenditure for both prescription and over the counter drugs represents
18.4 percent of the total expenditure for medical goods and services in France. This
percentage is clearly higher than in most other European countries. It would seem that
doctors in France and GPs in particular prescribe more drugs per visit (3.2 items) than
their counterparts in other countries. The consumption of certain types of drugs is also
higher in France than in other countries (anti-depressants, vasodilators, antibiotics). The
frequent use of new products and the virtual absence of generics makes the average
cost of drugs consumed higher when compared with other countries.
Generic products have only 2-3 percent of the market which is mostly in hospitals.
Generic competition is limited because prices of older products are too low to make it
commercially attractive. Because retail pharmacists are paid by a mark-up on wholesale
prices, they have always strongly opposed generic products and have even boycotted
them. Because prices are low and volume is high, the pharmaceutical industry competes
by innovation on the one hand and marketing on the other hand.
Reimbursable drugs which represent about 90 percent of the pharmaceutical market,
appear in a list which indicates their price and reimbursement rate as set at ministerial
level. Patients pay for drugs prescribed by a doctor and claim reimbursement. A
percentage of the standardised cost of prescriptions is excluded from the cost-sharing
arrangement with the insurance companies (ticket modérateur). However, direct billing of
the insurance companies by pharmacists (tiers payant) with patients paying only the non-
reimbursable share ( ticket modérateur) is becoming more usual and available upon
request. The complementary insurance schemes usually compensate fully for the
excluded charge while 10 percent of the people insured are exempt from making any
payment because of the type of their illness. Because of complementary insurance, the
impact of co-payments is diluted and doctors and patients are desensitised to the cost of
medicines. Mutuelles have however more actively promoted the use of medicines which
are cheaper equivalents of popular branded products.
Expense coverage by the Assurance-maladie ranges from 40 percent for non-essential
drugs to 100 percent for essential or expensive drugs (which make up approximately 44
percent by value of the reimbursable class). The sickness funds pay 71 percent of the
overall bill for medicines prescribed outside the hospitals and for all those used inside
hospitals. An increasing proportion of prescription medicines are not reimbursed (such
as most vitamins). Medicines bought over the counter are also strictly speaking
excluded.
The control of expenditure has meant acting on two components of pharmaceutical costs
for the Assurance-maladie, namely prices and reimbursement rates. In addition to setting
a specific pricing method at the production level, there have also been several reductions
of VAT on drugs (1976, 1987, 1990) as well as reductions in wholesale and pharmacy
distribution margins. Since 1976, reimbursement rates have fallen from 70 percent to 40
percent for certain non-essential drugs. The reduction of reimbursement rates and in
some cases, exclusion from any reimbursement at all for specific categories of products,
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addition, all products were affected by a general rise in patient contributions to
pharmaceutical expenditure in 1993 (Veil Plan).
In 1994, the combination of prices and volumes became the subject of an agreement
between pharmaceutical companies and the state. According to the agreement, from
1995 onwards companies must commit themselves to promoting an appropriate use of
drugs, within the framework of a national expenditure target. Sanctions in the form of
price reductions can be applied when consumption exceeds targets. In 1994, the growth
rate was much lower than the target set at 3.2 percent (0.7 percent for the expenditure
financed by the Sécurité Sociale and 2.1 percent for total pharmaceutical expenditure).
However in 1995 the share of pharmaceutical consumption financed by the  Sécurité
Sociale increased by 6.9 percent. It appears that until now there have been no price
reductions as provided for in the above agreement.  RMOs (treatment guidelines)
concerning prescriptions also represent an indirect mechanism for controlling
pharmaceutical expenditure and in some treatment categories, seem to have been
effective in leading to overall savings.
It would seem that French patients have an unusually positive attitude towards the
benefits of medicine and tend to expect to be given prescriptions when receiving medical
treatment. These expectations are a significant factor when considering changes in the
health care system.
5.9 Conclusions
The present French health care system is relatively equitable but inefficient. Almost the
entire population is covered by the sickness funds which provide most kinds of medical
care. The differences between the sickness funds are marginal. In terms of equity a
possible problem is the high level of co-payments which adversely affect the poor.
Although help is available through the Medical Aid this may not reach all who need it.
The delivery of health care is also reasonably equitable, although a further possible
problem could be the uneven distribution of primary care doctors who have a
disproportionately higher density in the south and low numbers in rural areas. This is
particularly true of specialists. Access and choice are hereby reduced. Because of the
Carte Sanitaire, hospital beds and high technology equipment is more equitably
distributed.
The finance system does not however encourage efficiency. Membership of a sickness
fund is compulsory and because a patient cannot opt for a scheme which charges less
for the same benefits, they are motivated to consume as much health care as they can.
In the primary care sector, physicians also have good reason to overtreat and patients
reinforce this because they appear to equate receiving prescriptions with quality of
service. The fragmentation of primary care means that patient records are often erratic
and treatments repeated unnecessarily.
There have been numerous attempts to control the soaring health care costs, including
the introduction of and subsequent increase in patients’ contributions, especially for
pharmaceuticals which have resulted in higher patient charges than in most OECD
countries. Cost containment measures have targeted the Assurance-maladie, rather than
considering health care expenditure as a whole. Some of these measures, such as the
increase in payroll contributions or the increase in co-payments, or the reduction in
services provided, have achieved their objective of improving the Assurance-maladie’s
finances in the short-run. On several occasions, the growth of expenditure related to
services covered by the  Assurance-maladie and overall health care has slowed
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and the implementation of the new measures and is more the result of psychological
influences on people’s behaviour than the measures’ effectiveness.
The cost containment measures have however had an effect over the long run with a
slow but certain deceleration in the growth rate of health care expenditure increases.
Between 1975 and 1995 the most frequently used cost containment measure was
increases in cost-sharing. Another aim of these increases was to increase the revenue of
the Assurance-maladie. This may be very effective in the short-term, but the reduction of
reimbursement rates which has been widely used for pharmaceuticals seems to have
been abandoned due to its unpopularity, its discretionary application and its minimal
long-term effectiveness. The resulting increase in prices to the consumer did not
contribute to reducing consumption, but on the contrary, led to the development of
complementary insurance ( mutuelles). The subsequent introduction of global budgets
has proved more effective in controlling the expenditure of the Assurance-maladie, but
has had no influence on the delivery of care or equity. This measure was maintained by
the Juppé Plan and is now accompanied by other measures aimed at improving the
quality of care.
1996 saw the commencement of the implementation of the Juppé Plan. Emergency
financial measures came into force and most of the administrative framework was set up.
In December 1996, the Loi de Financement de la Sécurité Sociale was passed and 1997
saw for the first time a cap on the growth of health expenses.
In June 1997 a new left-wing administration unseated the right-wing government. In spite
of this major political change there has been no significant change in health policy to
date. Even though the Juppé Plan contributed to the fall of the previous administration,
the newly elected government has continued to implement most of the measures based
on the existing legislation.
In 1998, the deficit of the Sécurité Sociale as a whole (health, family benefits, pensions)
again exceeded the target envisaged when Prime Minister Juppé presented his plan
(1996 forecast: FRF 17 billion deficit, actual: FRF 52 billion; 1997 forecast: FRF 12 billion
surplus, actual: FRF 47 billion deficit). The gap between forecast and actual deficit is due
mainly to a lack of revenue rather than to an increase in expenditure. To address this
issue, the Jospin government has decided to extend the period of the ‘exceptional’ 0.5
percent income tax from 13 to 18 years.
The second Loi de Financement de la Sécurité Sociale was more generous than the first.
The rate of increase allowed in 1998 was higher than in 1997, at 2.2 percent (as
opposed to 1.7 percent in 1997) for total reimbursed expenses. The breakdown by type
of care was 2.1 percent for ambulatory care (2 percent in 1997) and 2.2 percent for
hospital care (1.4 percent in 1997). The rates, which have legal force at national level,
are divided at regional level according to rules based on the age of the population for
ambulatory care. The allocation formula for the hospital sector, adjusts for discrepancies
in the cost of the provision of care in different regions.
A two-tier Convention between the doctors’ union and the sickness funds was signed in
March 1997. The agreement includes provisions applicable to GPs and specialists both
jointly and separately. The GPs’ Convention allows doctors to become médicin référent,
a kind of gatekeeper to the system. This is voluntary for both doctors and patients. Under
this system GPs must keep a detailed record for their patients and 10 percent of their
prescriptions must be for generic drugs. There are financial incentives to join the scheme
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then has to wait for reimbursement. Under the  médicin référent scheme the direct
payment is only 30 percent and if the patient has a complementary insurance (such as a
mutuelle or private insurance) it is possible that no charges are asked of the patient. By
the end of 1997, only 12.5 percent of GPs had joined the scheme as many are
concerned about the risk of increased control by sickness funds.
There has therefore been continuity in the French health care system under Juppé and
now Jospin. Similar economic constraints have driven the health policy decisions of both
governments which is one of the possible reasons why a popular measure such as
universal coverage based on residence, announced by Juppé, has not yet been
implemented. Measures to enhance public health can be expected but it is unlikely that
major changes regarding the financing and delivery of health services will be
recommended in the near future.
One further constraint on any major reforms is that the large majority of French people
are broadly satisfied with their health service. The system is good even if it is expensive
and none too efficient. There is rising disquiet over the cost and volume of treatment, but
this has not yet reached acute levels and is not widely shared. In contrast to other
countries like Germany, health care reform has not emerged as a major theme of
political controversy in France. In the eyes of the average French person, the present
system reconciles a number of important objectives of social solidarity and liberal-
pluralism, albeit at a high price which until so far has been bearable.Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 108Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 109
6. Conclusions
6.1 Common concerns in social insurance systems
No country seems to have it quite right. While none of the health care systems in the
countries in this report are on the verge of collapse, all face the same set of urgent
problems. These problems threaten to reduce the quality of care now being delivered or
drain the public coffers. In short, demand for health care is outpacing the ability to supply
it in all these industrialised nations.
The main factors which propel the growth in demand, appear to be the ageing
population, improvements in medical technology and real income growth. All of these are
in many ways very positive developments. Ageing occurs because the health care
system has been able to increase life-spans, and medical technology, while expensive,
save lives and often relieves pain and suffering and widens the range of potentially
beneficial treatments. Rising income is the result of gains in economic productivity which
is in turn often spent on health. These demands for better care are not adequately offset
by incentives for patients or providers to restrain excessive utilisation.
The problem therefore must lie in the way that health care is financed and delivered.
Almost everywhere there is dissatisfaction with existing methods of financing and
delivery and a search for new policy instruments. At the same time there is the
recognition that there is no quick fix solution to the challenges faced by the health care
system. The health care markets in this report are all dominated by insurance, whether
publicly or privately provided. This is necessary because illnesses are unpredictable and
the consequences of these illnesses may be financially catastrophic and the risks may
also be shared between the healthy and the unhealthy. However it is also well
established that patients and providers behave very differently when an insurer is paying
the bill. In some countries, the major insurer is the government, mainly to ensure the
equitable distribution of care. Thus the insurance problem becomes compounded by also
being a budgetary problem. The key to reorganising health care systems in most of
these countries requires finding an acceptable balance between the efficiency with which
care is financed and delivered and the equity or social solidarity of the system.
Health sectors in all OECD countries are noticeable for their high levels of government
intervention, involving different mixes of finance, direct ownership and regulation.
Throughout the 1980s the belief that a market-based competitive environment produces
the necessary incentive scheme for greater efficiency provided the rationale for
reformers to introduce market-based reforms in the health sector.
Unlike other sectors of the economy however, there is little empirical or theoretical
evidence to suggest that purely market solutions would result in greater efficiency within
the health care sector. There are many well-documented market failures that are
endemic to the health sector. Moreover, as far as empirical evidence is concerned, the
United States which has relied on market-based systems in health care to a far greater
extent than any other OECD country, has been conspicuous for its failure to contain
aggregate costs and has also experienced difficulties in achieving efficient solutions to
the provision and funding of health care services.
The political dominance of the argument for market-based systems in health care has
therefore been tempered since the late 1980s. However, policymakers might argue that
in fact excess capacity and perverse incentives, and not reliance on the market, are what
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solution to excess demand and the constraints on government financing, would be to
actually make the market work more effectively by increasing information and choice for
patients while placing insurers and providers in competition to provide optimal levels of
care at competitive prices. Each country is however different from all others and thus
competition is not the simple answer unless reform is carefully tailored to each country’s
particular social and political setting.
In order to encourage competition in a social-insurance based health care system,
insurance funds would have to be put on an equal footing in order to allow them to
assume a more commercial role as insurers, eventually leading to competition. However,
health insurance in a social insurance based system needs to be mandatory (at least for
part of the population), with a means for subsidising the health insurance premiums of
low-income households. Government plays a large role in setting institutional priorities
for subsidising the poor and the sick. Citizens should have access to basic health care
services irrespective of ability to pay. In other words, in an ideal scenario of social health
insurance, government collects income-related premiums and an independent central
fund divides the pool among private insurers in relation to the risks they bear. When
consumers shop around for insurance, insurers compete on the basis of providing the
best coverage at the lowest cost. This produces an essential source of efficiency in
competitive health care systems. Governments would need to set up a regulatory
framework within which these health care markets can work, define a guaranteed health
care package to which all citizens are entitled and assume responsibility for collecting
the income-related portion of all citizen’s health care payments such that the system is
equitable. The government also has a continuing role in assuring safety, quality and
fairness.
In a regulated market for health care insurance, premiums are based on average
expected costs of a group of individuals. Insurance companies have the incentive to pick
the good risks within that group or the healthier individuals in that group who will have
lower average health care costs. At the same time these individuals may choose to opt
out of such social insurance schemes altogether which would leave only the sick and
would tend to further disadvantage those left in the scheme as they are often also the
poor. Governments tend to address these adverse effects of regulated markets :
•  Obliging insurance companies to accept all individuals regardless of risk at a
common premium (which may be income-related), and
•  Obliging all individuals to take out insurance, even if the premium they contribute is
higher than their expected health care costs.
It is possible that mandatory insurance pools restrict the degree of competition for the
financing of health care, because insurers may be obliged to charge the same premiums
to all subscribers and accept all individuals. Similarly, if consumers are obliged to take
out insurance at a flat rate premium, irrespective of their risk, they may have limited
scope to express their preferences which curtails the ability of a market-response to
consumer demands to achieve economic efficiency. The problem is therefore to find a
reasonable balance between efficiency and social solidarity.
In the social insurance-based systems considered in this study, some competition exists
between funds where membership is open to all, while little or no competition exists
where membership is restricted. In Germany, everyone in the same fund pays the same
percentage of income, regardless of their individual risk. However, premiums across
funds vary so that some charge higher percentages of income than others. There is free
choice of sickness fund and members may change on a yearly basis. A different
approach which is broadly that followed in France and Switzerland, is to compensateSocial Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 111
individual funds for the risk profile they actually face so that members of all funds can be
charged the same premiums. In France the contribution rates are fixed so that they are
the same for all individuals within a fund but vary between funds. The sickness funds do
not typically compete since they are organised along occupational lines and membership
is therefore restricted. In Switzerland, compulsory health insurance contributions are
community-rated, so that all subscribers to a particular insurance company within a
canton or canton sub-region pay the same rate. Because the insurance companies have
to offer a standard benefits package and because managed care and quality competition
are not common, insurance companies compete on the level of the premium. Price
competition appears to work because many people change companies on an annual
basis depending on the premiums offered. In the Netherlands, insurers charge both an
income-related percentage contribution and a flat-rate contribution. The insurer is obliged
to quote the same flat rate premium to all insured people. Because the insurers’
revenues consist of risk-adjusted payments from the Central Sickness Fund,
supplemented by the flat rate premiums, the difference between actual costs and
revenue will be reflected in the flat rate premium which becomes the major source of
competition between insurers.
Often a compensation mechanism exists between funds (through transfers) to
encourage the development of decentralised, independent and commercially oriented
funds with opportunities for increased competition. Most social insurance-based systems
usually have some sort of risk-compensating mechanism in place between funds, albeit
that some are not very comprehensive. Premiums typically differ (sometimes
substantially) between funds. This reflects the differences in the risk structure of the
funds’ members, as well as the imperfect nature of the risk-adjustment. France relies on
a central risk adjustment mechanism to balance premiums across funds which in effect
means the larger funds compensate the smaller funds (with higher number of
beneficiaries per contributor). The Netherlands has experienced profound difficulties in
determining a risk-adjusted capitation formula with which to pay individual insurance
funds from the Central Fund. Currently age, sex, region and disability are used in the
formula but these predict only a small part of the variance in health care expenditure.
Germany has a (rather crude) compensation mechanism to equalise differences in
contribution rates and expenditure so that all sickness funds provide or receive
compensation for the differences in their contributory incomes and average
expenditures, while Switzerland has set up an organisation called Foundation 18 which
is responsible for the risk adjustment between registered insurance companies.
The existence of competing insurers does however tend to increase administrative costs.
These market oriented type reforms to increase efficiency, choice and responsiveness
increase transaction costs. They also make it difficult to achieve other objectives of
access and equity and equally increase the incentive for the insurer to compete on the
basis of the individual’s risk, thus increasing the potential for preferred risk selection or
‘cream-skimming’. The effective prevention of this ‘cream-skimming’ is essential for
reaping the benefits of competitive health insurance within a regulated premium
structure. There are therefore always trade-offs in any reform program.
It is important to recognise that reforms should proceed in a pragmatic fashion.
Successful policies are piecemeal. The puzzle is how to best regulate the healthcare
market to combine the anticipated benefits of competitive strategies with the need for
effective planning, co-ordination and equity considerations. Most policymakers have not
abandoned planning and regulation but rather sought to combine some market
incentives with a framework of rules to guide competition and the capacity to intervene to
tackle problems when they arise. The reforms in most cases therefore lead to managed
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Reforms have been attempted in all these countries and some important changes are
still taking place, for example in Germany and Switzerland. It is interesting to note which
of the Dutch reforms have been implemented and which have not. The initial plan to
introduce competition into the financing system has not been implemented completely,
largely because of resistance from political interest groups and because of the
complexity of the reforms. This illustrates the difficulty in implementing these changes
without risking high transaction costs.
There are often several impediments to rapid reform in any health care system.
Especially in countries where there is broad support for the existing health care system,
such as France, the reform process is harder. A move towards more competitive market
arrangements would require a change of culture for both providers and insurance funds.
Currently, the allocation of resources is decided by very powerful interest groups.
Change would require that in a sector which has been dominated by medical experts,
management decisions will need to be made regarding tougher economic and
commercial issues.
6.2 Health insurance in practice
In Germany and the Netherlands there is a long tradition of government regulation and
participation in the development of the systems, whilst in France and Switzerland the
degree of government control has historically been less. France accepted a complex set
of structures to ensure universal cover, a degree of equity and a large amount of choice
for patients. The main system does not cover the full cost of treatments, so
supplementary arrangements are available for most people to meet the remaining part.
Inclusion of other family members in addition to employed persons is common in most
social health insurance. This may involve an additional fee or may come without charge.
Such schemes that cover employed persons’ family members do well in terms of
coverage and universality but may have slightly higher contributions. The schemes in
this report all provide for non-working dependants as well as for the employed persons.
There is some variation in the ways in which contributions are paid to provide for retired
and unemployed persons. There are two kinds of methods that are used. In some cases
membership contributions are paid by government on behalf of those who are not
earning. This may be the most feasible method since it is difficult to cross-subsidise from
working people to non-workers. A second option is for membership to continue after
retirement (or loss of job) with working members paying to subsidise non-earners (who
pay nothing or reduced contributions). If the costs of services for non-workers are paid
directly by existing workers, then the percentage contributions have to be higher to pay
for this subsidy. However it has the advantage that the whole of the social health
insurance scheme can be kept separate from other government services.
The system in France is effectively universal although a small proportion of the
population slip through the social security net and fail to be covered. In the Netherlands
and Germany the systems allow richer people to opt out of the social health insurance
system and this potentially reduces solidarity. In practice, the level of opting out in
Germany is quite small. A possible reason for this is that the low transaction costs
associated with the main social health insurance system mean that the savings for richer
people opting for private insurance are small in many cases (as the premiums have to be
higher to cover transaction costs) and there is not much difference in terms of the quality
of services offered. The argument is that richer (and healthier) people can benefit from
opting out since the social health insurance schemes are actuarially unfair (they involve
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However if transaction costs are higher for private insurance, then it is likely that for
some people the premiums paid for their social health insurance will be lower. In the
Netherlands and Germany private ‘opt out’ schemes all offer risk-related instead of
community rated premiums, making it much more attractive for healthier and wealthier
people to opt out. However these are counter-balanced by disadvantages such as the
lack of ability to re-enter the social insurance scheme in Germany and the additional
premium payments for dependants of insurees.
In addition to ‘opt out’ options, some countries allow patients to supplement their social
health insurance with additional cover for added benefits. Again, these premiums are
usually risk-rated. Supplementary insurance in Germany which covers extra amenities in
hospital is a growing market for private health insurers, since sickness funds are not
allowed to offer such policies. In Switzerland the supplementary insurance is offered by
the same companies offering compulsory insurance and covers additional benefits such
as superior hospital accommodation and a free choice of hospital doctor. In the
Netherlands supplementary insurance is financed by risk-rated premiums which also
vary according to the level of deductible and the level of hospital accommodation
chosen. France’s level of voluntary, supplementary insurance is relatively high and
mostly covers patients’ co-payments. While these complementary insurance policies
may offer patients greater choice, they do allow for preferred risk selection and because
some proportions of the population will be unable to obtain these supplementary policies,
raise the issue of equity.
In France the social health insurance system involves more visible payments and a
significant contribution from patients or supplementary insurance. There may be some
advantages in an element of co-payment, since it can discourage excessive use of
services, although the evidence does not show that deterrent effects can work equally for
all services. Because supplementary insurance often covers co-payments, patients are
largely blunted to the effect that co-payments would otherwise have in reducing
utilisation. While co-payments are an important source of revenue in many countries,
they can also have the effect of reducing solidarity unless there is a system of
exemptions for those below a certain income level as in France.
Most countries have concerns over the growing costs of the system. In France there
have been efforts both to control costs and to pay off accumulated deficits in the social
insurance system, most of which are related to health expenditure. Since in each case
the main source of funding is the payroll, there is concern that this may make firms less
competitive. To some extent this argument is flawed. Competitiveness depends on a
number of factors, including the total cost of staff payments, productive efficiency and the
exchange rate of the currency. Since most EU countries now effectively have a single
currency it is not as easy to gain competitiveness through devaluation of the currency,
but nevertheless the link between health insurance costs and competitiveness is not
straightforward. It is interesting to note that in France the reforms of social security have
been specifically aimed at addressing the issue of the dependence on payroll income.
The new taxes and charges cover other sources of income and aim to raise revenue on
the basis of ability to pay. Germany has similar concerns, since rising health care
expenditure is not responsible for an increase in contributions, but the shrinking
proportion of GDP used for wages from which all social insurance contributions are
financed. Thus large profits by employers, increasing unemployment and wage
increases below productivity have caused a relative reduction in the financial flow to the
social insurance system since contributions are based only on labour. The dependence
on payroll contributions is therefore of increasing importance given the decline in the
number of permanent jobs in large organisations and new sources of finance will for the
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The levels of expenditure for health in each of these countries are a little above the EU
average when considered as a proportion of GDP. However, it is interesting that in the
Netherlands a significant reason for the high health care costs relative to GDP is the
relatively large private insurance sector. Rationing of access to care and the associated
signs such as long waiting times and more explicit controls on access to care are not
significant features in these countries. This does not mean that all services that
potentially produce health gain are provided, but that the extent of the need for rationing
is less than in some other countries.
In France, Switzerland and Germany, access to specialist care is available without
referral from primary care. The right to visit a specialist directly is valued highly in
France, but this does reduce the scope for gate-keeping to more expensive specialist
services. Ideas for controlling costs in France include the possibility of reducing this right
of direct access to the provider of choice. It is not clear that any such system of controls
could easily be put in place given the historical and cultural backgrounds of France and
Germany, although the gate-keeping principle is very much in vogue with Swiss
policymakers. A feature of social health insurance is the typical emphasis on choice of
provider. Restricting or ending this right is very controversial and increased choice is a
feature of attempts to modernise government funded health care systems. It is not clear
that it is choice  per se that is valued but rather the ability to take action to ensure
appropriate and good quality care. In practical terms, exercising choice is only possible
in some circumstances and the costs associated with extensive choice may be high
where alternative mechanisms for improving quality are available.
Efforts to put in place measures to control costs are likely to concentrate on using some
market mechanisms, direct caps on expenditure and other financing measures. There
are many possible mechanisms for cost control, including measures to restrict supply,
controls on access to care and better education and information. However, one of the
most effective ways to control total expenditure on health services is through constraints
on funding in a culture of adherence to budget constraints. In France this is partially
controlled through the restrictions on contribution rates. The trend in Germany is different
with more efforts to use competition amongst insurers to control cost. This is also the
trend in the Netherlands.
Controlling costs or prices has been the favoured strategy of French government. There
is general acknowledgement that the French public are hostile to general taxation and
measures which affect the degree of public financing of health care. They are strongly
attached to hypothecated taxes where payroll deductions are seen as contributions
rather than taxes per se and arouse less hostility. The independence of the social
security system as insulating health care spending from other financial pressures is seen
as paramount.
A growing concern in all publicly funded services is to ensure that funds are managed
properly and are put to the purposes for which they have been collected. The greater the
degree of decentralisation and devolution of power, the more important it is to have good
systems of accountability and audit. Comparing the social insurance systems offers
some useful insights. In Germany it is significant that traditions and understanding of
unwritten codes play an important part in the regulation of social health insurance. In
France there is no official state subsidy to the social health insurance system but the
funds have gone into deficit with growing pressure on expenditure and controls on
contributions. This has been possible in part because there is an element of guarantee
by government of the debts, but it does illustrate the need for good systems of
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An important element relating to this is what mechanisms are in place to deal with over
or under-spends of the social security system, which in part will be determined by the
legal and cultural background of the country. In Germany, sickness funds do not have
fixed budgets but have to cover all expenses which means that contribution rates have to
be adjusted if income is lower than expenditure. All budgets are on the providers’ side
rather than the payers’ side and any moves to shift this balance of power have been met
with fierce resistance. In Switzerland, an organisation called Foundation 18 is
responsible for meeting the financial obligations of insurance companies in financial
difficulty, while in France the sickness funds have to be self-supporting (they do not have
reserves to prevent deficits). Either insurance funds use such reserves when their
contributory income is less than their expenditure, or they need to adjust premiums.
Alternatively, funds may need to adjust the benefit package and ration care or adjust
provider payments, if they are not bailed out by a government which underwrites the
system. For the financial stability of the system, one or more of these mechanisms needs
to be in place and depending which is used, will have various effects on the system.
Limiting the benefit package may reduce equity and access to care while adjustments to
the premiums may have a similar effect. The number and size of the funds may also
impact on their financial stability.
Control of costs has therefore been an increasing feature of policy in countries with
social health insurance funding. Systems also appear to be in a perpetual state of reform
and change. This is also common in systems that rely mainly on tax funding. It is clear
that in all these countries there is a continuing search for the combination of universal
access, cost control, high quality of care and efficient provision of services.
6.3 Performance of health care systems
No reliable measure exists with which one could compare and evaluate different
countries’ health care systems. The following table lists some of the important measures
that are often used to examine the performance of health care systems. These include
health care expenditure, both per capita and as a percentage of GDP. This has risen
substantially in France. Systems where the patient pays a private provider and then
claims reimbursement (as in France) and where there is no overall contract between
insurers and providers, seem to be less successful in containing costs than contract
systems (like Germany) where there is an overall contract between sickness funds and
physicians’ associations on behalf of their members. Health care expenditure is
influenced by the macro-economic efficiency of the health care system. Micro-economic
efficiency can be evaluated by a measure such as physician visits per person per year.
This has been much higher in Germany and a possible explanation is that GP visits
attract no co-payments by the patient. This may also be due to historical and cultural
backgrounds and national preferences. The percentage of the population covered by
public schemes is a proxy for performance in terms of social solidarity. Most of the
countries score highly in this regard. The lower figures in Germany and the Netherlands
indicate the availability of voluntary opt-out schemes. The aggregate health status of the
population can be measured by potential years of life lost. Satisfaction with the health
care system indicates the results of a widely quoted survey and is sometimes used as a
proxy for the outcome of the health care system. There are however reservations about
the interpretation of these results as people in different countries are likely to have a
widely varying degree of awareness of the cost to them of the services they are getting.Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 116



























































France 7.6 8.9 1379 7.2 99 4434 8.9 41
Germany 8.4 8.1 1287 11.5 92 4039 6.4 41
Netherlands 8.0 8.1 1182 5.5 69 3499 9.7 47
Switzerland 7.3 7.8 1640 6.0 100 3718 7.1 n/a
United
Kingdom
5.6 6.1 909 5.7 100 4060 9.0 27
Note: n/a not available
Source: Hoffmeyer & McCarthy (1994)
6.4 What other countries might learn from these experiences
Many of the European countries like Germany and others in this paper have lessons to
offer as highly regulated, multiple payer financing systems. Ideas for health care reform
in other countries can draw on many of these ideas such as moves to managed care
organisations, methods of risk adjustment, evidence-based medicine and various ways
to encourage market mechanisms.
Some of the key messages from this paper are that there are no obvious quick fix
solutions to the challenges faced in these countries. Most aspects of the social insurance
system require careful balancing, as there are definite trade-offs to be made:
•  Increased access comes at a higher cost.
•  Increased diversity and choice produce higher transaction costs and may lead to
greater inequality.
•  Higher co-payments have the advantage of raising revenue and may be a valuable
tool in reducing excessive utilisation of some services, but they can reduce solidarity
if there are no exemptions in place.
•  Private ‘opt out’ schemes may be actuarially fairer for the richer population, but they
potentially reduce solidarity and equity.
•  Supplementary schemes can also produce inequality and if the complimentary
insurance is used to cover co-payments, may diminish the effectiveness of co-
payments in reducing utilisation.
•  More complex purchasing arrangements that allow for greater choice and
competition (as opposed to broader systems of contracting) produce higher
transaction costs.
•  Managed competition in health care financing could in theory be feasible if a suitable
comprehensive risk-adjustment mechanism were in place, but this has been shown
to be almost impossible to implement in practice.
•  And finally the legal, social and cultural backgrounds and traditions of the country will
temper any changes or reform programmes. These norms will affect the role of
government and the degree of intervention, the level and degree of bargaining power
that the institutional players have, the level of risk sharing between purchasers and
providers and the mechanisms to ensure the financial stability of the social insurance
system.Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 117
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8. Appendix A: Comparative data
8.1 Demographics
Table 20: Total Population, Thousands of Persons
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
France 56735 57055 57374 57654 57900 58143 58380 58608
Germany 63254 79984 80594 81179 81422 81661 81895 82061
Netherlands 14947 15070 15184 15290 15383 15459 15494 15277
Switzerland 6796 6800 6875 6938 7019 7041 7072 7087
United Kingdom 57561 57808 58006 58191 58395 58606 58801 59009
Source:  OECD (1999)
Table 21: Births, Crude Rate per 1000 Population
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
France 13.5 13.3 12.9 12.3 12.3 12.5 12.6
Germany 11.5 10.4 10.0 9.8 9.5 9.4 9.7
Netherlands 13.2 13.2 13.0 12.8 12.7 12.3 12.1
Switzerland 12.5 12.7 12.6 12.1 11.9 11.7 11.7
United Kingdom 13.9 13.8 13.5 13.1 12.9 12.5 13.0
Source:  OECD (1999)
Table 22: Total Unemployment as Percentage of Labour Force
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
France 9.3 9.1 10.1 12.5
Germany 6.2 5.6 6.7 8.1 8.6 8.3 9.1 10.1
Netherlands 8.9 8.5 6.6 8.2 6.8
Switzerland 0.5 1.9 3.1 4.3 5.2
United Kingdom 6.8 8.4 9.8 10.4 9.8
Source:  OECD (1999)
8.2 Economics
Table 23: GDPer Capita, US$ PPP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Germany 18351 17070 18454 18558 19747 20871 21194 22081
France 17358 18244 19003 18684 19279 20306 20523 21294
Netherlands 15926 16515 17422 17854 18836 20283 21073 22639
Switzerland 21223 22003 23055 23670 24251 25557 25160 26007
United Kingdom 15907 15512 16600 16881 17558 18136 19644 20430
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8.3 Health status
8.3.1 Life expectancy
Table 24: Life Expectancy, Females at Birth
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
France 80.9 81.1 81.4 81.4 81.8 81.9 82.0 82.3
Germany 79.0 78.7 79.1 79.2 79.5 79.8 79.9 80.3
Netherlands 80.1 80.2 80.3 80.0 80.3 80.4 80.4 80.6
Switzerland 80.9 80.9 81.2 81.4 81.6 81.7 81.9
United Kingdom 78.5 78.8 78.9 79.1 79.2 79.4 79.5
Source:  OECD (1999)
Table 25: Life Expectancy, Males at Birth
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
France 72.7 72.9 73.2 73.3 73.7 73.9 74.2 74.6
Germany 72.7 72.2 72.6 72.7 73.0 73.3 73.6 74.1
Netherlands 73.8 74.1 74.3 74 74.6 74.6 74.7 75.2
Switzerland 74.0 74.1 74.3 74.7 75.1 75.3 75.7
United Kingdom 72.9 73.2 73.4 73.7 73.9 74.1 74.3
Source:  OECD (1999)
8.3.2 Mortality
Table 26: All Causes, Deaths per 100 000 Population
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
France 649.97 640.12 626.44 625.55 601.51 599.77
Germany 766.77 789.89 759.43 759.63 738.56 724.63 712.32 687.48
Netherlands 714.88 707.54 695.01 722.68 690.47 690.15
Switzerland 673.54 652.28 635.88 624.00 607.20
United Kingdom 786.87 777.04 753.76 770.59 731.44 738.74 720.58 706.13
Source:  OECD (1999)
Table 27: Infant Mortality, Deaths per 1000 Live Births
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
France 7.3 7.3 6.8 6.5 5.9 4.9 4.8 4.8
Germany 7.0 6.9 6.2 5.8 5.6 5.3 5.0 4.8
Netherlands 7.1 6.5 6.3 6.3 5.7 5.5 5.7
Switzerland 6.8 6.2 6.4 5.6 5.1 5.0 4.7
United Kingdom 7.9 7.4 6.6 6.4 6.2 6.0 6.1 5.9
Source:  OECD (1999)Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 121
Table 28: Maternal Mortality, Deaths per 100 000 Live Births
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
France 10.4 11.9 12.9 9.3 11.7 9.5 12.0
Germany 7.3 8.7 6.7 5.5 5.2 5.4 6.4 6.0
Netherlands 7.6 6.0 7.1 8.2 6.1 7.4 13.2
Switzerland 6.0 1.2 4.6 6.0 3.6 8.5
United Kingdom 8.0 7.0 7.0 6.0 8.0 7.0 7.0 6.0
Source:  OECD (1999)
Table 29: Potential Years of Life Lost, All Causes, Under 70 Years per 100 000
Population
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
France 5142 5143 4987 4905 4742 4580
Germany 4790 5027 4775 4671 4537 4441 4316 4164
Netherlands 4178 4066 3976 4001 3802 3757
Switzerland 4644 4661 4480 4256 4179
United Kingdom 4709 4557 4306 4261 4109 4110 4053 3951
Source:  OECD (1999)
8.3.3 Morbidity
Table 30: Low Birthweight, Percentage of Total Live Births
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
France 5.3 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.9 5.8 5.8 6.2
Germany 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.8 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.2
Netherlands 4.9 4.9 4.9
Switzerland 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.2 5.5 5.7
United Kingdom 6.7 6.8 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.2 7.2 7.4
Source:  OECD (1999)
Table 31: Down’s Syndrome, Rate per 10 000 Births
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
France 13.4 13.5 10.1 10.3 9.6 7.0 10.4
Germany 7.9 7.4 7.2
Netherlands 11.2 13.1 13.1 11.3 10.4 16.7 18.0
Switzerland 13.0 8.4 12.2 14.9 12.5
United Kingdom 5.9 6.3 5.7 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.4
Source:  OECD (1999)Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 122
Table 32: Aids Incidence per Million Population
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
France 74.2 79.5 88.2 93.4 96.7 88.2 66.4 37.6
Germany 23.0 21.0 22.5 23.5 23.5 20.8 17.1 10.6
Netherlands 28.0 29.6 33.7 31.0 31.1 33.9 28.2 20.9
Switzerland 97.0 85.4 101.7 93.7 95.1 81.6 71.4 52.6
United Kingdom 22.0 24.0 27.2 30.7 31.7 29.9 24.1 18.7
Source:  OECD (1999)
Table 33: Road Traffic Accidents, Injured Per Million Population
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
France 3981 3610 3463 3286 3116 3120 3058 3024
Germany 7085 6320 6412 6228 6342 6281 6028 6110
Netherlands 3572 3230 3267 3193 3279 3383 3193 3143
Switzerland 4303 4109 4131 4036 4268 4170 3835
United Kingdom 6125 5558 5546 5446 5767 5658 5826 5934
Source:  OECD (1999)
8.4 Healthcare resources
Figure 1: Hospital Beds per 1000 Population, 1990 and Latest Available Year
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Table 34: Inpatient Care Beds per 1000 Population
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
France 9.7 9.6 9.4 9.2 9.0 8.9 8.7 8.5
Germany 10.4 10.1 9.9 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.6 9.4
Netherlands 11.5 11.4 11.4 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.5
Switzerland 20.8
United Kingdom 5.9 5.6 5.4 5.1 4.9 4.7 4.5
Source:  OECD (1999)
Table 35: Magnetic Resonance Imaging Units per Million Population
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
France 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5
Germany 1.9 2.0 2.6 3.6 4.1 4.8 5.7 6.2
Netherlands 0.9 1.3 1.8 2.5 3.9
Switzerland 3.8 7.5
United Kingdom 1.0 1.1 1.4 2.3 3.4
Source:  OECD (1999
Table 36: General Practitioners per 1000 Population
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
France 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5
Germany 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0
Netherlands 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
Switzerland 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
United Kingdom 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Source:  OECD (1999)
Table 37: Certified Registered and Practising Nurses per 1000 Population
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
France 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.9 5.9
Germany 8.9 8.7 9.0 9.5 9.5
Netherlands 9.0
Switzerland 13.8
United Kingdom 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.0 5.0 4.5
Source:  OECD (1999)Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 124
8.5 Healthcare utilisation
Figure 2: Physicians’ Contacts per Person in the WHO European Region, Latest
Available Year
Source:  WHO (1999b)
Table 38: Average Length of Stay Inpatient Care, Days
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
France 13 12 12 12 12 11 11 11
Germany 17 16 16 15 14 14 13
Netherlands 34 34 34 33 33 33 33 32
Switzerland 20 17 17 - 13
United Kingdom 16 14 12 10 10 10 10
Source:  OECD (1999)
Table 39: Average Length of Stay Acute Care, Days
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
France 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6
Germany 14 13 13 12 12 11 11 10
Netherlands 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 9
Switzerland 13 13 12 12 12 12 12
United Kingdom 6 5 5 5 5 5 5
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Source:  WHO (1999b)
8.6 Expenditure on health
Table 41: Total Expenditure on Health as Percentage of GDP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
France 8.9 9.1 9.4 9.8 9.7 9.8 9.8 9.6
Germany 8.7 9.4 9.9 9.9 10.0 10.4 10.8 10.7
Netherlands 8.3 8.6 8.8 9.0 8.8 8.8 8.7 8.5
Switzerland 8.3 8.9 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 10.1 10.0
United Kingdom 6.0 6.5 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.8
Source:  OECD (1999)
Table 42: Public Expenditure on Health Per Capita, US$ PPP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
France 1146 1234 1333 1365 1384 1474 1491 1520
Germany 1221 1250 1434 1424 1529 1701 1792 1822
Netherlands 964 1050 1189 1252 1282 1366 1310 1404
Switzerland 1204 1344 1498 1589 1653 1781 1783 1825
United Kingdom 804 842 973 987 1021 1057 1148 1177
Source:  OECD (1999)Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 126
Figure 3: Health Care Expenditure in US$ PPP Per Capita In the WHO European
Region, 1997
Source:  WHO (1999b)
FIGURE  4: PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL HEALTH
EXPENDITURE IN WHO EUROPEAN REGION, 1997
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8.7 Financing
Table 43: Private for Profit Insurance Payments, Million US$ PPP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
France 2148 2412 2757 2892 3066 3112 3288
Germany 7321 8263 9412 10026 10922 11837 12759
Netherlands 2542 3922
Switzerland 216 165 192 202 209 174 171
United Kingdom 1833 1986 2339 2392 2475 2577
Source:  OECD (1999)
Table 44: Out of Pocket Payments, Million US$ PPP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
France 13418 14058 13982 14606 14709
Germany 11278 13823 15806 16983 18303 19270
Netherlands
Switzerland 3479 3865 4851 5179
United Kingdom 1890 1944 2134 2106 2089 1964
Source:  OECD (1999)
Table 45: Territorial Government Financing, Million US$ PPP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
France 3532 3698 3967 4017 4173 4489 4562
Germany 10955 14444 16605 17275 17096 17778
Switzerland 2712 2640 2596 2744 2764
United Kingdom 43447 45921 54767 56248 58098 61688
Source:  OECD (1999)
8.8 Social protection
Table 46: Public Expenditure on Sickness Benefit, Per Capita, US$ PPP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
France 96 103 111 110 109 110
Germany 73 73 82 83 92 102
Netherlands 480 474 488 493 395 404 411
Switzerland 53 58 62 63 67 72
United Kingdom 59 35 43 42 34 35
Source:  OECD (1999)Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries 128
Table 47: Social Expenditure on Housing Benefits, Per Capita US$ PPP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
France 131 140 152 166 175 186
Germany 26 25 36 34 31 32
Netherlands 54 59 59 59 59 66 71
Switzerland 18 18 24 25 24 24
United Kingdom 209 197 269 305 329 341
Source:  OECD (1999)
Table 48: Social Expenditure on Unemployment, per Capita US $ PPP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
France 324 353 382 394 376 363
Germany 202 307 361 478 497 497
Netherlands 406 417 455 527 605 620 610
Switzerland 28 78 215 382 341 294
United Kingdom 107 163 217 207 185 164
Source:  OECD (1999)
Table 49: Disability Cash Benefits, Per Capita US$ PPP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
France 183 192 204 205 207 218
Germany 150 148 167 182 198 228
Netherlands 768 802 843 843 803 821 775
Switzerland 193 209 238 273 295 329
United Kingdom 264 308 387 451 481 486
Source:  OECD (1999)
Table 50: Cost Sharing Total Health Care, Billing Mean Co-Payment, Percentage
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
France 75 75 74 74 74 74 73 73
Germany 92 92 91 91 91 91 91 91
Netherlands 73 74 77 78 77 77 72 76
Switzerland 91 91 90 90 90 90 90 90
United Kingdom 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93
Source:  OECD (1999)